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ABSTRACT 
‘(…) to ensure equality for all children, this Regulation covers all decisions on 
parental responsibility, including measures for the protection of the child, 
independently of any link with matrimonial proceedings.' [Recital 5 of Brussels II bis] 
Brussels II bis (Council Regulation 2201/2003) complements the Hague Convention 
on Child Abduction, with its well-established set of international rules and the related 
definitions based on a considerable body of case law. The interrelation has given rise 
to difficulties of application and issues of interpretation despite the existence of a set 
of rules supposed to regulate the complementary structures. Besides this 
interrelation, the Regulation interacts with the Hague Convention on Child Protection.  
Though Brussels II bis has been analysed with regard to different single aspects, it 
has not yet been considered which consequences the actual provisions of the 
Regulation and the ECJ’s decisions have both on the interrelation and its application 
in the national courts.  It has further hitherto not been critically analysed whether the 
Regulation and the judgments of the ECJ take the right direction to meet the 
ambitious aim defined in the preamble and throughout the text, respecting the ‘best 
interests’ of the child.  
Now that a decade of Brussels II bis has passed and with a series of pioneer cases 
decided by the ECJ and with an intervention of the ECtHR in Convention and 
Regulation cases, the Regulation’s effectiveness is worthy of critical consideration.  
Despite the existence of some specific rules on the interrelation of the Regulation and 
the Conventions, their very co-existence gave rise to various interacting situations 
and questions of interpretation. For courts familiar with the rules of the Convention on 
Child Abduction and with at least their own respective national case law arising under 
it, the application of the added layer of rules of the Regulation and the interpretation 
of its different concepts was and still remains a challenge.  
A comparison of Brussels II bis with the two international instruments with regard to 
the role of ‘habitual residence’ and the suitability of the other central concepts of the 
provisions for the particularity of family disputes will demonstrate the differences of 
cases involving the Regulation and those involving the Conventions.  
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By governing jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and orders 
relating to parental responsibility, the Regulation has a very wide application 
covering, for example, custody, access, guardianship and even placement of children 
in foster or institutional care. Further, Brussels II bis takes up concepts which lie at 
the very heart of the application of the Convention on Child Abduction and about 
which there is extensive jurisprudence. 
This thesis will explore a selection of legal issues arising from the interrelation 
between these private international law instruments dealing with parental 
responsibility and child abduction which the national courts applying the Regulation 
are confronted with.  
The question whether Brussels II bis is an effective instrument which has 
strengthened the return mechanism under the Convention on Child Abduction and 
can work hand in hand with the Convention on Child Protection is also important to 
critically evaluate. It will be considered if the provisions in the Regulation have been 
drafted clearly enough and the concepts defined so well that they promote the 
interests of the children concerned, where the provisions are complementing the 
Convention on Child Abduction, and has learned from the latter’s flaws so as to 
enhance the recognition and enforcement processes related to child abduction.  
It will be concluded whether or not the Regulation is an advancement only in terms of 
having implemented efficient, intra-Community provisions on jurisdiction, recognition 
and enforcement or a real advancement supporting the ‘best interests’ of the 
child(ren), despite the complications of application it has introduced.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
A. General introduction and aims of the work 
I. The framework of cross-border family law – an area of constant change  
Traditionally, the harmonisation and unification of EC private international law 
only concerned commercial law and its related areas of civil law, not the law on 
parental responsibility, abduction or divorce.1 However, as the number of family 
disputes not restricted to the borders of one judicial area rose significantly 
during the last decade2, the European legislator decided to respond by 
introducing new legislation in the area of private international law regarding 
family matters, with the respective competences in the Amsterdam and Lisbon 
Treaties,3  in line with the Tampere Conclusions.4 Against such background, a 
court inside or outside the European Union seised in a cross-border family law 
case may have to make decisions on its competence and on the application of 
the correct provisions: first, it must decide whether or not the provisions of 
                                            
1 Hondius, E., ‘Towards a European Ius Commune: The Current Situation in Other Fields of 
Private Law’, pp. 118-139, in Boele-Woelki, K. (ed.), Perspectives for the Unification and 
Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, European Family Law Series, Antwerp 2003. 
2 MEMO/10/100 of the European Commission, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-10-100_en.htm?locale=en, last accessed 02 May 2016. 
3 Treaty of Lisbon, 1 December 2009; As the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force on 1 May 
1999) introduced institutional and material modifications, it further amended the status of private 
international law, extending competences considerably, as will be explored in detail in this 
thesis. Though, prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, some private international law rules were 
embedded either within directives, regulations or conventions, such as the Brussels Convention, 
the considerable shift occurred when competence in the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters was transferred from the third to the first pillar, thereby extending Community 
competences. The possibility to create new legislation regarding judicial cooperation in civil 
matters opened up the possibility to adopt legislation in the area of conflict of laws regarding 
family law and led to Brussels II, the precedent of Brussels II bis. With the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the EC Treaty was replaced by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). 
4 Tampere European Council: Presidency Conclusions’ (15–16 October 1999), available at 
www.europarl.eur opa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm., last accessed 02 May 2016.  
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Brussels II bis5 are applicable; and if so, it must decide whether or not it 
assumes jurisdiction or whether or not it should enforce or recognise a 
judgment or order pursuant to the rules of the Regulation. In the context of 
conflict of laws regarding wrongful removals and retention, the Regulation has, 
for many disputes, replaced the Hague Convention on Child Abduction6, which 
by the time the Regulation was implemented, already had a well-established set 
of international rules and the related definitions based on a considerable body 
of case law developed in the courts over a period of over two decades. 
Furthermore, the Regulation interrelates with the newer Hague Convention on 
Child Protection.7 Hence, despite the existence of some particular rules on the 
interrelation of the Regulation and the Conventions8, their very co-existence 
risked giving  rise to various conflicting situations and questions of 
interpretation. For courts familiar with the rules of the Convention on Child 
Abduction and with their own respective national case law arising under it, the 
application of the added layer of rules of the Regulation and the interpretation of 
its different central concepts was and still remains a challenge, as will be 
demonstrated. For although the Regulation within its own complex body of 
rules, does contain multiple references to the Conventions, as shall be seen in 
the thesis, there is limited clear guidance as to their mutual (in)compatibility, 
which, it is suggested here, created a real risk that the focus on the best 
interests of the child may all too easily get lost among the issues of procedure. 
Yet the very aim of the Regulation, as indicated in its own Preamble, is to 
                                            
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ 2003, L 338/1, in this thesis 
hereinafter also the “Regulation” and “Brussels II bis”. 
6 Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
hereinafter also the “Convention on Child Abduction”. 
7 Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children, hereinafter also the “Convention on Child Protection” or the “1996 
Convention”; the Convention on Child Protection and the Convention on Child Abduction are 
hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Conventions”. 
8 Brussels II bis explicitly refers to the Convention on Child Abduction in recitals 17 and 18, 
Article 11(1), (2), (3), (6), (8), Article 42(2)(c), Article 60(e) and to the Convention on Child 
Protection in Article 12(4) and 61, further to both Conventions in Article 59(1), 62(1) and (2). 
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promote and protect rather than undermine the child’s best interests.9   Hence, 
this inherent risk, it is argued here, can only have been worth taking if the rules 
in the Regulation can be shown to be a true advancement in terms of legal 
clarity and certainty, to promote the best interests of the child(ren) concerned, 
as is envisaged in the Preamble.10 However, the situation which has been 
created is not straightforward and whether or not this has been achieved is the 
fundamental question which this thesis aims to be address. However, on the 
surface at least, the additional layer of rules which has been created is not 
straightforward for courts, difficult to align with the long-established concepts 
and interpretations and may be procedurally complicated and unclear and thus 
detrimental to children’s best interests in some situations. 
For example, if in a case of child abduction, a court denies that the Regulation 
is applicable as for instance, the habitual residence is determined to be 
geographically outside the scope of the Regulation, procedures will have be 
based on the Convention on Child Abduction. Cases may turn out considerably 
longer and more complex in cases of interaction between the Regulation and 
the Convention on Child Abduction, the parties have to deal with two layers of 
rules in two international instruments in one case, potentially increasing the 
burden on the court, the legal costs and extending the procedural length. . 
Mutatis mutandis, if an order or decision was sought by the parties in a parental 
responsibility or abduction case under one of the Conventions, the court may 
decide that the respective Convention is not applicable and that the allocation of 
jurisdiction, or recognition or enforcement will be subject only to the Regulation, 
with similar issues of delays, procedural length and uncertainty for the parties 
concerned. Hence, the rationale for the method and the framework for analysis 
employed will be set out before setting out the approach of the following 
chapters which combined will provide critical insight into the fundamental 
                                            
9 Brussels II bis, Recital 12 “The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility 
established in the present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in 
particular on the criterion of proximity. This means that jurisdiction should lie in the first place 
with the Member State of the child's habitual residence, except for certain cases of a change in 
the child's residence or pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental 
responsibility.”. 
10 Ibid.  
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question of whether or not the Regulation represents an advancement in terms 
of enhancing the children’s interests as compared with the previous situation. 
II. Scope of analysis and methods 
In view of the issues raised above, and with the aim of assessing the influence 
of this situation on the best interests of children affected by these provisions, in 
terms of procedural fairness and legal clarity and certainty, this thesis will 
analyse the provisions on jurisdiction, enforcement and recognition in Brussels 
II bis and those in the Conventions on Child Abduction and Child Protection 
regarding jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement as to their functioning. In so 
doing, it will compare the structure of comparable rules under the Regulation 
and the Conventions and will consider the interrelation and complementary 
structures. A comparison of the Community instrument with the Convention on 
Child Abduction with regard to the role of the concept of ‘habitual residence’ and 
the suitability of the central concepts of the provisions for the particular nature of 
family disputes shall demonstrate the differences in approach of cases involving 
Brussels II bis and those just involving the Convention. In order to assess the 
successes and potential failings of the Regulation in its ambition to better 
promote the best interests of the child it was important to adopt appropriate 
criteria as a framework for the proposed analysis of the issues at the outset. 
With regard to the interrelation of the Convention on Child Abduction and the 
Regulation, the criteria identified for this purpose were selected in order to judge 
how far the Regulation was able to realise its potential to improve the existing 
situation under the Convention, despite the additional layer of rules. Both in the 
context of the Regulation’s rules applying on a stand-alone basis in the Member 
States and in the context of the interrelation with the Conventions, as developed 
more fully below, the clarity of legislative definitions of key concepts, greater 
certainty for parties, reduction of delay in proceedings and general procedural 
fairness, including the opportunity to be heard and an evaluation of the welfare 
risks for the children concerned, are seen as the main areas where analysis 
should be undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the Regulation in 
promoting the child’s best interests. Such analysis aims to further reveal the 
effects of the Regulation on cases involving children from or abducted to non-
Member States. The analysis of the differences of the central concepts (habitual 
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residence, provisional measures, return orders, grave risk, hearing the child) in 
the Conventions on the one hand and in the Regulation on the other hand aims 
to reveal the benefits and flaws of the individual rules. It shall further explore 
whether the rules are encouraging national courts to have sufficient regard to 
the best interests of the children concerned and how well the Regulation can be 
seen to promote the best interests of the children concerned as it suggests in 
the Preamble and throughout the Regulation. Through analysing the case-law 
of the Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the “ECJ”), the body of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) which deals with requests for 
preliminary rulings from national courts, certain actions for annulment and 
appeals, this thesis wishes to establish the effects of the interpretation of the 
provisions on intra-Community cases on the Regulation. For the Regulation, the 
ECJ is clearly the court with determining influence on the interpretation of the 
rules contained therein. However, there is no court with equivalent jurisdiction in 
the context of Conventions context, which is potentially problematic. Thus, to 
provide as good a comparison as possible, it has been decided to undertake an 
analysis of the case law under the Conventions in English and U.S. courts at, 
mostly, federal court and superior appeal court level. It is submitted that such 
decisions will best reveal the accepted interpretation of the central concepts, 
such as ‘habitual residence’, under the Conventions and permit a comparison 
with interpretation of the same concept under the Regulation. The proposed 
analysis of the Conventions case law will concentrate on the case law of 
English and U.S. courts since traditionally, those courts have interpreted the 
Convention on Child Abduction in a frequent, detailed and diligent way and 
decisions have been considered leading by experts in the field. Because of the 
common law approach to case law and the meticulous interpretation of statutory 
and hence similarly Convention or Regulation rules, the thesis will concentrate 
on such case law considering it the best that is available.  
In the context of the Regulation, case law of superior courts of other 
jurisdictions applying and interpreting the Regulation will only be referred to 
where relevant and will mainly comprise cases which have influenced or led to 
decisions of the ECJ. 
Thus, the English and U.S. case law shall be the cornerstone of the analysis, 
both with respect to the Conventions and the Regulation. Decisions in the civil 
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law jurisdictions of Germany and France are only discussed when leading 
interpretations on the central concepts and terms were provided in those cases 
and when the cases were considered “leading” cases in such jurisdictions and 
had an influence on the interpretation of the central concepts by other courts.11 
An assessment of definitions provided by the case law and by official reports 
shall consider the suitability of the provisions of Brussels II bis for safeguarding 
best interest in cases under the Regulation. This is of particular relevance given 
that their efficiency in protecting the interests of children was stated to be a 
‘major concern to the European Union’.12 Further, the particular difficulties in 
cases which are be under the umbrella of both the Regulation and one of the 
Conventions will be discussed. It is suggested that the effectiveness of the rules 
of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in an area concerning the interests 
of a child or several children subsequent to the divorce or separation of their 
parents must be judged differently than for rules regarding commercial disputes 
and that the EU’s intention to promote intra-Community mobility is a double-
edged sword. The provisions directly affecting children should work thoroughly 
in the interests of those children in the first place. The Convention on Child 
Protection lays emphasis on protective measures, but has only recently been 
ratified. The effect of this on the interrelation with the Regulation will also be 
discussed. 
An assessment of case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to 
issues regarding the Convention on Child Abduction and the Regulation and the 
Court as a potential ”instance of review” of Convention cases and even 
Regulation cases shall further be critically assessed. The question whether the 
new rules of the Regulation and the interpretations provided by the related case 
law are promoting a procedural certainty for recognition and enforcement in the 
best interests of the individual child(ren) is closely related to the question of 
whether the guidance of the ECJ for the interpretation of the concepts in 
                                            
11 For instance, in Germany, cases of importance are identified as such by the courts; cases 
decided in German higher regional courts and decisions by the French Supreme court.  
12 Communication from the Commission - Towards an EU strategy on the rights of the child, 
COM/2006/0367 final; Informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, 1-2/10/2007. 
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Brussels II bis have been respected by the national courts. Mutual trust and 
judicial cooperation13 have become of dominant significance for the functioning 
of the enforcement and recognition in context of the application of the 
Regulation in the national courts and in the interaction of the Regulation and the 
Conventions.  
To establish whether its provisions are in the best interests of the child it is 
significant to consider that the provisions in Brussels II bis have quite regularly 
during the last few years14 been a subject of ECJ case law, whilst the English 
courts and US courts have established a considerable body of case law 
regarding the main concepts under the Convention on Child Abduction during 
the last decades.15  
As judges are confronted with most difficult decisions of applicability and 
precedence of particular Regulation rules over Convention rules, as well as 
complementary provisions, it is submitted that it is vital to analyse whether the 
Regulation’s system in regard to abduction cases is more effective than the 
Convention on Child Abduction’s system in attaining its objective of protecting 
the respective child’s interests. In all of the above mentioned decision-making 
processes and the interpretation of the terms and rules of the Regulation and 
the Conventions, the concept of ‘habitual residence’ is of central importance 
                                            
13 Judicial cooperation is a common term in the context of the Convention on Child Abduction 
and the Regulation and in the context of the EU, it refers to cooperation between the Member 
States, more concrete, between the authorities involved in the application of the Regulation, 
more details at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/judicial-cooperation/index_en.htm, last accessed 
02 May 2016; in the context of the Hague Convention on Abduction, the significance of 
cooperation has been recognised in the Explanatory Report, and in the Judicial 
Communications (available at <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=21), last 
accessed 02 May 2016; Prel. Doc. No 6 of August 2002 - Practical Mechanisms for Facilitating 
Direct International Judicial Communications in the context of the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention (Preliminary Report + Annexes) and has constantly been a matter of discussion for 
the Permanent Bureau: “Emerging Guidance regarding the development of the International 
Hague Network of Judges and a set of General Principles for Judicial Communications within 
the context of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction”, available at <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=21>, last 
accessed 02 May 2016. 
14 since 2006, the European Court of Justice decided 20 cases, and in every year more cases 
were decided than in the previous year, see < http://curia.europa.eu/juris>. 
15 For statistics see the national Statistics of Convention cases, 
https://www.hcch.net/de/instruments/conventions/publications1/?dtid=32&cid=24, last accessed 
01 May 2016. 
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and plays a major part in the analysis in the following chapters, not only as a 
subject itself in Chapter 2 A I 1 but also in the context of the relation of and 
interaction (Chapter 3) and as a terminus as such. Though the concept of 
habitual residence has often been criticised for its ‘flexibility’16 in comparison to 
the ‘continuity’ of the concept of domicile, the former concept has gained a 
leading role for the Regulation and it will be seen whether the ECJ has already 
given considerably reliable guidelines on how to determine it.17 The following 
chapters will demonstrate that habitual residence has been a cornerstone of the 
case-law on the Convention on Child Abduction during the last decades.  
The second central subject of analysis will be the practicability of the rule that 
the Convention on Child Abduction ‘continue[s] to apply as complemented by 
the provisions of this Regulation’18 and the provisions on recognition, 
enforcement and return orders will be assessed in the context of Chapters 3 A 
and 4. It shall be considered whether, in view of the ‘best interests of the child’, 
the complementary provisions of Brussels II bis have already promoted and are 
capable of efficiently promoting legal certainty and procedural fairness. An 
assessment of recent case law as mentioned above will determine whether the 
ECJ’s interpretations of the main concepts respects the interests of those 
children whose interest is at stake and whether the respective provisions are 
built solidly enough to promote the harmonised approach throughout the 
European Union. 
By bringing up, for instance, a new interpretation of the concept of habitual 
residence for the EU Member States, which the Regulation requires to be 
                                            
16 McEleavy, P., in Malatesta, A., Bariatti, S., Pocar, F. (eds.), The External Dimension of EC 
Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, The Hague 2008, p.291; Shuz, R., 
The Hague Child Abduction Convention, Oxford 2013, p.220, both considering flexibility a factor 
of uncertainty.  
17 Case C-523/07, Proceedings brought by A, [2009] WLR (D) 129. 
18 Recital 17 of the Regulation. 
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autonomously interpreted19, despite the long-established case law in cases 
involving contracting states but also for cases involving non-contracting states 
under the Convention on Child Abduction,20 the EU Commission may now be 
promoting uncertainty. Despite the existence of ECJ rulings which provide 
guidance as to the determination of habitual residence in the context of 
Brussels II bis, the habitual residence still needs to be determined by the court 
in each case on the basis of certain factual elements, at its discretion. 
The Regulation introduces the concept of hearing the child. The link between 
the child’s right to participate in the proceedings and the ‘best interest’ approach 
is obvious.21 However, it will be considered if this concept has proven 
successful in the context of the Regulation. The matter of hearing the child is a 
repeated and dominating concept in the Regulation, in particular pursuant to 
Articles 11, 23, 41 and 42 of the Regulation and paras 19 and 20 of the 
Preamble. Additionally, Article 11.2 of Brussels II bis states: 
                                            
19 It is ‘new’ since under EU law, a Regulation must be interpreted autonomously, hence by 
bringing up the Regulation and by building the provisions around the concept of habitual 
residence, the Commission brought up a new ‘version’ of habitual residence. As stated in the 
previous sentence the use of habitual residence in the Regulation has been interpreted by the 
ECJ. Nonetheless, this interpretation by the ECJ is a guideline rather than a fixed definition and 
provides the national courts with some discretion; Case C-195/08 PPU, Inga Rinau, [2008] ECR 
I-5271. 
20 See the Australian case of State Central Authority v Ayob, [1997] FLC 92-746; 21 Fam LR 
567 where the mother had left the United States and returned to Malaysia (a non-contracting 
State) with the child and then proceeded to Australia. On the American father's application to 
the Australian Central Authority an order for the return of the child to the U.S was issued; for a 
definition of habitual residence: United States District Court for Colorado Application of 
Robinson, 983 F.Supp. 1339 (D.Co. 1997) stating that ‘settled’ requires substantial evidence of 
the child's connections to the new state of residence, not only the passage of time, this 
interpretation has been shared by the ECJ in Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17; see 
David S v Zamira S, 574 N.Y.S. 2nd 429 (1991) and Re N (Minors)(Abduction), [1991] 1 FLR 
413, [1991] Fam Law 367 on the requirements for being ‘settled’ as the requirement for habitual 
residence; for a regularly cited and widely accepted definition: in England: Re Bates, CA 
122/89. 1, 10, High Court of Justice, United Kingdom (1989); in the U.S.: Friedrich v Friedrich, 
983 F.2d 1396 at para 1401 (6th Cir. 1993); for criticism: Rogerson, P., ‘Habitual residence: the 
new domicile?’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 86, 100-101. 
21 Recital 19 of the Regulation reinforces the importance of hearing the child in the context of the 
application of the Regulation, and whilst the instrument ‘is not intended to modify national 
procedures', the necessity of hearing the child (under national rules) is made clear; in the 
Chapter analysing Art.11(2) and the obligation to ensure that the child is given the opportunity to 
be heard when applying Articles 12 and 13 of the Hague Convention, the debate whether such 
obligation to hear the child is an advantageous tool will be discussed; for a general overview: 
McEleavy, P., ‘The Impact and Application of the Brussels II bis Regulation in the United 
Kingdom', in Boele-Woelki, K. and González Beilfuss, C. (eds), Brussels II bis: Its Impact and 
Application in the Member States (Intersentia, 2007), pp 316–317. 
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“When applying Arts 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be 
ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the 
proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age 
or degree of maturity.” 
With regard to the interrelation of the Regulation on Child Abduction and the 
Regulation, the case of Rinau22 was a first, but by no means the last, example 
that the Convention on Child Abduction can no longer be dissociated from the 
Regulation.23 As will be demonstrated by an analysis of various cases in the 
course of this thesis, not only the ECJ but also the English courts recognised 
the difficulties accompanying the interrelation of the Regulation and the 
Convention. There is interrelation and, in some situations, even competition, as 
will be delignated in Chapters 3 A and 4. Despite their very similar objective, 
Brussels II bis and the Conventions differ with regard to the structure of their 
rules and assessing those rules and the respective case law will hence not only 
underline distinctions but also highlight the successful and less valuable 
approaches with regard to the protection of the best interests of children. When 
considering that Brussels II bis refers to the Hague Conventions on Child 
Abduction and Child Protection in Articles 11, 42, 60 and Articles 12 and 61 
respectively and the Regulation “aims to remedy the shortcomings of the Hague 
Convention”24, it must be considered if the Convention on Child Abduction really 
had such shortcomings25 before the Regulation was introduced.  
Interaction of the instruments in disputes involving non-Member States may 
cause uncertainty and is complex in its application which may be a real 
disadvantage. On the other hand, a harmonisation of the case law in cases of 
parental responsibility and child abduction at intra-Community level may have 
                                            
22 Rinau, supra note 19 para.12. 
23 In Rinau, ibid, the ECJ gave its first judgment on the interpretation of the Regulation as far as 
its relationship with the Convention on Child Abduction is concerned. 
24 Commission Working Document, Mutual Recognition of Decisions on Parental Responsibility, 
March 27, 2001, COM (2001) 166 final. 
25 McEleavy, P., ‘The New Child Abduction Regime in the European Union: Symbiotic 
Relationship or Forced Partnership?’ (2005) 1 Int J Priv Law, 5-34. 
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actively promoted and benefited a fairer process, for children resident in 
Member States.  
A harmonization of the rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in the 
field of conflict of laws regarding family law promises to support the further 
realisation of free movement. Though Brussels II bis has been analysed with 
regard to different aspects26 it has not been considered   whether the provisions 
in the Regulation have been drafted clearly enough and the concepts defined 
clearly enough so that they promote the (best) interests of the children 
concerned, even where the provisions are only complementing the Convention 
on Child Abduction. This will reveal if the co-existence has further developed 
the concepts of the Convention on Child Abduction and can diminish inherent 
flaws so as to enhance the processes of a fair return order and non-return order 
procedure without interfering with possible hitherto well-functioning concepts of 
the Conventions. 
With regard to jurisdiction, an analysis of the case law on the Conventions, in 
the Supreme Court and in the Courts of Appeal in England and in the Federal 
Courts of the United States, the courts in which a considerable number of cases 
on the Convention on Child Abduction have been decided during the last years, 
will be undertaken. Additionally selected case-law in civil law jurisdictions will 
demonstrate the distinctions between the allocation of jurisdiction in the context 
of the Regulation and Convention. It will be considered whether the approach of 
Brussels II bis is so insular that it may not only be regarded as potentially 
harmful to international cooperation and in conflict with the internationalist 
                                            
26 For instance: McEleavy, P., ‘Private international law: Brussels II bis: matrimonial matters, 
parental responsibility, child abduction and mutual recognition’ (2004) ICLQ, 53(2), 503-512; 
McEleavy, P., ‘The Brussels II Regulation: How the European Community has moved into 
Family law’ (2002) ICLQ 883-908; McEleavy, P., supra note 25 JPIL (30), 5-34; Rauscher, T., 
‘Parental Responsibility Cases under the new Council Regulation “Brussels IIA’’ ’ (2005) Eur L F 
1, 37-46. 
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approach27 of private international law but also a danger to an effective, fair 
allocation of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in the ‘best interest of 
the child’.  
Whilst it may have been true that the Brussels II Regulation must have been 
read in conjunction with the Brussels I Regulation28 it remains to be assessed 
whether this is equally true for Brussels II bis and what consequences this 
interpretation has and has had for the case law. Does it create controversy that 
- as the Borras Report29, the Explanatory Report on Brussels II stated - identical 
terms in the Brussels II and Brussels I Regulation must be given the same 
meaning and have courts in their interpretation of the Brussels II concepts 
referred to the case law on Brussels I instead of referring to well established 
case-law regarding the Convention?  
Even the European legislator seems to have now recognised the need to 
address the difficulties caused by the instruments’ interrelation.30  
With respect to enforcement, the question whether Brussels II bis has 
strengthened the Convention on Child Abduction in cases of enforcement is 
worth critical consideration since the national courts’ practice on allowing a child 
to be taken abroad permanently and the enforcement of return orders differed 
                                            
27 Re E [1999] 2 FLR 642; Re J [2004] EWCA Civ. 417, [2004] 2 FLR 85; the Hague 
Conventions are the result of the states’ awareness for international cooperation and the view 
that international treaties are a better instrument to achieve certain objectives than national 
rules; the Regulation replaces those rules for the Member States and creates a new system 
applicable to situations in Member States and in some situations even beyond the borders of 
the EU. 
28 Stone, P., ‘The developing EC private international law on family matters’, (2001) 4 CYELS 
373, in Dashwood, A., Hillion, C., Spencer, J., Ward, A., The Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies: 2001, Oxford, 2002; Caracciolo di Torella, E., Masselot, A., ‘Under construction: 
EU Family Law’, EL Rev. 2004, 29(1), 32-51, 44. 
29 Borras Report, Explanatory Report on the Convention, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of 
the Treaty on European Union, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters (approved by the Council on 28 May 1998) prepared by Prof. 
Alegria Borras (1998) OJ C 221/27. 
30Practice Guide for the application of the new Brussels II Regulation (EU Commission, October 
2005) at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/guide_new_brussels_ii_en.pdf, last 
accessed 02 May 2016. 
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noticeably during the last decades.31 Based on a different interpretation and 
application of habitual residence and on a different procedural approach to 
recognition and enforcement, some countries have a history of reluctance to 
return an abducted child, whilst others have an advanced way of handling it and 
respecting the Convention on Child Abduction.32 This thesis will analyse, from a 
perspective not taken before, whether the flaws of the concepts of enforcement 
and recognition under the Convention on Child Abduction have been addressed 
in the Regulation so as to inhibit delays and unfair results caused by non-
enforcement of orders. After the Hague Convention on Child Abduction had 
been dealing with the issue of enforcement for over thirty years, Brussels II 
introduced an additional basis for return orders. It is hence worth critically 
considering the case-law of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) with regard to return orders made under the Convention on Child 
Abduction and under Brussels II bis. Conflicts with the Regulation and future co-
existence shall be discussed with regard to the Convention on Child Protection. 
In the context of the provisions on applicable law the thesis will discuss the 
provisions in the Regulation referring to the Conventions, hence the rules on 
applicability of the Conventions for the determination of the applicable law. 
Hence, it will be analysed whether the proper functioning of the Regulation is 
impaired as it regulates jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement yet not the 
applicable law. Therefore, in the context of establishing the interrelations and 
interactions created by the co-existence of the European beside the 
international instruments a further question an answer will have to found for is 
whether legal uncertainty is caused by the fact that applicable law is not dealt 
with by the Regulation.  
In furtherance to the discussion of the existing framework, the thesis will discuss 
the need for possible amendments of Brussels II bis, and will discuss whether a 
review of the jurisdictional or recognition and enforcement concepts will be 
                                            
31 Schulz, A., ‘The enforcement of child return orders in Europe: where do we go from here?’, 
(2012) IFL 43, 46-47. 
32 As laid down in Re T (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2008] EWHC 809 (Fam), [2008] 2 FLR 
1794. 
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required. It will finally conclude from its analysis whether the promotion of intra-
Community mobility has been gained at the expense of supporting the best 
interests of the children concerned or if the Regulation supports an efficient 
allocation of jurisdiction but establishes a enforcement and recognition process 
at the detriment of the child(ren) concerned in the because of its interrelation 
with the Convention on Child Abduction. In this context it will also critically 
assess the European Parliament’s call on the Commission to submit a proposal 
for the amendment of Brussels II bis and the reactions to this request.33 It must 
be considered a primary concern to determine whether the Regulation promotes 
the search for the best forum or the most favourable law rather than protecting 
the interests of children by fairly allocating the competent court and enabling 
swift return in the situation of divorce and separation or even abduction.  
III. Approach to the task 
Chapter 1: The second part of this Chapter considers the legislative process 
regarding the Regulation during the last years, from the Treaty of Amsterdam to 
the extension of Union competence and the development from Brussels II to 
Brussels II bis. It refers to the Regulation’s relation with the Hague Conventions 
in view of the aims of the Hague Conference, as well as the development of the 
cornerstone concepts in U.S., UK and continental case law. Further, it portrays 
the integration into conflicts of laws in UK family law and the position of 
Brussels II bis in the framework of international family law. In Chapter I D, the 
meaning of the term 'best interest(s)' in the context of the Convention on Child 
Abduction, the Convention on Child Protection and the Brussels II bis 
Regulation, hence in the context of custody, parental responsibility and 
abduction cases, is analysed.  
Chapter 2 analyses the provisions in the Regulation, first on jurisdiction, in view 
of the main concepts established by the ECJ during almost one decade with an 
                                            
33 Report announced to be published on http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_ 
freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l33194_en.htm., last accessed 02 May 
2016.  
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emphasis on the connecting factor 'habitual residence' and the suitability of 
those central concepts of the provisions for parental responsibility and custody 
cases. Such analysis reveals the benefits and shortcomings of the individual 
rules and reveals whether the rules encourage national courts to have regard to 
the ‘best interests’ of the child concerned as is suggested in the Preamble and 
throughout the Regulation. It examines consistency with general legal doctrines 
developed under the Convention on Child Abduction as incorporated in the 
Regulation or taken up by the ECJ and national courts. It critically analyses 
whether by bringing up a ‘new’ approach to the interpretation of  habitual 
residence the Regulation is really promoting legal certainty. It will be determined 
if the guidance provided by the numerous ECJ decisions strengthens the 
Regulation by introducing continuity and certainty of definitions or whether the 
Regulation weakens the functioning of the Convention and inhibits its 
application. 
Chapter 2 also addresses the particularities of jurisdiction under Brussels II bis 
in child abduction cases. In the second part of the Chapter, the Regulation's and 
the ECJ's concepts regarding provisional measures in the context of Brussels II 
bis are examined and with regard to complex situations where children are 
resident in third states and/or where it is difficult to determine the place of 
habitual residence of the child.  
The second part, Chapter 2 B, also assesses the ECJ case-law in the context of 
return orders, and the rules on divorce in view of their impact on parental 
responsibility cases and discusses an extension of application of the Regulation 
to cases involving non-Member States and the interrelation in cases involving 
Member States and Contracting States, prorogation and derogation, in the 
context in which the ‘best interests’ are relevant, or even referred to explicitly. 
Chapter 3 compares Brussels II bis with the two Hague instruments, the rules 
directly addressing the interrelation and beyond this scope, the rules which are 
relevant for the interrelation. It demonstrates that the Conventions can no longer 
be dissociated from the interpretation of the Regulation and examines the 
consequences the ECJ’s decisions have on the interrelation with and proper 
functioning of the Conventions, thereby showing whether the legislative efforts 
of the EU and the judgments of the ECJ take the right direction to meet the 
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ambitious aim of respecting the best interests of the child. Such aim of 
respecting the ‘best interests’ of the child is explicitly incorporated in the rules of 
the Regulation but only indirectly in the Convention on Child Abduction. 
Hundreds of cases have been decided on the Convention on Child Abduction 
during the last decades and, as explained, the analysis of the case law will be 
restricted to English and US courts, the courts in which a considerable number 
of leading cases on the Convention on Child Abduction have been decided 
during the last years and to some leading decisions in continental courts. The 
chapter addresses difficulties in the Convention on Child Abduction which the 
Regulation tries to overcome, in the interest of fast and fair proceedings.  
The chapter assesses the structure of jurisdiction, enforcement and recognition 
under the Convention on Child Abduction and establishes the effects of the 
rules for children in Member States and non-Member States, Contracting 
States, in the interrelation with the Regulation. The chapter further assesses the 
concept of hearing the child in the Regulation and the Conventions. Besides this 
interaction, the impact on cases which are initiated in non-Member States but 
‘drawn’ into the ambit of the Regulation shall be analysed. Whilst the ECJ's 
judgment in Sundelind Lopez34 has approached the issue of whether Brussels II 
bis applied to divorce proceedings where the respondent was a third country 
national, resident and domiciled outside the EU, this will have to be analysed in 
the context of child abduction cases. Furthermore, with regard to parental 
responsibility, the territorial scope in parental responsibility disputes involving a 
child habitually resident in a third country will be assessed. 
Chapter 3 finally assesses the interrelation with the Convention on Child 
Protection.   
Chapter 4 critically discusses the concepts of enforcement and recognition in 
the Regulation in interrelation with the Convention on Child Abduction. The 
provisions are analysed both as interpreted by the ECJ and in official reports 
and as applied in the national case law so as to review their procedural 
                                            
34 Case C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez, [2008] 1 FLR 582. 
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suitability and the protection of the individual child’s best interest in cases under 
Regulation and the Convention. It hence assesses the complementary or 
prevailing nature of the respective provisions in the Regulation. Further, the 
chapter analyses the ECtHR's suggestion that it has the function of a reviewing 
court and considers the involvement of the ECtHR in the interpretation of 
Brussels II bis and the Convention on Child Abduction, and considers how 
return orders were particularly prone to involvement by the ECtHR and how the 
influence of the ECtHR has an impact on national case-law and the 
interpretation of the Regulation. It delineates the lack of mutual trust of the 
national courts in the cases underlying the ECJ case law and its significant 
impact on a proper functioning of the Regulation in the 'best interests' context. It 
further analyses the power of the Regulation and its mechanism of overriding 
the Convention in the interaction of Articles 11 of the Regulation and 13 of the 
Convention of Child Abduction.  
In the first part of Chapter 5 with regard to the provisions on applicable law it is 
examined how the provisions on applicable law in the Convention on Child 
Abduction and in the Convention on Child Protection work for the Regulation 
and how the fact that the Regulation does not contain any rules on the 
determination of the applicable law influences the interrelation. Hence, Chapter 
5 deals with a further issue of interrelation in addition to what is discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
As the Convention on Child Protection also contains rules on applicable law, it 
is determined how this third instrument adds to the interrelation. It is assessed 
how choosing the "right" applicable law is influential on protecting the 'best 
interest(s)'.  
Chapter 5 further addresses areas of concern with regard to which structural 
amendments to the Regulation are necessary, as specific possibilities for 
improvement will then have  become clear from the preceding analyses. It 
reveals the cornerstones of concern with regard to the Regulation. In this 
context the Public Consultation of the EC Commission and the results of the 
Study undertaken by Beaumont, Walker and Holliday as a research project 
founded by the Nuffield Foundation are analysed.  
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In Chapter 6, based on the considerations in the previous chapters, it will have 
become clearer if Brussels II bis has strengthened a fair allocation of jurisdiction 
and if its recognition and enforcement provisions have promoted proceedings in 
the best interests of the children concerned and has brought about a true 
advancement. Chapter 6 will answer the research question.  It draws a 
conclusion if the Regulation, to the extent it complements and replaces the 
Convention on Child Abduction, has abolished existing difficulties. It will have 
been established if there are well-functioning jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement processes but the interrelation creates difficulties to the detriment 
of the interests of the child(ren) concerned. Or if there is, in general, an 
improvement. It will be suggested which concepts have proven successful and 
which amendments are required to prevent a run for the best forum or the most 
favourable court to order provisional measures or to prevent the enforcement of 
(return) orders. It is finally suggested if an  improved compatibility of the 
Conventions and the Regulation or a completely distinct structure of the rules of 
the Regulation with no intervention in the respective other system’s rules would 
be helpful to warrant an efficient procedure and swift proceedings with legal 
certainty. 
B. Brussels II bis – the background 
Analysing Brussels II bis with regard to its alleged objective of safeguarding the 
best interests of the child(ren) concerned requires a consideration of the 
background of the Regulation and of the concepts adopted from other 
Regulations. Considering that Brussels II bis refers to the Hague Convention on 
Child Abduction and the Convention on Child Protection in Articles 11, 42, 60 
and Articles 12 and 61 respectively it seems reasonable to establish how and 
why the Regulation and the revised version were introduced. Where persons 
and families move within the EU35, establishing jurisdiction rules in the field of 
                                            
35 There is a close link between the movement of persons and cross-border divorce and 
parental responsibility disputes that it is reflected in the Statistics referred to herein. Most 
importantly the ECJ departed from the workers concept by holding that, if EU citizens were not 
allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member State, this would constitute a hindrance 
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family law may support the further realization of free movement and contribute 
to the diminution not only of trade but also of legal borders.36  
The development of EU competences, starting from the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1997 and culminating with the Treaty of Lisbon ten years later has allowed the 
Union to create legislation directly in the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, with a cross-border implication.37 Under the umbrella of Article 65 of 
the Treaty of the European Union38, the EU has, with Brussels II bis, proceeded 
with rules on parental responsibility proceedings, a process of harmonisation 
which it had initiated it by Brussels II. During the last decade several moves  
moves have been made with respect to the harmonisation of the private 
international law in the area of family law and in contrast to Brussels II bis, 
Regulations EC 1259/2010 and 4/2009 include provisions on appiicable law.39  
To understand the analysis of the provisions, a short look into the legislative 
background of the current version of the Regulation proves valuable. Brussels 
II, the precedent of Brussels II bis, has had an immense impact not only on 
 
 
to the exercise of the freedoms granted by the Treaty, since citizens would be discouraged from 
exercising their rights of entry into and residence in this Member State- Case C-127/08, Metock 
v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2004] ECR I-10719. 
36 Change to the concept of free movement of persons within the EU has occurred in different 
ways, one being the combined reading of provisions on EU citizenship and on anti-
discrimination by the ECJ – most recently in Metock, where the Court stated that securing the 
possibility to lead a “normal family life” was irreplaceable to enable and protect the free 
movement of EU citizens. Social and welfare rights have been developed constantly, also with 
regard to third-country nationals, primarily by the case law of the ECJ (most recently in Case C-
291/05, Metock and Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v Eind [2004] ECR I-10719 
and Förster (Case C-158/07 Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, and 
Baumbast, Baumbast and Case C-413/99, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] ECR I-07091) and might further develop as a result of Directive 2003/109/EC however 
the restrictions Member States may still refer to must not be disregarded („genuine link“ and 
„certain degree of integration“). 
37 Crifo, C., ’Civil Procedure in the European Order: An Overview of the Latest Developments‘ in 
Dwyer, D. (ed.), The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On, Oxford 2009. 
38 Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version) - Part Three: 
Community policies - Title IV: Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons - Article 65, OJ C 325. 
39 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations. 
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private international law but also family law by giving all EU Member States 
except Denmark40 the same basis for jurisdiction for divorce, separation and 
annulment proceedings, and to an extent parental responsibility. Under the 
revised Regulation rules for proceedings regarding parental responsibility and 
abduction were added.41 As the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced institutional 
and material modifications, it further amended the status of private international 
law, extending competences considerably. Though, prior to the Amsterdam 
Treaty, private international law rules were already embedded for instance in 
the Brussels Convention42, the considerable shift occurred when competence in 
the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters was transferred from the third to 
the first pillar43, thereby extending the Community competence to legislation in 
the field of private international law. 
As a result of the reorganisation of the responsibility of judicial cooperation in 
civil matters in the pillars, the European Commission's initiative in private 
international law related to family law has then increased rapidly.44 It is not for 
this thesis to consider the practical effects of the process of harmonisation 
directly grounded upon Article 81 TFEU. It is sufficient to mention at this point 
that the minutes of the Tampere meeting of the European Council in 199945 set 
out specific plans for civil, including family, law and with regard to family law, a 
number of those measures have been put in place. This was possible because 
of the changes in the law making structure and procedures for the adoption of 
                                            
40 Brussels II bis does not apply to Denmark. 
41 Scope of the Regulation as per Article 1. 
42 Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters. 
43 The Pillars of the European Union: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced a new 
institutional structure which remained until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This 
institutional structure was composed of three “pillars”: The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred 
some of the fields covered by the third pillar to the first pillar (free movement of persons): 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm, last accessed 02 May 2016. 
44  supra note 39; Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations; Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. 
45 Tampere Council Meeting, Minutes Part II, Item 10(b), OJ C54 of 25 Feb 2000. 
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legislation introduced by the Amsterdam and then the Lisbon Treaty.46 Brussels 
II was the start of a decade of the implementation of European legal instruments 
in the area of private international law regarding family law.47 Pursuant to the 
Lisbon Treaty, in most areas of EU legislation, decisions can be taken by 
qualified majority voting, however, in the family law field legislative proposals 
are subject to unanimity voting so that a Member State can exercise their 
national veto. The amendments suggested by the European Parliament have no 
binding force and national Ministers of Justice reserve the decision making 
power. Any change to EU family law needs to be approved by every national 
Parliament. Judicial co-operation in civil matters remains subject to qualified 
majority voting in Council and a shared power for decision making power with 
the Parliament and under such treaty umbrella, the Commission Work 
Programmes are evidence for the rapid development in legislation in the area of 
conflict of laws.48  
The shift from the third to the first pillar and hence the removal of the necessity 
for a link between a legislative instrument and the internal market was the legal 
basis for the Union competence on the adoption of measures in the field of 
conflicts of law rules regarding family law.49 As discussed, ‘judicial cooperation’ 
became a cornerstone element for such new legislation - it initiated a complex 
body of rules with considerable influence on national jurisdictions and courts 
and transferred considerable legislative power from the States to the EU, 
thereby aiming at a contribution to further integration.50 In England, the first 
                                            
46 The Lisbon Treaty initiated change in the EU's law-making structures- bringing about changes 
in with respect to how EU legislation is proposed and adopted. Civil justice and conflict of laws 
family law provisions are in the chapter on ‘freedom, security and justice'. Few changes were 
made to these sections which was mainly Art 65 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. In the Lisbon Treaty, Art 65 on ‘judicial co-operation in civil matters' refers to the 
scope of action – ‘matters having cross-border implications'. 
47 ibid. 
48 All Commission Work Programmes available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-
documents/index_en.htm, last accessed 02 May 2016. 
49 Fallon, M., ‘Constraints of Internal Market Law on Family Law’, in Meeusen, J., Petergás, M., 
Straetmans, G., Swennen, F., (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, 
Antwerp/Oxford, 2007, pp.149-181. 
50 Tichy, L., ‘A new role for private international law’ in Brownswood, R., Micklitz, H.-W., Niglia, 
L. and Weatherill, S. (eds.), The Foundations or European Private Law, Oxford 2011, p.401, 
412. 
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version of the Regulation, Brussels II, with respect to certain provisions, 
effected no profound change in the law since the harmonized jurisdictional 
bases were to a certain extent reflective of the grounds for jurisdiction in 
matrimonial causes, and the Family Law Act 1986 already provided for an 
almost-automatic recognition of most foreign matrimonial decrees. English 
courts seized in divorce proceedings already had accessory jurisdiction with 
regard to related child proceedings, and child custody orders from other 
Member States were already granted recognition under the Luxembourg 
Convention.51 
However, it became clear that there were very profound indirect consequences. 
Regulation 1347/2000 was the first EU instrument dealing exclusively and 
directly with family law from a private international law perspective, based on 
the 'Brussels II Convention' of 199852 (which never came into force).  
Brussels II was subject to massive criticism.53 Criticized for its unfair treatment 
of non-marital children, the Regulation came to an end when the Commission 
Proposal in a slightly adapted form was adopted as Brussels II bis54, to also 
refer to parental responsibility disputes arising outside of the context of 
                                            
51 Luxemburg Convention, European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, Luxemburg, 
20.V.1980 The solicitors' representative association (Resolution) estimated in its Comments on 
the EU Green Paper on Applicable Law and Jurisdiction in Divorce Matters 
(Rome III) available at http://www.resolution.org.uk/site_content_files/files/resolution_response_
to_green_paper_on_divorce_law_2.pdf>, last accessed on 30 April 2016; that over half of the 
international family cases dealt with in England and Wales concerned third countries, in 
particular the United States and Commonwealth.  
52 On 28 May 1998, the Member States signed the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters (known as the "Brussels II 
Convention") and the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice (Official Journal C 221 
of 16.07.1998). Explanatory reports on the Convention and the Protocol were approved on the 
same day. The Convention has not been ratified by the Member States. 
53 Lowe, N., 'Negotiating the Revised Brussels II Regulation’ (2004) IFL, 205-217. 
54 Ibid. 
Chapter 1 
33 
matrimonial proceedings and child abduction situations including the immediate 
recognition of access and return orders without exequatur.55  
By 2006 the originally small Brussels II bis plan had developed into a foundation 
for further harmonisation of family law in the context of private international law, 
providing the foundation for further influence in this area based on the 'Tampere 
Conclusions'56. Though the EU's legislative influence in the area of private 
international law appeared to become more moderate in general since 2006, as 
several approaches such as the amendment of Brussels I was put on hold,57 it 
may not be argued that the EU's interest in the area of family law was 
diminishing. Rather, the recent Regulation on choice of jurisdiction in divorce 
matters58 and Commission and Council communications demonstrate the EU’s 
ambitions to take further influence on the area and 'Rome III'59 demonstrates 
that the EU has no fear to deal with applicable law in the context of 'enhanced 
                                            
55 http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/glossary/glossary_en.htm, last accessed 02 May 2016, 
Exequatur is a concept specific to the private international law and refers to the decision by a 
court authorising the enforcement in that country of a judgment, arbitral award, authentic 
instruments or court settlement given abroad. Abolition of the exequatur procedure between 
Member States for all judgments in civil and commercial matters is the ultimate objective of the 
mutual recognition programme adopted by the Commission and the Council in December 2000. 
56 Conclusions 33 and 34 of the European Council Meeting at Tampere, 15 and 16 Oct 1999, 
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/civil/recognition/doc_civil_
recognition_general_en.htm, last accessed on 30 April 2016. 
57 A long reform process by the EU Commission starting in 2007 finally led to Regulation (EU) 
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
(Brussels Regulation (recast)). 
58 Council Regulation, supra note 39 (OJ n. L 343, p. 10 ff.). 
59 The proposal for “Rome III” died the legislative death; it was a Commission proposal for a 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and 
introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters of 17 July 2006 (so-called 
‘Rome III' Regulation). In June 2008, the Council recorded that there was no unanimity to 
proceed with the proposed Regulation. Wells-Greco, M., ‘Evolving EU Private International Law: 
an Overview of the Commission’s Proposal on the Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal 
Separation’ (2010) IFL November, 333-335; The European Commission released its proposal 
on 24 March 2010 (COM (2010) 0105) for a Regulation laying down choice of law rules in 
divorce and legal separation matters. The positive opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee was submitted shortly thereafter on 14 July 2010 (SOC/379);  At the end of 
2010, the Union then adopted Regulation EC No 1259/2010 on the law applicable to divorce 
and legal separation.  
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cooperation'. Furthermore, the Commission has confirmed its commitment to a 
further abolition of exequatur in the area60. 
The process of harmonisation particularily pursued during the past fifteen years 
has been accompanied by approaches to a further harmonisation in the area of 
family law. Those arguing in favour of harmonization argue that it will be a 
continuation of the process initiated by Brussels II and that this development 
further demonstrates the symbolic significance of the adoption of Regulation 
1347/2000.61 Those arguing against the harmonization say that the first 
impression of the lawyer or researcher considering or dealing with the impact of 
the new ‘European’ family law structure on third state or formally ‘Hague’ cases 
is that it is problematic and creates a labyrinth.62  
With regard to conflict of laws rules, the process of harmonisation was generally 
welcomed, however, it has been commented quite often that any further steps 
than the now existing would need to be considered carefully.63 
Whilst the harmonisation was welcomed within the EU, the other perspective is 
the perspective of non-Member States. In addition, disputes are often not 
restricted to the EU and to intra-Community settings. Though aware of the 
difficulties related to Article 4, para 2 of Brussels I, the European legislator 
omitted to integrate into Brussels II bis a provision as a solution for such ‘third 
state’ situations in Brussels II and then again in Brussels II bis. With respect to 
                                            
60 In June 2011 the European Council adopted a Resolution entitled “Roadmap for 
strengthening the rights and protection of victims, in particular in criminal proceedings”, (OJ C 
187, June 2011, 28th). Brussels II bis is a Title IV instrument.  
61 Boele-Woelki, K., ‘The European Agenda: an Overview of the Current Situation in the Field of 
Private International Law and Substantive Law’ (2006) IFL 149, 154; Dethloff, N., ‘Arguments for 
the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe’, in Boele-Woelki, K. (ed), supra 
note 1, pp. 51-53, referring to Brussels II. 
62 Meeusen, J., ‘System Shopping in European Private International Law in Family Matters’, in: 
International Family Law for the European Union (eds. Meeusen, Johan et al.), 
Antwerpen/Oxford, 2007, p. 239-278, p. 270; Baker, H., ’The Court of Justice and Brussels II 
Revised, (2006) IFL, November, Feature; Karsten, I., ‘The State of International Family Law 
Issues: A View from London’ (2009) IFL, March 2009, Features; McGlynn, C., Families and the 
European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism, Law in Context Series Cambridge 2006, p.152; 
common law jurisdictions, which are used to applying the lex fori in family law matters and 
accustomed to the use of judicial discretion to control forum shopping, England and Ireland 
have had to make much greater adjustments to accommodate the EU family law. 
63 ibid p.412. 
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Article 4 of Brussels I, an extensive discussion had developed on the 
application of the Regulation to situations involving third states, i.e. non-Member 
States. According to one view, the provision refers to the national rules, thereby 
embedding them into the structure of the Regulation64 and domestic rules may 
solely be applied if the Regulation provides for an authorization. According to 
the other view, the Regulation only regulates jurisdiction between the Member 
States in so far as the judicial area of the EC is concerned and the national 
rules remain applicable to the extent the judicial area is not concerned.  The 
discussion moved in various directions, including the well-known Owusu65 case 
and the question whether the extension of the personal scope of the jurisdiction 
rules to defendants domiciled in non-Member States might be possible and ‘to 
what extent the special jurisdiction rules of the Regulation, with the current 
connecting factors, could be applied to third State defendants.’66 Being aware of 
this problem, the European legislator could, over the years when Brussels II and 
Brussels II bis were implemented, have sought a solution so as to clarify the 
situation with respect to non-member states cases regarding in family disputes. 
The ECJ’s reasoning in Owusu seems consistent with the Preamble of Brussels 
I: “There must be a link between proceedings to which this Regulation applies 
and the territory of the Member States bound by the Regulation. Accordingly 
common rules on jurisdiction should, in principle, apply when the defendant is 
domiciled in one of those Member States”. Article 4 was not amended by 
Regulation 1215/12 (Brussels I bis) and at least the problem of domiciliaries of 
non-Member States remains. This discussion is vital, since, to the same extent 
as in Brussels I, the scope of Brussels II bis is unclear with respect to an 
application of the Regulation to cases regarding non-Member States, in 
particular Contracting states under Conventions, except as explicitly regulated 
in the Regulation. Depending on the outcome of the determination of the 
                                            
64 Briggs, A., The Conflict of Laws, Oxford 2nd edition 2008, p.91; McClean, D., Morris: The 
Conflict of Laws, London 5th edition 2000, p.123. 
65 Case C-281/02 - Andrew Owusu v N. B. Jackson, trading as "Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas" 
and Others. 
66 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels, 21.4.20
09, COM(2009) 175 final, p.8 et seq., at http://eurlex. europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2009:0175:FIN:EN:PDF, last accessed on 02 May 2016. 
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habitual residence of the child, the Regulation may hence be applicable or not 
be applicable. Third country relationships are of particular significance for the 
United Kingdom because of its Commonwealth background but also for the 
continental systems since there are growing numbers of private relationships 
going beyond the EU’s borders. Mc Glynn regarded some provisions in 
Brussels II bis “likely to provoke adverse reaction” in third countries and as 
McEleavy points out, this would allow a parent of a New York resident child to 
rely on his French nationality to obtain a French court order which would then 
be enforceable in all Member States.67  
As this analysis moves on, it will be considered in more detail whether the 
European harmonisation impedes the consensus with third countries and 
whether there are indications that future family law measures might have to be 
based on wider consultation having respect to third country interests68 as 
enhanced cooperation is one of the primary aims of the Commission. A 
preliminary aim is the cooperation between the courts of the Member States69 
and the Joint Conference of the European Commission and the Hague 
Conference on Access to Foreign Law in Civil and Commercial Matters70 was a 
                                            
67 McEleavy, P. ‘Brussels II bis: The Communitarisation of Family Law Continues’ (2004) IJFL 
(2), 14-16, 14; for a background of the harmonisation process at the beginning see Boele-
Woelki, K. (ed.), supra note 1; for criticism on a harmonised European family law: McGlynn, C., 
supra note 62. 
68 Commission (EU), ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions--
Justice, Freedom and Security in Europe since 2005: An Evaluation of the Hague Programme 
and Action Plan’ SEC (2009) 766 final (10 June 2009) 103; Council (EU), ‘The Stockholm 
Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens’ 17024/09 (2 
December 2009) 25. 
69 Council Decision 2001/470/EC of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network in 
civil and commercial matters [See amending act(s)]. 
70 Joint Conference of the European Commission and the Hague Conference on Access to 
Foreign Law in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels, 15 to 17 February 2012, information 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2012&varevent=248, 
last accessed on 02 May 2016. 
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starting point for necessary cooperation between the organisations which have 
developed the Regulation on the one hand and the Convention on the other.71 
There is a gap in clarity as to whether the Regulation applies beyond the 
borders of the EU. The interpretation of the rules of Brussels II bis in disputes 
regarding non-Member and ‘Hague’72 States is furthermore significant as, from 
the US perspective, the European approach is to an extent inconsistent with the 
due process inherent to US law and the Regulation is considered an intrusion in 
US cases rather than a benefit.73 According to Silberman, cases are drawn into 
the EU.74 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the problem of the 
Regulation in matters somehow related to non-Member States which are 
Contracting States is not restricted to those provisions directly referring an 
interaction of the legislative instruments Convention on the one side and 
Regulation on the other. It is far more complicated and extends to various 
situations.  
Furthermore, as explained further above, the jurisdiction rules in Brussels II bis 
and their application in disputes related to non-Member State are inextricably 
linked to the judicial controversy and scholarly discussion on two central views 
related to Brussels I - one holds that the Regulation refers to the national rules, 
thereby embedding them into the structure of the Regulation, and domestic 
rules may solely be applied if the Regulation provides for an authorization. The 
other view holds that the Regulation only regulates jurisdiction between the 
Member States in so far as the judicial area of the EC is concerned and that the 
                                            
71 Report on a conference organised jointly by the European Commission and the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law in February 2012 to discuss access to foreign law in 
civil and commercial matters, very general statements were made, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/foreignlaw_concl_e.pdf, last accessed on 01 May 2016. 
72 Hague cases are cases being dealt with under one of the Conventions.  
73 Silberman, L., ‘Recent US and European decisions on the 1980 Hague Convention on Child 
Abduction: a perspective from the USA in tribute to William Duncan’ (2012) IFL March, 53-55. 
74 ibid. 
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national rules remain applicable to the extent the judicial area is not 
concerned.75  
As the considerations on Brussels I76 indicate, the provisions particularly related 
to non-Member States play a significant role within the conflict of laws 
Regulations. With regard to Brussels II bis, the central problem with regard to 
non-Member States is the interrelation of the Regulation with the Conventions 
and the application of the Regulation once a parental responsibility case or 
abduction case also relates to a Contracting State or once the rules are 
complemented by the Convention of Child Abduction.  
It is of utmost significance for parties and courts to know whether they will be 
dealing ‘just’ with a ‘Hague’ case or a case solely under the Regulation, or if 
both apply. Legal certainty for EU domiciliaries and parties from Contracting 
States cannot be disregarded if the interests of one child or more children are at 
stake. There are several situations where the Regulation expands its scope 
beyond the European borders, which will be discussed in the following 
chapters.A further issue is the background of guidance on the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Regulation. While it may have been true that the Brussels 
II Regulation must have been read in conjunction with the Brussels I 
Regulation77 it remains to be seen whether this is equally true for Brussels II bis 
and it will be seen how valuable the separate set of rules is.78 The Borras 
Report, the Explanatory Report on Brussels II,79 stated that identical terms in 
the Brussels II Convention and Brussels I must be given the same meaning, 
with the ECJ case-law having to be taken into account. What does this mean for 
the case-law regarding Brussels II bis, in particular in cases of child abduction?  
                                            
75 Briggs, A., supra note 64, p. 91; Collins, L., Dicey, Morris, and Collins on the conflict of laws, 
London 15th ed 2006, Volume 1, Part 3 , Chapter 12, 12-013 to 12-023. 
76 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), 14 
December 2010, COM (2010) 748 final. 
77  As was suggested by Stone, P., supra note 28; Caracciolo di Torella, E., Masselot, A., Under 
construction: EU Family Law) (2004, E L Rev, 29(1), 32-51, 44. 
78 The Jenard Report on the Convention of 27 September 1968 (on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1979) OJ C 59 1) had pointed out 
the difficulties of including family matters in the Brussels Convention. 
79 Borras Report, supra note 29, para 6. 
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English judges and scholars have been particularly aware of the difficulties 
inherent in dealing with and interpreting the rules regarding Brussels II bis and 
the Convention on Child Abduction and Child Protection.80 Annual reports and 
statistics identify difficulties of interpretation and implementation, reveal gaps 
and support the argument that international judicial cooperation is significant to 
enhance the efficiency of dealing with such cases.81 Without doubt, the 
Regulation has an laudable objective set forth in the preamble82 – the following 
chapters will analyse whether the achievement of this objective is a price too 
high as, possibly, children either from Member States or from Contracting 
States83 are disadvantaged by the provisions or that litigants from Member 
States are faced with disadvantages in the international context. Statistically, an 
increase in cross-border cases falling under the scope of Brussels II bis can be 
observed in the Member States, as well as a general increase in cases under 
the Regulation and the Conventions.84   
Whilst as a Title IV instrument, Brussels II bis solely applies to cases ‘having 
cross-border implications’, Article 66 of Brussels II bis provides that individual 
                                            
80 “the participation of English family lawyers and judges in international matters has increased 
significantly, and their reputation has noticeably shifted from being rather insular to being 
involved, highly capable and willing to make a contribution to improving the lives of families 
unfortunate enough to be involved in a dispute with an international dimension” Nichols, M., 
‘Keeping pace with international family law: a view from the trenches’ (2013) IFL July, Features 
July; notably, the number of cases decided in English courts on questions involving Convention 
and Regulation cases considered ‘leading’ by the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law has also increased. In 1999, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law established The International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT), with a 
database of decisions in the Contracting States to the Convention and Brussels II bis decisions. 
81 Statistics for Germany available at 
<http://www.bundesjustizamt.de/cln_349/EN/Topics/citizen__services/HKUE/Statistics/statistics
__2011,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/statistics_2011.pdf>, for Ireland at    
<http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Increase%20in%20the%20number%20of%20applications
%20dealt%20with%20by%20the%20Central%20Authority%20for%20Child%20Abduction>, for 
England, there are no statistics, but a useful report: <http://www.ejtn.net 
/PageFiles/6333/Annual_Report_England_Wales2011.pdf>; last accessed on 01 May 2016. In 
France there are no statistics, neither The Ministry of Justice nor the National Institute for 
Demographic Studies (INED) collect case statistics, there are no such statistics in Sweden, 
Spain.  
82 Preamble refers to the objective to “serve the protection of the children’s best interest “  
83 The Hague Conference regularly discusses improvements and difficulties of the Conventions; 
Duncun shows that the Hague Conference also considers the case-law under the Regulation: 
Duncan, W., ‘Future Developments in International Family Law with Special Emphasis on 
Cross-border Child Protection: A View from The Hague’, March (2010) IFL, 24.  
84 supra note 81. 
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territorial units within a multi-jurisdictional Member State shall be treated as 
Member States for the situations set forth therein. There have also been  EU 
attempts to encourage mediation with regard to marriage breakdown and 
resulting parental responsibility proceedings.85 In some jurisdictions, EU 
harmonization has encouraged forum shopping in divorce matters, thereby 
diverting divorce and parental responsibility proceedings to different 
jurisdictions.86 As de Boer mentions the lack of clarity resulting from the many 
undefined terms in Brussels II has been criticized by British and continental 
lawyers alike.87 Replacing Regulation 1347/2000 with Regulation 2201/2003 
offered a chance to remove many problems known to be existing under the 
former, however many drafting errors were made. For instance, the error in 
Article 8(2) of Regulation 1347/2000 is repeated in Article 7(2) of Regulation 
2201/2003.88 As de Boer noted, Regulation 1347/2000 was unclear regarding 
the construction of ‘nationality’ in cases of dual nationality and regarding the 
meaning of ‘acceptance’ of jurisdiction.89 Whilst a different formulation is being 
applied in respect of the latter in Regulation 2201/200390 no changes were 
made with regard to other drafting flaws. For instance, there is uncertainty 
produced by unclear wording with respect to the procedures preceding a 
second hearing by the court of origin in child abduction cases Article 11(6)-(8).91 
Besides all criticism related to the Regulation, it should however not be 
disregarded that the rules of child law in England had been extensively 
condemned for their complexity92 so that Brussels II and Brussels II bis were 
assumed to provide a chance for less problematic procedures than under the 
preceding regime. McEleavy argues that the flawed drafting of Brussels II and 
                                            
85 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008] OJ L136/3. 
86 Carruther, J., ‘Party autonomy in the legal regulation of adult relationships: what place for 
party choice in private international law?’ (2012) ICLQ 61(4), 881-913; Cuadernos de Derecho 
Transnacional, October 2011, Vol. 3, Nº 2, pp.85-129. 
87 de Boer, T., ‘Jurisdiction and Enforcement in International Family Law: A Labyrinth of 
European and International Legislation’ (2002) 49 Netherlands Intl L Rev. 307, 343-344. 
88 Grammatical errors: ‘‘in’’ and ‘‘either’’ 
89 de Boer, supra note 87, at 344.  
90 Article 12(1)(b) of the Regulation.  
91 McEleavy, supra note 25 at 30-31.  
92 Lowe, N. ‘The Family Law Act 1986--A Critique’ (2002) Fam Law, at 39-60. 
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Brussels II bis may be considered the result of rushed negotiations, 
misunderstood complex legal concepts, compromises resulting from unrelated, 
and politically more important, matters93 whilst de Boer argues that there was 
an institutional unwillingness to consider academic legal literature before 
drafting the Regulation.94  
After more than 10 years after the introduction of the Regulation, this thesis 
analyses whether some of the criticism is obsolete and which new grounds for 
criticism have developed.  Hence, it seems this is an unfortunate situation, 
considering that lawyers and judges are left in the dark as to whether there will 
be efforts of the EU Commission regarding amendments of the Regulation.95  
In view of all the matters identified within this Chapter, the following Chapters 
will analyse if the situation with respect to Brussels II bis and the Conventions is 
still as problematic as some have assumed during the last years.96  
Before embarking on this, however, it is important to consider the critical term 
“in the best interests of the child”, both within the parallel pieces on international 
legislation and for the purpose of the thesis. 
  
C. “Best interests” of the child  
A possible definition of the term “best interests of the child” can be approached 
in different ways, from a cultural, sociological and legal perspective.97 However, 
                                            
93 McEleavy, P. ‘First Steps in the Communitarisation of Family Law: Too Much Haste, Too Little 
Reflection?’ in Boele-Woelki, K. (ed), supra note 1, 522-523. 
94 de Boer, supra note 87, at 344. 
95 Tichy, L., supra note 50, p.401. 
96 Lowe, N., supra note 52, Lowe argues that the moment “will surely come when the 
proliferation of international instruments will simply become counter-productive because of the 
ensuing complexity”; McEleavy, P., ‘Luxembourg, Brussels and now the Hague: congestion in 
the promotion of free movement in parental responsibility’ (2010) ICLQ, 59(2), 505-519; 
McEleavy argues that “The 1996 Hague Convention has undoubtedly suffered from the 
vagaries of European politics during its short life, but it is at last to derive some benefit from the 
communitarization of private international law as it is able to enter into force simultaneously for 
eighteen of the nineteen outstanding Member States not already States Party”. 
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as this thesis concentrates on the analysis of the interaction of the Regulation 
and the two Conventions, it is fair to limit the presentation of the interpretations 
of best interest to an overview in the legal context. Over the last decades family 
courts across the world have developed a similar approach on how the best 
interests of the child (or best interest as used in singular in US courts and 
continental courts) should be determined, but with differing results in the 
national jurisdictions.98 As there is no definition of the term in, for instance, 
English statutes, Parker argued that ‘best interest’ standards are regarded as 
indeterminate and the influence of the principle depends on the context in which 
it is applied and varies from one jurisdiction to another.99 However, the term has 
become an integral part of the international declarations and conventions 
concerning the protection of children.100 In the context of this analysis, the focus 
shall lie on the meaning and application of the term in the context of the 
Convention on Child Abduction, the Convention on Child Protection and 
Brussels II bis, hence in the context of parental responsibility and abduction 
cases.  
In the Preamble of the Convention on Child Abduction, it is stated that  
“the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their 
custody”,101 
 
 
97 Alston, P., ed., The Best Interests of the Child, Oxford 1994. 
98 Fortin, J., Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, Cambridge, 2009, p.23; Lehmann, J., 
Children Australia, Volume 33, Issue 01, January 2008, pp. 2-3. 
99 Parker, J., ‘The best interests of the child – Principles and Problems’ (1994) Int J Law Policy 
Family 8 (1), 26-41. 
100 The U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child comprises a Preamble and ten principles. 
G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354. For an online text 
of the Declaration, see the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
Web site, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/25.htm; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49; 
the Convention on Child Protection; the Convention on Child Abduction. 
101 Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 6, preamble. 
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In the Convention on Child Protection, the Preamble states that “the best 
interests of the child are to be a primary consideration”102 and the Preamble of 
Brussels II bis is even clearer:  
“The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in 
the present version of the Regulation are a constant reference to the best 
interests of the child, in particular based on the criterion of proximity. This 
means that jurisdiction should be in the Member State of the child's habitual 
residence, except for certain cases of a change in the child's residence or 
pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility.”103 
With regard to such an agreement, Article 12(3) of the Regulation requires that  
“(b) the jurisdiction of the courts has been accepted expressly or otherwise in an 
unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings at the time the court is 
seised and is in the best interests of the child.” [emphasis added]  
And Article 15 of the Regulation with reference to a court which is “better placed 
to hear the case” restricts the transfer to cases where the transfer as such is in 
the best interests of the child. Finally, Article 23 of the Regulation refers to a 
possible non-recognition in cases of parental responsibility  
 “(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member 
State in which recognition is sought taking into account the best interests of the 
child” 
According to Article 1 of the Convention on Child Abduction, the objective of the 
Convention on Child Abduction is  
“to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State”  
and to secure  
                                            
102 Hague Convention on Child Protection, supra note 7, preamble. 
103 Regulation, supra note 5, recital 12 of the preamble. 
Chapter 1 
44 
“that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” 
In the Explanatory Report to the 1980 Hague Convention, it is mentioned that 
during the drafting of the Convention it was decided not to include the wording 
‘best interests of the child’ because of the experience that this concept entailed 
that judges of a state to which the child had been removed would rule on the 
custody of the child.104  
Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Preamble of the Regulation reflect the drafters’ 
intention to combat the increase in international child abductions and to protect 
the children concerned. In theory, the concept of the best interest of the child 
therefore means the immediate return of the child to his/her State of habitual 
residence as the right with priority over the interests of the parents. In June 
2011, the Special Commission on the practical operation of the 1980 and 1996 
Conventions considered Neulinger105 and Raban106, two cases in the ECtHR 
which will also be significant in the following analysis. Those cases have drawn 
the Convention on Child Abduction into the ambit of the European Court of 
Human Rights and raised many questions of interpretation of the Regulation but 
also the question whether the national courts in such cases also have to 
consider the European Convention of Human Rights and even the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and whether the ECtHR’s requirements on 
assessments to be undertaken by the national courts can in any way be binding 
or be of relevance for the interpretation of the Convention on Child Abduction or 
even the Regulation.  
Though, as Professor Pérez-Vera noted, the principle of the best interests of the 
child is not explicitly part of the Convention on Child Abduction and the wording 
of the objectives of the Convention and the Preamble circumvent a clear 
                                            
104 Explanatory Report on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial the 1980 
Hague Child Abduction Convention, Offprint from the Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth 
Session (1980), volume III, Child abduction, The Hague 1982. 
105 Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland, Application No 41615/0708 January 2009. 
106 Raban v Romania, Application No 25437/08, 26 October 2010. 
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reference so as to avoid that courts would resort to the concept to avoid 
returning a child to a –in their assessment ‘wrong’ country.107 This suggests she 
considers a firm, explicit concept disadvantageous as it would enable courts to 
resort to denying a return to the state of the habitual residence (as the ultimate 
concept of the Convention which shall only be denied if very exceptional 
circumstances apply). Pérez argues that the absence of a direct reference 
should not lead to the conclusion that the Convention  
“ignores the social paradigm which declares the necessity of considering the 
interests of children in regulating all the problems which concern them”.108  
Rather, she argues, the preamble declaration that the contracting state 
“firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in 
matters relating to their custody”109 
demonstrates how serious this paradigm is taken. Whilst Pérez-Vera underlines 
this as an advantage, the lack of an explicit reference bears the disadvantage 
that those applying the Convention must not consider the “best interests” a 
paramount standard but must consider that the “interests of children” are of 
“paramount importance”110.  
The term relates to the concept in the Convention on the Rights of Children, and 
despite limited historical references to this idea in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, it is a primarily contemporary legal concept.111 The concept of “the best 
interests of the child” was firmly introduced into an international legal instrument 
                                            
107 supra note 104, 21-23. 
108 ibid. 
109 ibid. 
110 Preamble of the Convention on Child Abduction. 
111 Eekelaar, J., ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 6.2 
(1986) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 6.2, 161–182; Archard, D., and Skivenes, M., ‘Deciding 
Best Interests: General Principles and the Cases of Norway and the UK.’ (2010) Journal of 
Children’s Services 5.4, 43–54. 
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in the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child.112 Principle 2 of the 
Declaration states, 
 “[t]he child shall enjoy special protection, in the enactment of laws for this 
purpose the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.” 
Both the Regulation and the Conventions display the European legislators’ view 
that uniform rules determining which country’s authorities are competent to take 
the necessary measures are decisive for the direction a cross border family law 
case takes and how the competent court should be determined to safeguard the 
interests of the child or the children concerned. The cooperative, internationalist 
approach that a legislative instrument regulating conflict of laws rules beyond 
the borders is the underlying principle. The “best interest” is not just a term used 
in the Regulation and in Conventions, it is a principle underlying the whole 
concept of protecting a child’s interests in cross-border decisions on jurisdiction, 
recognition or enforcement set forth in the rules of the Regulation.113 As will be 
explored in this thesis, it is a principle of utmost importance in family law cases 
dealing with conflict of laws issues, not least because the determination of the 
competent courts and the recognition and enforcement can significantly 
influence the direction a case takes. Whilst the concept also is also an integral 
part of national family law in most jurisdictions, the protection of the child’s 
interests tends to be even more difficult in cross-border cases, where many 
other factors are involved. What is most important for this analysis is that the 
Regulation in its preamble and the Practice Guide114 claims the Regulation’s 
rules are in the best interest, so that a ‘correct’ interpretation of those rules 
would generally –though not ultimately- safeguard the best interests of the child. 
Making such a claim despite the fact that there was an international instrument 
covering jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement and applicable law in the context 
of child abductions, is not a humbled approach. It is an approach with the 
underlying firm trust in that a European law instrument is more appropriate than 
                                            
112 supra note 100. 
113 As will be established in the analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4..  
114 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2005), supra note 30. 
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an international instrument. In the Convention on Child Protection, explicit 
references to the best interest can be found in multiple rules.115 In the Lagarde 
Report on the Convention on Child Protection it is explained with regard to 
Article 8 that as an exception to jurisdiction in the state of the habitual 
residence, the article provides the possibility for the authority which normally 
has jurisdiction to transfer jurisdiction to the courts of another Contracting State 
if it considers the transfer would be to a court ‘better placed in the particular 
case to assess the best interests of the child’.116 Nonetheless the Report refers 
to the drastic example of both parents being killed in an accident. In such a 
situation the child would return to the State of nationality where the other 
members of his or her family reside.117 The Commission rejected proposals 
which would have authorised transfer to the authority of a non-Contracting State 
if such were in the best interests of the child.118 As such, there is no possibility 
to transfer jurisdiction to a non-Contracting state under Article 8 of the 
Convention on Child Protection. As the Convention entered into force in the 
Member States of the European Union, there can be no situation that the 
transfer can be denied to a Member State for the reason of being a non-
Contracting state. Articles 8 and 9 incorporate into the Convention a revocable 
system of forum non conveniens and forum conveniens, with the reason that 
the child’s best interests are better protected or ensured by authorities in a state 
other than the state of the habitual residence. The Chapter on applicable law in 
the Convention on Child Protection has a similar approach to the best interest; 
in Article 15(2), there is no reference to proximity but to the best interests. 
With regard to Article 15 the Report points out that the Commission rejected 
proposals which would have obligated the authority exercising jurisdiction to 
respect certain substantive rules laid down in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, such as the consent of the child in respect of measures concerning 
                                            
115 Article 8(1), 8(4), 9(1), 10(1), 22, 23(2), 28, 33(2) and the Preamble of the Convention on 
Child Protection. 
116 Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, Paul Lagarde, 1998,  
Description, Offprint from the Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session (1996), tome II, Protection 
of children, p.559. 
117 supra note 116, p.559. 
118 ibid. 
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him or her, or the taking into account of the social background of the child as 
well as the ethnic, cultural and religious origins of his or her parents.119 In 
Chapters 3 and 5 hereof the concept established in Chapter 3 of the of the 
Convention will be examined in more detail in the context of the interaction of 
the Convention and the Regulation and in the context of applicable law. 
Neither the drafters of the Regulation nor of the Conventions decided to refer to 
the best interests of the child principle used in Article 3 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
As noted by Professor van Bueren,  
"...a lack of certainty or indeterminacy is inherent in the best interests principle. 
Indeed such a lack of certainty, which some may regard as flexibility and as a 
virtue, is essential in the case-by-case approach, which the best interest 
standard requires."120  
From being based on a psychological approach121, the "best interests" standard 
has developed into a more complex concept regularly referred to in the 
Convention on Child Protection and the Brussels II bis Regulation as well as the 
case law on the Brussels II bis Regulation and the Convention on Child 
Abduction.122 As the case law on the Convention on Child Protection is still in its 
infancy it is all the more important to establish the interrelation with the 
Regulation and to fully understand its influence on the use and interpretation of 
the concept of the best interest. In his foreword to the 1996 Convention Practice 
                                            
119 supra note 116, p.575. 
120 Van Bueren, G., Child Rights in Europe, Council of Europe (Strasbourg), 2007, statement. 
121 Between 1973 and 1986, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit published three influential, 
controversial books on the best interests of the child. During the 70s and 80s, children in child 
welfare proceedings were increasingly represented by lawyers or guardians whose advocacy 
included a consideration of their interests: Spinak, J., ‘When Did Lawyers for Children Stop 
Reading Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons from the Twentieth Century on Best Interests 
and the Role of the Child Advocate’ (2007) Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 41, 393. 
122 Paton, J., ‘The correct approach to the examination of the best interests of the child in 
abduction convention proceedings following the decision of the Supreme Court in Re E 
(Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal)’ (2012) J Priv Int L, 8(3), 547-576. 
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Guide, published by the Ministry of Justice in February 2013, Lord Justice 
Thorpe, the Head of International Family Justice for England and Wales, notes: 
“…the Convention has been widely recognised by all experts in the field as a 
highly significant international instrument.” 
and 
“The Convention became available to our court in November 2012. Now that we 
have the Convention it is vital that specialists in the field of international law 
should be familiar with the Convention and should rapidly develop expertise in 
its use.”123 
Despite the fact that it might be a loosely defined term from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, the context of the Conventions and the Regulation in which it is 
closely linked to the concept of habitual residence – both in the case-law of the 
Regulation and the Conventions and in the wording of the Regulation and the 
Convention on Child Protection – seems to have made a considerably more 
concrete and ‘tangible’ concept. At the same time, it will become evident in the 
following assessment how the use of the concept has been fragmented by the 
interaction and interrelation of the legal instruments and by the discretion of the 
national courts in interpretation of the wording of the norms referring to the 
concept in those instruments. In turn, the rules in the international and in the 
European instrument can be perfectly drafted in some parts and in the interest 
of the children but nonetheless to the detriment of children because of the lack 
of clarity in other parts and/or because of the relationship and interaction 
between the Regulation on the one hand and the Conventions on the other 
hand. What is the merit of a continuous reference to the principle of the ‘best 
interest’ if the interaction of the Regulation and the Conventions make conflict of 
laws issues so complicated and abstract that the courts dealing with it are 
                                            
123 The 1996 Hague Convention Practice Guide, available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/20130128112038/http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/protecting-the-vulnerable/official-
solicitor/international-child-abduction-and-contact-unit/1996-hague-convention-guide.pdf; last 
accessed 01 May 2016. 
Chapter 1 
50 
caught in making decisions on how the Regulation is applicable and if one of 
the Conventions also has to be dealt with. In the course of the following 
assessment it will be explored how the concept of best interest is linked to 
habitual residence as the connecting factor of great influence, to the jurisdiction 
laws in general, to the concepts of declining jurisdiction and conflicting 
proceedings and to provisional and protective measures, so as to assess if the 
EU’s move into the international family law has brought a true advancement. It 
will be explored if the advancement the legislator claims it has brought in the 
interest of the children involved in the respective cases has really taken 
place.124  
As Lord Kerr stated in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD: 
 “it is a universal theme of the various international and domestic instruments to 
which Lady Hale has referred that, in reaching decisions that will affect a child, 
a primacy of importance must be accorded to his or her best interests. This is 
not, it is agreed, a factor of limitless importance in the sense that it will prevail 
over all other considerations. It is a factor, however, that must rank higher than 
any other. It is not merely one consideration that weighs in the balance 
alongside other competing factors. Where the best interests of the child clearly 
favour a certain course, that course should be followed unless countervailing 
reasons of considerable force displace them.” 125 
As this thesis moves on, it will be discussed if and how the principles 
incorporated in and concepts applied in the context of the Regulation and 
primarily the Convention on Child Abduction have worked to ensure that the 
interests of the child are a primary consideration.  
                                            
124 Preamble of the Regulation; Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2005), 
supra note. 
125 ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4 at para. 46. 
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D. Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has set the framework of analysis and the aims of the further 
research. It has provided an overview of the background of the existing 
framework of the Regulation and the Conventions and to the cornerstone term 
“best interests of the child” before the substantive analysis regarding the 
provisions in Brussels II bis can begin. It has indicated the origins of Brussels II 
bis, and has given some attention to the upcoming questions arising from the 
existing framework of the Conventions and the Regulation. The different 
questions culminating in the research question of whether an advancement may 
have been achieved have been explained. In the following chapter, the concept 
and particularities of the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement 
in Brussels II bis will be considered, and whenever it is deemed necessary a 
referral to and comparison with the rules in the Conventions will be undertaken 
to clarify how the Regulation deviates from the existing concepts. This is the 
first cornerstone which will then lead to the issues of the interrelation, which will 
be approached as this thesis moves on in the following chapters.   
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Chapter 2 Family Disputes – The framework of the Regulation and the 
Conventions   
A. Jurisdiction, enforcement and recognition in Brussels II bis  
I. The following will analyse the provisions in the Regulation, first on 
jurisdiction, in view of the main concepts established by the ECJ 
during the last decade, with a focus on the connecting factor 'habitual 
residence' and will assess the suitability of those central concepts for 
parental responsibility and custody proceedings. It will consider 
benefits and shortcomings of the individual rules and assess whether 
the rules encourage national courts to have regard to the ‘best 
interests’ of the child concerned as is suggested in the Preamble and 
throughout the Regulation. It will further assess distinctions between 
the central concepts with general legal doctrines developed under the 
Convention on Child Abduction as incorporated in the Regulation or 
taken up by the ECJ and national courts. It will further address whether 
the Regulation is promoting legal certainty by bringing up a new 
approach with respect to the concept of ‘habitual residence’ and 
through the guidance on interpretation provided by the numerous ECJ 
decisions so as to determine if one strength of the rules is that it 
added to continuity and certainty.Jurisdiction in Brussels II bis   
In the following, the concept of jurisdiction in Brussels II bis will be analysed to 
provide an insight to the most relevant provisions in the context of parental 
responsibility and child abduction. Issues on jurisdiction are at the heart of many 
disputes and the specific nature of the provisions seem to draw many cases into 
the ambit of the Regulation, as will be assessed.126 
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1. ‘habitual residence’ – introduction  
In Marinos v Marinos127, not long after the Regulation had entered into force the 
English High Court assumed the concept of habitual residence in Brussels II bis 
very close to the common law concept of domicile and whilst this may be true 
for the common law concept of domicile, there is not much similarity of the 
concept under Brussels II bis to general concept of domicile. Marinos v Marinos 
were proceedings under Brussels II bis concerning the question whether the 
wife was habitually resident in the UK and could therefore issue a petition for 
divorce in the English courts. The judgment considered the significant question 
how the Regulation’s concept of habitual residence had to be interpreted and if 
a difference under the Regulation of the terms "habitual residence" and "reside" 
should be assumed.  
Brussels II bis requires the courts in the Member States to take the Regulation 
as a basis for any consideration regarding parental responsibility, custody and 
abduction cases – the courts are obliged to consider the rules of jurisdiction in 
order to ascertain whether or not jurisdiction can or, depending on the 
applicable Article, must be assumed. If the court may not assume jurisdiction, it 
is obliged to consider whether the courts in any other Member State have 
jurisdiction. Should the court deny this, the national rules would apply. The key 
connecting factor is habitual residence.128  
Though there is no definition of habitual residence in the Regulation or the 
Practice Guide129, the Preamble of the Regulation refers to a “real link” between 
the party concerned and the Member State exercising jurisdiction and a close 
examination of the ECJ case-law established during the last years gives an 
                                            
127 Marinos v Marinos [2007] EWHC 2047 (Fam); 2 FLR 1018.  
128 Articles 3, 5, 7 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Regulation. 
129 Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation (EU Commission, 
2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/brussels_ii_practice_guide_en.pdf, last 
accessed on 30 April 2016, Section 3.2.3.1: “Habitual residence is not defined by the 
Regulation. The meaning of the term should be interpreted in accordance with the objectives 
and purposes of the Regulation. It must be emphasised that the interpretation of habitual 
residence is not determined by reference to any concept of habitual residence under any 
particular national law, but should be accorded an “autonomous” meaning under and for the 
purposes of the law of the European Union. Whether or not in any particular case a child has 
her or his habitual residence in any particular Member State has to be determined by the court 
in each case on the basis of the facts applying to the situation of that particular child.” 
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indication of the minimum requirements necessary for habitual residence130 of 
the child to be assumed. But it also reveals the difficulties entailed by the 
missing definition on the one hand and the chances such an omission may offer 
judges in cases relating to non-Member States on the other hand. As the 
following will explain, habitual residence is one of the cornerstone terms in the 
Regulation, closely linked in various sections with the qualifier ‘if it is in the best 
interests’. 
2. Structure and concept of the jurisdiction provisions  
As regards its content, the Regulation is inspired particularly by the Hague 
Convention on Child Protection.131 Article 8(1) of the Regulation, - like Article 
5(1) of the Convention on Child Protection -, confers jurisdiction on the courts of 
the State of the habitual residence (résidence habituelle) of the child, thereby 
establishing a general rule for jurisdiction.132  
The general scheme for a court seised with a request concerning parental 
responsibility based on Brussels II bis is to establish, first, whether it has 
jurisdiction pursuant to the general rule, Article 8, and if this is not the case, 
whether it has jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 9, 10, 12 or 13. Should none of 
those rules confer jurisdiction to the court, the question will be whether a court 
of another Member State has jurisdiction in accordance with Article 17, and if no 
court is competent under the Regulation, the national court may exercise any 
jurisdiction available under the national law, Article 14. 
Brussels II bis has caused considerable discussion for attaching great 
significance to the availability of a forum for separating couples and parents 
seeking custody or access rights but not containing a set of “central” provisions 
on jurisdiction as can be found in Brussels I. Rather, it offers a rather complex 
                                            
130 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17, was the first case in the ECJ to clarify the meaning 
of the term habitual residence in the Regulation; the second case; Case C-497/10 PPU 
Mercredi v Chaffe was a request by the Court of Appeal to clarify the appropriate test for 
determining the habitual residence of a child for the purpose of Article 8 of the Regulation and 
Article 10 of the Regulation. 
131 Practice Guide (2005) supra note 30, para XI.  
132 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 29 January 2009 on Proceedings brought 
by A, supra note 17. 
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set of rules on jurisdiction regarding rights of access and custody, -parental 
responsibility- and a less complex one on divorce, legal separation and 
marriage annulment.133  
Given the pioneer nature of some rules134 and the ambitious aims of the 
legislator135 that the Regulation shall act in the best interest of the child, it will be 
seen how this is effected by the courts. In the following a more detailed insight 
to the concept and structure of the rules regarding jurisdiction will be provided. 
3. The general rule with regard to children and parental responsibility 
Generally, of the seven alternative bases for jurisdiction provided by the 
Regulation, Article 8 is the provision which most reflects the general principle 
that the most appropriate forum with regard to questions of parental 
responsibility is the Member State of the habitual residence of the child. The 
concept extends to the provisions on matrimonial matters. Hence, in the context 
of matrimonial matters, according to Article 6, a spouse who is habitually 
resident in the territory of an EU Member State may solely be sued in the courts 
of a different Member State if one of the provisions on jurisdiction contained in 
Articles 3-5 of the Regulation applies. 
A change of habitual residence of the child while proceedings are pending does 
not result in a change of jurisdiction. However, the transfer of a case is possible 
in the circumstances stated in Article 15.  
Proceedings regarding A136 raised some important questions regarding the 
interpretation of the Regulation. First it raised the question of how the concept 
                                            
133 de Boer, supra note 87; Caracciolo di Torella, E. and Masselot, A., ‘Under Construction: EU 
Family Law’ (2004) E.L. Rev., 29(1) 32-51, 44; Rauscher, T., supra note 26, p. 37. 
134 Pioneer insofar as the Convention rules are replaced and concepts related thereto are no 
longer the basis for the considerations of the judge; The “Report on the application of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000” demonstrates how much the Regulation has changed but also 
how many uncertainties remain. 
135 Conclusions 33 and 34 of the European Council Meeting at Tampere, 15 and 16 Oct 1999, 
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/civil/recognition/ 
doc_civil_recognition_general_en.htm, last accessed 02 May 2016. 
136 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17. 
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of habitual residence in Article 8(1) of the Regulation, and the associated Article 
13 of the Convention on Child Abduction, are to be interpreted under 
Community law, bearing in mind in particular the situation in which a child has a 
permanent residence in one Member State but is staying in another Member 
State. Second, the question was whether a case, after the taking of the 
protective measure, has to be transferred of the court's own motion to the court 
of the Member State with jurisdiction. In Proceedings brought by A137, a 
reference to the ECJ by a Finnish court, a case in which children C, D and E 
were taken into immediate care and placed in a foster-family, the Court held, 
that due to the absence of a definition in Article 8(1) of the Regulation of the 
concept of ‘habitual residence’, must be considered in the light of the context 
and the objective of the Regulation, above all the best interests of the child.138 
In contrast to McEleavy’s assumption that the ECJ might refer to the 
‘connecting factor’ or to residence for a certain period of time139 the Court held 
that its case-law relating to the concept of habitual residence in other areas of 
European Union law may not be directly transposed to the context of Article 8 of 
the Regulation but that the habitual residence must be established by 
considering all circumstances of the respective individual case.140 Emphasising 
that physical presence is insufficient, the Court underlined that the residence of 
the child must reflect some degree of integration in a social and family 
environment. The other significant question regarded the conditions for adopting 
a protective measure such as the taking into care of children under Article 20(1) 
of the Regulation and the question whether such a measure may be applied 
pursuant to the rules of national law and, additionally, whether the case must be 
transferred to the court of another Member State having jurisdiction after such a 
                                            
137 ibid. 
138 ibid, para 44; the term must be „interpreted as meaning that it corresponds to the place which 
reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment. [...] in 
particular the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a 
Member State and the family’s move to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and 
conditions of attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships 
of the child in that State must be taken into consideration. It is for the national court to establish 
the habitual residence of the child“. 
139 McEleavy, P. (2004), supra note 26, 503-512. 
140 supra note 132, paras 37 et seq. 
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measure has been taken. The questions to the Court showed a full set of 
complex issues relating to the interpretation of the Regulation, all of which will 
be touched upon again in the separate chapters on the respective aspects. For 
instance with regard to provisional and protective measures in urgent cases, the 
Court held that measures may be taken by a national court under Article 20 if 
such measures are indeed urgent and provisional.141 This interpretation will be 
analysed in Chapter 2 B I-II on provisional measures.  
According to the Advocate General, the interpretation of habitual residence 
proposed by the Court in this case should be assumed to be equally applicable 
for the other types of jurisdiction directly or indirectly connected in Articles 9, 10 
and 13,142 not least because Article 5(1) of the Convention on Child Protection, 
like Article 8(1) of the regulation, confers jurisdiction in the first place on the 
courts of the State of the habitual residence of the child and the Convention 
particularly acted as a role-model for those rules.143  
4. A reflection on the strength of habitual residence compared to domicile 
The concept of habitual residence is inherent first of all in the general rule on 
jurisdiction but also throughout the Regulation. Though the concept of habitual 
residence has been used very differently in a very flexible way and the ECJ, in 
the short time Brussels II (bis) exists, has not been hesitant to establish a new 
concept for the definition and dispense with the interpretations developed by the 
steady flow of case-law of the Contracting States to the Convention on Child 
Abduction.144 Because of the guideline for the application of the concept 
provided by the ECJ in Proceedings brought by A145 and Mercredi v Chaffe146, 
                                            
141 supra note 132, paras 46 et seq. 
142 supra note 17132, para 19. 
143 Siehr, K., ‘The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and its application in 
the EU and the world’ (2012) IFL 77; Pirrung J., ‘Improvements to international child protection 
as a result of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention’, (2012) IFL 70 at 72.  
144 The term has been interpreted very flexible approach in the UK (Re F (A Minor) (Child 
Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548; Re R (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [2003] EWHC 1968 (Fam), 
[2004] 1 FLR 216; Cameron v Cameron [1996] SC 17. Cf Re P-J (Children) (Abduction: Habitual 
Residence: Consent) [2009] EWCA Civ 588, [2009] 2 FLR 1051.). 
145 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17. 
146 Mercredi v Chaffe, supra note 130. 
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national courts now have to find a way to respect the key requirements defined 
therein. The requirements set forth by the European Court of Justice that 
habitual residence is  
“the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and 
family environment”147  
depend on numerous factors.148 Though it is true that the domicile is generally  
easier to determine149, the concept of habitual residence is an integral part of 
the Convention on Child Abduction.150 Furthermore, to an extent, flexibility, 
which remains possible, may be significant in abduction cases, to allow a court 
to reflect on a particular situation, with particular circumstances.151 The broader 
meaning and interpretation of habitual residence as compared to the strict legal 
concept of domicile enables the court dealing with a cross-border abduction 
case or parental responsibility case to consider circumstances, not simply 
facts.152 As the analysis moves on, it will be seen whether habitual residence is 
not only more suitable than domicile in the context of family law cases but also 
whether the key aspects mentioned by the ECJ are sufficiently clear to give the 
national courts a guideline for the determination of a habitual residence which is 
in the child’s interest. With the general rule on jurisdiction referring to the 
habitual residence of the child as the connecting factor, the Regulation has 
taken up a concept well established in conflict of laws regarding family law153 
but given it a new, independent interpretation, with consequences for every 
provision and concept in the Regulation which mentions the term. In A v A the 
Supreme Court noted that there had been debate as to whether the concept of 
                                            
147 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17, para 44. 
148 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17. 
149 Domicile defines the legal relationship between the individual and that legal system which is 
invoked as his personal law: Mackay, J., Halsbury's Laws of England, Conflict of laws (Volume 
19 (2011)), 2. Domicile and Residence, (1) Nature of Domicile, 336.; A person is domiciled in 
that country in which he either has or is deemed by law to have his permanent home.  
150 supra note 20. 
151 Beaumont, P., McEleavy, P., The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 
Oxford 1999, p.90. 
152 Pursuant to the judgement in the Matter of KL (A Child) [2013] UKSC 75, “there is no legal 
rule, akin to that in the law of domicile, that a child automatically takes the habitual residence of 
his parents”. 
153 Mackay, J., supra note 149, (3) Residence 360. Habitual residence. 
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habitual residence in the case law of the courts of England and Wales for the 
purposes of the Convention on Child Abduction and under English law differed 
from the interpretation of the Court of Justice with respect to the Regulation.154 
The Court held that the concept of the Court of Justice should be favoured. 
Furthermore, the Court brought up the valuable argument that the courts in 
England and Wales had applied a separate concept based on the concept of 
"ordinary residence". It further noted that the concept in R v Barnet London 
Borough Council, ex p Shah155 was not suitable for determining the residence of 
a child applicable to a child, placing too much emphasis on the intentions of the 
parents.156  
It further referred to the temptation of the courts to assume that a child's 
habitual residence was that of those holding parental responsibility  
“there is no legal rule akin to that whereby a child automatically takes the 
domicile of his parents."157 
"[T]he test adopted by the European Court is preferable to that earlier adopted 
by the English courts, being focussed on the situation of the child, with the 
purposes and intentions of the parents being merely one of the relevant factors. 
The test derived from R v Barnet London Borough Council, ex p Shah should be 
abandoned when deciding the habitual residence of a child.”158 
5. Exceptions to the general rule  
Articles 9, 10, 12 and 13 define the requirements for the courts of a Member 
State in which the child is not habitually resident to have jurisdiction. 
Article 9 provides that where a child lawfully relocates from one Member State 
to another and acquires a habitual residence in the respective new state, the 
courts of the former State of habitual residence shall retain jurisdiction for a 
                                            
154 A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 60 [2013] 3 WLR 761.  
155 R v Barnet London Borough Council, ex p Shah [1983] 2 AC 309. 
156 A v A and another, supra note 154, Lord Hughes noted that emphasis should not as such be 
on the parents’ intentions.  
157 ibid. 
158 ibid. 
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period of three months following the move. This operates to preserve the 
opportunity for those who become unable to exercise access rights in the same 
manner as before the move to apply for an appropriate adjustment of access 
rights before the court that granted them such rights. Consequently, the courts 
of the Member State where the child stays subsequent to the move do not have 
jurisdiction in matters of access rights during the three month period 
immediately after arrival of the child. However, Article 9 is subject to several 
conditions, namely that the courts of the Member State of origin must have 
issued a decision on access rights, that it applies only to ‘lawful’159 moves and 
only during the three-month period following the move, that the child must have 
acquired habitual residence in the new Member State during this period and 
that the person holding access rights must still have habitual residence in the 
Member State of origin. Hence, this rule refers to non-abduction situations, 
where a parental responsibility right has led to a move of the child. 
Apart from the fact that those restrictions seem relatively strong and require a 
combination of circumstances, it seems a reasonable necessity that the child 
must have acquired habitual residence in the new Member State.160 It must be 
noted that the courts of the new Member States may decide on matters other 
than access rights and that under the Regulation access orders might take 
advantage of the new ‘fast track’ recognition regime.161 To consider the rule “an 
innovative rule which encourages holders of parental responsibility to agree 
upon the necessary adjustments of access rights before the move”162 is very 
optimistic, as will be seen in the course of the analysis on the recognition of 
orders.  
As for the remaining grounds of jurisdiction, reference will concisely be made to 
jurisdiction based on presence, Article 13 and to residual jurisdiction, Article 14. 
Most rules on jurisdiction reflect the legislator’s favourable ambition that the 
                                            
159 As compared to wrongful removal and retention. 
160 As habitual residence is the connecting factor jurisdiction of the courts of the new Member 
States without the acquiring of habitual residence would have been in discrepancy with the aims 
of the Regulation set forth in the Preamble.  
161 Article 41 of the Regulation. 
162 Practice Guide, supra note 30, section II 2.a. 
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criterion of proximity always has priority and that jurisdiction should always be in 
the Member State of the child's habitual residence, except for few exceptional 
situations.163 But Article 14 is much more complex than it suggests at first sight. 
The provision may lead to the unfortunate situation that decisions in matters 
relating to parental responsibility taken on potentially exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction take advantage of the Regulation's provisions regarding recognition 
and enforcement. Why is that? The predominance of Article 8 hardly allows for 
any exceptions. National rules of jurisdiction are almost never applicable. But 
pursuant to Articles 7 and 14 the national rules are still relevant when no court 
of a Member State has jurisdiction when the connecting factor leads to 
jurisdiction outside the Member States. Hence, in the framework of the rules on 
jurisdiction, Article 14 is less authoritative than the other provisions.  
Closing Chapter II, Section 2 of the Regulation, Article 15 has a uniqueness 
compared to other Community private international law instruments. It allows for 
a transfer of jurisdiction to the courts of another Member State in exceptional 
circumstances. Article 15(3) sets out five circumstances in which a “particular 
connection” to another Member State will be established, namely, where that 
Member State has become the habitual residence of the child after the court 
referred to in paragraph 1 was seised; or is the former habitual residence of the 
child; or (c) is the place of the child's nationality; or is the habitual residence of a 
holder of parental responsibility; or is the place where property of the child is 
located and the case concerns measures for the protection of the child relating 
to the administration, conservation or disposal of this property. The Article is 
based on the functioning and the advantages of cooperation between the courts 
to make certain that even in exceptional cases jurisdiction is allocated in the 
court which most suitably placed to deal with the case, having regard to the best 
interest of the child. Hence, a court which would otherwise have jurisdiction in 
accordance with Article 8 may request the courts of another Member State to 
                                            
163 Recitals (12) of the Regulation. 
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assume jurisdiction if the courts in that Member State are “better placed to hear 
the case”.164 
It remains to be seen how the ECJ will deal with nationality as a connecting 
factor, as mentioned by Article 15(3)(c) of the Regulation. This aspect will be 
considered in more detail when discussing the relation of the Regulation and 
the Convention on Child Protection. 
6. The particularity of jurisdiction in child abduction cases 
Whilst the Convention on Child Abduction solely provides legal remedies to 
interrupt the period of undisturbed presence and to hinder the acquisition of a 
habitual residence in the state to which the child was abducted, in Brussels II 
bis, jurisdiction in child abduction cases is governed by a special rule, Article 10, 
which builds on the concept of Article 7 of the Convention on Child 
Protection165. Hence, under the Regulation, generally the courts of the Member 
State in which the child was habitually resident before the abduction remain 
competent to decide on the substance of the case also after the abduction.166 
Jurisdiction may be attributed to the courts of the Member State to which the 
child was abducted under strict conditions.167 With regard to jurisdiction in 
abduction cases, the Regulation is based on the seemingly simple approach 
that it applies whenever a child is habitually resident in a Member State where a 
child has been abducted to or from a Member State. The relationship between 
                                            
164 Article 15(1) of Brussels II bis; as discussed herein at p.43 and 48. 
165 Pursuant to the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Convention, p. 133, the 
“rights of custody” referred to in Article 7 are those that have been attributed under the law of 
the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or 
retention (Art. 7(2)) available at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/handbook34en.pdf, last accessed  
02 May 2016. 
166 Practice Guide (2005), supra note 30. 
167 The Regulation allows for the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of the requested Member 
State in two situations only: Situation 1: The child has acquired habitual residence in the 
requested Member State and all those with rights of custody have acquiesced in the abduction 
or Situation 2: The child has acquired habitual residence in the requested Member State and 
has resided in that Member State for at least one year after those with rights of custody learned 
or should have learned of the whereabouts of the child and the child has settled in the new 
environment and, additionally, at least one of the following conditions is met: no request for the 
return of the child has been lodged within the year after the left-behind parent knew or should 
have known the whereabouts of the child; a request for return was made but has been 
withdrawn and no new request has been lodged within that year. 
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the Regulation and the Convention on Child Abduction is based on a seemingly 
simple formula that in matters covered by the Regulation this new law prevails 
over the provisions of the Convention on Child Abduction. However, before 
analysing in depth the interaction, the structure of the Regulation’s provision 
should be given consideration.  
Two aims are supposed to be met by Article 10. The wording has the objective 
of avoiding that the abductor initiates proceedings in the Member State to which 
the child was abducted and to have respect to a change in the habitual 
residence of the child which may have occurred.168 By not generally denying the 
courts of the new habitual residence jurisdiction the rule remedies the alleged 
failure of the Convention on Child Abduction that the court of the State to which 
the child has been wrongfully moved may hear the case on the merits if the 
return of the child has been refused. However, the question is how much 
discretion the courts of the Member State have to determine if they have 
jurisdiction since there are temporal and substantive conditions. The courts of 
the former habitual residence retain jurisdiction under Article 10 even if the 
former habitual residence has been lost and the new habitual residence has not 
yet been acquired. This exceptional construct impedes that the courts of the 
state in which the child is present, i.e. the courts of the state to which the child 
was abducted, have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the courts of the former habitual 
residence is extended and only under exceptional circumstances the courts of 
the Member States with the new habitual residence acquire jurisdiction.  
Article 10 followed by Article 11 by virtue of which the return of the child is 
organised judicially. Article 11 has the alleged aim of setting the rule for a return 
procedure not replacing the concept of the Convention on Child Abduction but 
complementing it.169 As will be analysed in detail in the section on the 
relationship of the Regulation and the Convention in Chapters 3 A IV-V and 4 B 
                                            
168 “The Regulation aims at deterring parental child abduction between Member States and, if 
such nevertheless take place, ensuring the prompt return of the child to his or her Member State 
of origin”, Practice Guide 2005, supra note 30, Chapter VII. 
169 Recital 17 of the Regulation “In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return of 
the child should be obtained without delay, and to this end the Hague Convention of 25 October 
1980 would continue to apply as complemented by the provisions of this Regulation”. 
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I, the rule has not just completed the rules of the Convention but rather is a 
considerable change of the concept underlying the Convention in this 
respect.170 Whilst Article 13 of the Convention on Abduction allows for a non-
return order by the requested court, Article 11 of the Regulation prioritises the 
return of the child. As already set forth in Article 10, the courts of the former 
habitual residence maintain jurisdiction.  
Decisions rendered in the State of the former habitual residence of the child 
have priority and with respect to litigation over the return of the child the priority 
is also granted by Article 11(8).  
In general, the courts of the original habitual residence retain jurisdiction if the 
child is wrongfully removed or retained after having visited a person holding 
rights of access and the courts of the Member States to which the child was 
removed or where the child is retained do not have jurisdiction unless the child 
becomes habitually resident and either each person having rights of custody 
has acquiesced in the removal or retention or the child has resided in the state 
of wrongful removal for one year after those having rights of custody had actual 
or constructive knowledge of the residence and additionally, the child is settled 
in the new environment.171 Whilst settlement in the new environment needs to 
be regarded as a cornerstone of habitual residence172 and thus closely linked to 
the definition of this term wrongful removal is the central aspect in Articles 10 
and 11. It is the initiating event for the concepts set forth in Articles 10 and 11 of 
the Regulation. The definition of wrongful removal in Article 2 (11) of the 
Regulation takes up the concept presented in Article 7(2) of the Convention on 
Child Protection.173 Wrongful removal or retention shall never be sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction. In such a situation, the only competent courts are the courts 
                                            
170 McEleavy, P., supra note 25.  
171 Art 11 of the Regulation. 
172 Article 12 of the Convention on Child Abduction provides “The judicial or administrative 
authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period 
of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, 
unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.”; Article 10 of the 
Convention takes up this idea: “[...] had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child 
is settled in his or her new environment and at least one of the following conditions is met [...]”. 
173 Article 3 in the Convention on Child Abduction defines the term ‘‘wrongful’’.  
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of the State of origin and only under some conditions the courts of the State 
where the child has acquired a new habitual residence have jurisdiction. Those 
conditions are similarly worded than the conditions laid down in Article 7 of the 
Convention on Child Protection and are set forth as an alternative, as either the 
explicit acquiescence (sub-paragraph (a)) or the inactivity (sub-paragraph (b)) of 
the holder of rights of Custody is required. Each person having rights of custody 
has to acquiesce, and in case of joint custody, all the holders must acquiesce. 
Besides, acquiescence has a different value in the Regulation than in the 
Convention on Child Abduction. Pursuant to Article 16 of the Convention on 
Child Abduction, the courts of the new habitual residence can acquire 
jurisdiction over custody rights a non-return order, acquiescence being one of 
the multiple conditions necessary to obtain such an order. A non-return order is 
however sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the new habitual 
residence. 
In contrast, under Article 7 of the Convention on Child Protection and Article 10 
of the Regulation, a non-return order is not sufficient for the courts of the new 
habitual residence to acquire jurisdiction.  
Acquiescence is required. Pursuant to sub paragraph (b) jurisdiction may shift if 
a child has settled, has actually spent a significant period of time in the 
environment and acquired a new habitual residence. 
Additionally, the requirement is that the holder of the rights has not asked for 
the return of the child. For a significant period of time during which the child has 
settled in the new state a substantial finding by the court is required that the 
child “is settled in his or her new environment”.174 Whilst this is the same 
wording as in Article 7 of the Convention on Child Protection, it is evident only 
with respect to the Regulation that judicial discretion will be exercised in the 
best interest of the child, as it is the general principle laid down in the 
Preamble.175 
                                            
174 Article 10 b of the Regulation.  
175 Regulation, recital (12). 
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However, Article 11 (8) of the Regulation provides, in any loophole situation, for 
priority of decisions of the Member State where the child was habitually resident 
prior to the removal, such priority also applying over a non-return order.  
In the Regulation the condition of general inactivity is either fulfilled when the 
holder of the rights of custody has not lodged any request for the return of the 
child (point i), or has withdrawn the request (point ii). Such situation is also part 
of the two Conventions but with a different scope as will be explained later.176 
With complete inactivity the rule suggests that it is in the best interest of the 
child to give jurisdiction to the courts of the State to which the child has been 
abducted more than a year before, in which the child has settled, and from 
which the owner of the rights of custody has made no attempt to remove the 
child. The second assumed situation (point iii) is linked to the procedural 
particularities of the return procedure, but the aspect of inactivity of the holder of 
the rights of custody is maintained. As will be discussed in more detail in the 
specific chapter, Article 11 is the provision aiming at the organisation of a 
precise coordination between the Convention on Child Abduction and the 
Regulation. In that regard Articles 11(6) and (7) set forth the action that has to 
be taken in the courts of the State where the child was habitually resident. 
The holder of custody who did not consent to the removal (the left behind) gets 
the chance to appear before the court of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident, such court having jurisdiction on the merits. 
However, if the left-behind parent does not react within three months of the date 
of notification it can be assumed that he has either acquiesced or taken into 
account the non-return order and the courts of the new habitual residence of the 
child acquire jurisdiction over the merits.  
As will be analysed in more detail in the chapter on interaction, it is hence 
possible that the proceedings have been closed in the State of origin before the 
one-year period expires. The court of the state of origin retains jurisdiction as 
                                            
176 as discussed at p.107 et seqq. and 142 et seqq. herein. 
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Article 11(7) states that the court seised shall close the case “without prejudice 
to the rules on jurisdiction contained in this Regulation”.  
Further explanation is useful for understanding the implications of this aspect. 
As was mentioned, a key provision of the rules on jurisdiction regarding child 
abduction in the Regulation is the rule dealing with refusal of the court of the 
requested state to make a return order under Article 13.177 
Pursuant to Article 11(7) the court must immediately notify the parties, who 
have three months to bring custody proceedings. This procedure was the 
subject of the reference to the ECJ in Rinau.178  
In that case, during pending divorce proceedings in Germany, where the 
divorcing couple had lived throughout their marriage, the mother and child 
remained in Lithuania after a holiday. The German court provisionally awarded 
custody of the child to the father, the decision was upheld on appeal. The father 
then brought Convention proceedings for the child's return but this was refused 
by the Lithuanian court. Though the refusal to return was later overturned by the 
Lithuanian Court of Appeal and the children ordered to be returned to Germany, 
the enforcement of that decision was repeatedly suspended. Subsequently, the 
German court granted the divorce, awarded full custody to the father and 
ordered the mother to return the child, with an Article 42 certificate enclosed to 
the decision. As the mother brought proceedings in Lithuania for non-
recognition of the German custody and return order under the Regulation, the 
proceedings were brought before the Supreme Court which then made the 
reference to the ECJ: given that the refusal to return had been overturned, had 
the German court correctly invoked Art 11(8)?.179 Pursuant to the ECJ the 
German court had acted right and the Lithuanian court had to recognise and 
enforce the return order. Hence, an Article 11(8) judgment accompanied by an 
Article 42 certificate may only be issued following a decision not to return the 
child made by the requested state.  
                                            
177 Lowe, N., ‘A Review of the Application of Article 11 of the Revised Brussels II Regulation’, 
IFL (2009), 27-34. 
178 Rinau, supra note 19. 
179 ibid. 
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Pursuant to the Court it was irrelevant for the purposes of issuing a certificate 
that the non-return decision had been ‘suspended, overturned, set aside or, in 
any event, has not become res judicata or has been replaced by a decision 
ordering return, insofar as the return of the child has not actually taken place'; 
and “the requested court must therefore declare the enforceability of the 
certified decision and allow the child's immediate return”. Hence, to conclude on 
Article 11, the most notable element of Article 11 is the mechanism which is 
applied where a non-return order is made on the basis of Article 13; the 
authorities in the State of the child's habitual residence may thereby rule on 
whether the child should be sent back notwithstanding the non-return order. If a 
subsequent return order is made under Article 11(7) of the Regulation and is 
certified by the issuing judge, this return order is automatically enforceable in all 
EU-Member States.180 Rinau also touches upon other interesting aspects in 
respect to the Regulation which will be examined in the respective chapters. It is 
suggested that the legislator has taken a courageous step when including 
abduction in the Regulation not least since there are four major differences in 
applications made under the Regulation in comparison to those made under the 
Convention.181 As will become even more evident in Chapters 3 A  and 4 on the 
interrelation of the Convention and the Regulation, it was a far-reaching 
approach to include a matter covered by the Convention with the Regulation, 
with obvious implications on cases involving Member and non-Member States. 
                                            
180 Article 11(7) of the Regulation - Return Order Granted: Re A (Custody Decision after Maltese 
Non-Return Order) [2006] EWHC 3397; Article 11(7) of the Regulation - Return Order Refused: 
Re A HA v MB (Brussels II Revised: Article 11(7) Application) [2007] EWHC 2016 (Fam), [2008] 
1 FLR 289. 
181 The court is required to hear the views of the child unless this appears inappropriate having 
regard to the age or degree of maturity of the child, Article 11(2). 2. The court is required to hear 
the views of the applicant parent if it is considering not to return the child, Article 11(5). 3. The 
court may not refuse to order a return even if a defense of grave risk to the child has been made 
out under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention provided it is established that adequate 
arrangements have been made to ensure the protection of the child after his or her return. 4. If 
an order refusing a return has been made, the applicant or abducting parent may –within three 
months of the non-return order- request the court of the country from which the child was 
abducted to hear and determine the issue of custody/residence of the child. 
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7. Prorogation of jurisdiction 
Article 12 enables a court of a Member State in which the child is not habitually 
resident to decide on a case either because the case is connected with a 
pending divorce proceeding, or since the child has a substantial connection with 
this Member State. The Article refers to two situations - first if divorce 
proceedings are pending in a Member State, the courts of that Member State do 
have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility connected with the 
divorce182 and second, the courts of a Member State may have jurisdiction in 
matters of parental responsibility even if the child is not habitually resident but 
when there is a substantial connection and proceedings are pending other than 
for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment on a ground of jurisdiction 
set out in Article 3. The question of what a substantial connection is has 
indirectly been dealt with in a preliminary reference to the European Court of 
Justice in L v M, R and K.183This reference raised the question as to whether 
Article 12(3) must be interpreted as establishing jurisdiction over proceedings 
concerning parental responsibility even where no other related proceedings are 
pending. The Court answered in the affirmative. Furthermore, it held that Article 
12(3)  
“must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be considered that the 
jurisdiction of the court seised by one party of proceedings in matters of 
parental responsibility has been ‘accepted expressly or otherwise in an 
unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings’ within the meaning of 
that provision where the defendant in those first proceedings subsequently 
brings a second set of proceedings before the same court and, on taking the 
                                            
182 Pursuant to the Practice Guide (2005), supra note 30, the court of the divorce proceedings 
has jurisdiction provided the following conditions are met: when at least one of the spouses has 
parental responsibility in relation to the child, and the spouses and all holders of parental 
responsibility accept the jurisdiction of the divorce court, whether by express acceptance or 
unequivocal conduct and (emphasis added) The jurisdiction of that court is in the superior 
interests of the child. This superior interest is equal to the best interest pursuant to the 
explanation of the Practice Guide, section VI. 
183 Case C-656/13, L v M, R and K, [2015] OJ C16/8 
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first step required of him in the first proceedings, pleads the lack of jurisdiction 
of that court.”184  
Another preliminary reference was brought to the ECJ by the Court of Appeal in 
the case E v B185 In this case the question was, if, where there has been a 
prorogation of the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State in relation to matters 
of parental responsibility pursuant to Article 12(3), prorogation of jurisdiction 
only continues until there has been a final judgment in those proceedings or 
does it continue even after the making of a final judgment. The European Court 
of Justice gave a preliminary ruling that jurisdiction which had been prorogued 
under Art 12(3) of the Regulation in favour of a court of a Member State before 
which proceedings were brought by mutual agreement of the holders of parental 
responsibility ceased following a final judgment in those proceedings. However, 
in both situations under Article 12(3) the cornerstone requirement is the child’s 
best interest.  
Only if no habitual residence can be established and if no jurisdiction is 
allocated by means of Article 12, the courts of the Member State in which the 
child is present have jurisdiction under Article 13(1) of the Regulation. With no 
decisions on Article 13 by the European Court of Justice except for Mercredi v 
Chaffe186 and no explanation in the Practice Guide it is hard to establish the 
legislator’s intention behind this article and it remains to be seen how Article 13 
will be applied in the national courts.  
8. Rules on derogation in favour of national law  
In a provision on parental responsibility equivalent in its effect to the provision 
regarding divorce cases, Article 7, Article 14 refers jurisdiction to the respective 
Member State’s national law on private international law if no court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 8 to 13. As the Green Paper on Brussels I187 
                                            
184 ibid, para 59. 
185 Case C-436/13, E v B, OJ C421/14. 
186 Mercredi v Chaffe, supra note 130. 
187 Green Paper on the re view of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 66. 
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suggested amendments to the equivalent rule in Regulation No. 44/2001, it 
remains to be seen if amendments will be proposed with regard to Articles 7 
and 14 of Brussels II bis. Such amendments seem unlikely since the last Green 
Paper solely referred to jurisdiction with regard to divorce and Rome III was the 
result.188 The most recent suggested amendments to Brussels I189 proposed the 
removal of the rule so as  
“to promote the interests of claimants and defendants and promote the proper 
administration of justice within the Union, the circumstance that the defendant is 
domiciled in a third State should no longer entail the non-application of certain 
Union rules on jurisdiction, and there should no longer be any referral to 
national law.”190  
Under the revised Brussels I Regulation, the situations in which national law is 
referred to are now reduced since the revised Regulation provides for further 
exceptions to the rule referring to the national rules on private international law 
by addressing a number of circumstances under which Member State courts 
can exercise jurisdiction even if the defendant is not domiciled within the EU.191 
It will have to been seen if a solution to this loophole in Article 14 is brought up 
by the EU Commission.  
                                            
188 Green Paper on applicable law and jurisdiction in divorce matters, COM/2005/0082 final, 
published on 14 March 2005, not published in the OJ, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_
matters/l33255_en.htm, last accessed 02 May 2016; as the subject matter of the paper is 
divorce only, Article 14 is not mentioned. 
189 Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (Recast) COM(2010) 748 final: The proposal would have 
extended the Regulation's jurisdiction rules to third country defendants. This amendment would 
have generally extended the possibilities of companies and citizens to sue third country 
defendants in the EU because the special rules of jurisdiction which e.g. establish jurisdiction at 
the place of contractual performance become available in these cases. More specifically, the 
amendment would have ensured that the protective jurisdiction rules available for consumers, 
employees and insured will also apply if the defendant is domiciled outside the EU. The 
proposal further harmonises the subsidiary jurisdiction rules and creates two additional fora for 
disputes involving defendants domiciled outside the EU.  
190 ibid. 
191 Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012. 
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II. General assessment – jurisdictional structure 
The set of rules on the determination of jurisdiction in Brussels II bis are built on 
the assumption that the courts of the Member State in which the child or 
children is/are habitually resident are best suited to assume jurisdiction over 
cases of parental responsibility and abduction. The general rule is not complex 
itself, rather the lack of a definition of how habitual residence should be 
determined made it difficult for the national courts to apply the rule. With the 
explanatory decisions presented in Mercredi v Chaffe192 and Proceedings 
brought by A193 national courts now have a guideline how to determine habitual 
residence under the Regulation. However, as discussed, there are exceptions 
to the general rule. Articles 9, 10, 12 and 13 define the requirements for the 
courts of a Member State in which the child is not habitually resident to have 
jurisdiction under the Regulation. Article 9 and 15 have been praised in the 
original Practice Guide194 as being “innovative”, in the 2014 edition, such praise 
was limited to Article 15.195 Article 15, which establishes a sui generis forum 
non conveniens jurisdiction for national courts only in relation to children in 
situations where it is deemed that the transfer of a case to another court would 
be in the child's best interests, is a novelty. However, this novelty results from 
the fact that the Regulation applies to parental responsibility and divorce 
proceedings. Quite a number of cases have been decided on the interpretation 
of Article 15.196 In the Court of Appeal case of Re M197 where the child with 
Czech nationality had always been resident in England and Wales and was in 
foster care, the issue of the conditions for a transfer were critically examined. 
The court held that the power to transfer under Article 15 was is an exception to 
the general rule of jurisdiction under Article 8 and that exceptions to general 
principles had to be narrowly interpreted. Confirming the approach in AB v 
                                            
192 Mercredi v Chaffe, supra note 130. 
193 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17.  
194 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2005), supra note30, section II 2 and III.  
195 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2014), supra note 129, section 3.3. 
196 Re M (A Child) [2014] Fam Law 966, [2014] 2 FLR 1372, [2014] EWCA Civ 152, [2014] 2 
FCR 585, [2014] WLR(D) 92. 
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JLB198 and thereby clarifying the difficulties of the interpretation of Article 15, the 
Appeal Court’s decision can be regarded as at least a step forward. But this is a 
step forward in the English courts. There is no authoritative interpretation by the 
ECJ. As Munby J argued “the ambit of the discretion is likely to be limited in 
most cases, for the court cannot direct a transfer unless all three conditions are 
met while, on the other hand, since the discretion is exercisable only if the court 
has satisfied itself both that the other court is “better placed” to deal with the 
case than it is and that it is in the best interests of the child to transfer the 
case,”199 This case makes more than evident how difficult it has been for the 
national courts to interpret exceptional rules in the Regulation the concept of 
which is ‘innovative’ in the view of the European legislator,200 but distinct from 
well-known concepts. 
With regard to jurisdiction in abduction cases, the Regulation is based on the 
seemingly simple approach that it applies whenever a child is habitually resident 
in a Member State where a child has been abducted to or from a Member State.  
The conditions set forth in Article 10 are alternatives, either the explicit 
acquiescence or the inactivity is required.201  
                                            
198 AB v JLB [2008] EWHC 2965 (Fam) para 36. 
199 ibid; as discussed herein at p. 50, 54, 69, 106, 140, 152 et seqq..  
200 Practice Guide (2005), supra note 30, section II 2 and III. 
201 Sub-paragraph (a) and sub-paragraph (b) of Article 10. 
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B. The context of orders, provisional measures and matrimonial matters  
I. This part of the chapter addresses the particularities of the rules on 
orders, the Regulation's and the ECJ's interpretations of the concepts 
regarding provisional measures, and the case-law on measures in 
complex situations where children are resident in third states, where 
there are parallel proceedings or where it is difficult to determine the 
place of habitual residence of the child, all with a view on whether the 
best interests are endangered or preserved. The Regulation’s rules 
regarding court orders, provisional measures and the best interests 
Provisional measures have been an issue of discussion in the context of the 
first European provisions on jurisdiction, enforcement and recognition. Under 
the processor of Brussels I, the Brussels Convention,202 the ECJ as early as in 
1990 considered the question of provisional measures.203 Pursuant to Article 31 
of Brussels I an individual may apply to the court of another Member State for 
provisional measures prior to the judgment even if a court in a Member State 
was first seised. However, the provision does not provide an applicant with a 
remedy but solely permits Member States to provide reliefs the respective 
domestic law allows for. Whilst the case-law on provisional measures under 
Brussels I was already quite disputed204, the rules on provisional measures in 
Brussels II bis are even more complex.  
According to the Van Uden doctrine of the ECJ205 the granting of provisional 
and protective measures requires a real connecting link between the subject-
matter of the measures sought and the forum. However, it remains unclear 
whether a ‘real connecting link’ is similar to the minimum contacts test found in 
                                            
202 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. 
203 Case C-115/88 Mario Reichert et al v Dresdner Bank, [1990], ECR 1-27, para 34. 
204 Dickinson, A., 'Provisional Measures in the "Brussels I" Review: Disturbing the Status Quo?' 
(2010) 6 JPIL Law 519. 
205 Case C-391/95, van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line et al [1998] ECR I-7091, I-7135. 
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US law, mentioned further above,206 or whether it imposes a territorial 
restriction.207 Brussels II bis is different insofar as Article 20(2) imposes a 
requirement as to the temporary nature of the measure, a scheme adapted from 
the Hague Convention on Child Protection. However the wording of Article 31 
makes evident that the temporary nature is equally necessary. Though in van 
Uden the Court held that the limitation of Article 3 does not apply to provisional 
measures, neither Article 31 Brussels I nor Article 20 Brussels II bis create a 
new basis for jurisdiction. The basis for jurisdiction lies in national law and the 
ECJ has underlined the necessity of limiting the exorbitant use of interim 
protective measures.208 Provided that the courts of any Member State have 
jurisdiction, Article 31 is applicable, however the main proceedings should never 
be neglected.209 Even if provisional measures may be granted after a judgment 
but before a declaration of enforceability in accordance with Article 47(1), it 
must be remembered that those measures are of a temporary nature.  
For both Brussels II bis and the Hague Conventions it seems adequate to argue 
that the court must “ensure that provisional measures are not used to frustrate 
internationally agreed principles of jurisdiction”, an argument mentioned by 
Lawrence with regard to Article 31.210  
                                            
206 Whilst the US courts return to applying the concept developed in International Shoe 
(International Shoe Co v Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 319; CompuServe, Inc. v Patterson, 
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir 1996) to examine the defendant's “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state, Article 2 and the requirement of domicile are not built so as to allow for considerations of 
litigation fairness. Brussels I places an emphasis on the obligation underlying the dispute and 
Articles 15-16 are designed to be protective pursuant to such a contractual obligation. Brussels 
II bis has a different emphasis; Schlosser, Hess, B., Pfeiffer, T., Schlosser, P., Study 
JLS/C4/2005/03, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member 
States, September 2007, p.104, at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/civil/studies/do
c/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf, last accessed 02 May 2016, p.133 et seq. illustrates the 
disadvantages of a lack of certainty in the Member States’ courts- this is even more tragic in 
child custody cases. 
207 Schulz, A., ’Einstweilige Maßnahmen nach dem Brüsseler Gerichtsstand- und 
Vollstreckungsübereinkommen in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften (EuGH)’ (2001) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 805-836; Warner, S., 
Middlemiss, S., ’Patent litigation in multiple jurisdictions: an end to cross border relief in 
Europe?’, Case Comment, (2006) EIPR, 28(11), 580-585. 
208 van Uden, supra note 205, for a comment on this particular issue in Aird, R. ‘Interim 
protective measures which provide security towards a common security measure’ (2002) CJQ 
21(Jul), 271-281. 
209 van Uden, supra note 205. 
210 Lawrence in Wermuth v Wermuth (No 1) [2003] 1 FLR 1022, para.38. 
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In Proceedings regarding A the Court refused to apply the case-law on Article 
24 of the Brussels Convention, - the predecessor of Article 31 of Brussels- I, to 
the provisional measures ordered in accordance with Brussels II bis.211 Under 
Brussels I with its entirely commercial focus provisional measures aim at 
maintaining a factual or legal situation. Due to the provisional interference with 
defendant’s rights, the court must take a decision as to which measures are 
ordered.212 The aim of provisional measures in a commercial case differs from 
the aim of those ordered in accordance with Brussels II bis. Jurisdiction with 
regard to a provisional measure under Brussels II bis has a totally different aim. 
It is a significant tool in urgent cases, in which a provisional arrangement in 
respect of the persons, and in particular of course the children, concerned is 
substantial while, at the same time, the substance of the matter is or will be 
decided elsewhere. Applications for interim relief may either be filed before the 
court which has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case, or before another 
court pursuant to the conditions set out by Article 20 of the Regulation. Brussels 
II bis does not set forth that a request for provisional relief may be stayed just 
because jurisdiction is considered to be exclusively vested in the court which is 
competent to hear the main proceedings.213 
Article 20 allows a court take steps to protect a party even if this court does not 
have jurisdiction under Brussels II bis. In Purrucker II214, in 2010, the ECJ 
referred back to Purrucker I215 and noted that Article 20 of the Regulation may 
not be regarded as a provision which determines substantive jurisdiction. It 
further noted that due to the objective of the Regulation to ensure, “in the best 
interests of the child, [that] the court which is nearest the child and which, 
accordingly, is best informed of the child’s situation and state of development, 
takes the necessary decisions.”216  
                                            
211 Proceedings regarding A, supra note 17. 
212 van Uden, supra note 205. 
213 Case C-296/10, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez (‘Purrucker II’) official summary 
of the judgement para 3. 
214 ibid. 
215 Case C-256/09, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez (‘Purrucker I’). 
216 Purrucker II, supra note 213, para 84. 
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It further held that the provisions of Article 19(2) (court second seized must stay 
proceedings where proceedings relating to parental responsibility relating to the 
same child and involving the same cause of action are brought before courts of 
different Member States) are not applicable where a court first seised is solely 
seised for the purpose of provisional measures within the meaning of Article 20 
of the Regulation and where a court of another Member State having jurisdiction 
with regard to substance of the cause is seised second of an action directed at 
obtaining the same measures.217 In this case, all parties who submitted 
observations agreed that there cannot be lis pendens between an action 
brought to obtain provisional measures within the meaning of Article 20 and an 
action initiating substantive proceedings.218 The Court’s repeated reference to 
the best interests of the child demonstrates the emphasis it lays on respecting 
Recitals 12, 16 and 21 of the preamble.219 It argued that, when the interest of 
the child requires a judgment which may be recognised in Member States other 
than that of the court second seised, that it is the duty of that court to proceed 
with consideration of the action brought before it if a reasonable time has 
passed since the party claiming lis pendens, the court first seised and the 
central authority were contacted to determine the cause of action of 
proceedings and jurisdiction.220 Purrucker was a complex case insofar as there 
were three sets of proceedings: the first, brought by the father in Spain 
regarding provisional measures and rights of custody, the second, brought in 
Germany by the father, regarding the enforcement of the judgment of the 
Spanish court granting provisional measures and the third, brought by the 
mother in Germany, regarding the award of rights of custody. The proceedings 
                                            
217 ibid. 
218 ibid, Observations submitted on behalf of: Ms Purrucker, by B. Steinacker, Rechtsanwältin; 
the German Government, by J. Möller and J. Kemper, acting as Agents; the Czech 
Government, by M. Smolek, acting as Agent; the Spanish Government, by J. López-Medel 
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barrister; the European Commission, by A.-M. Rouchaud-Joët and S. Grünheid, acting as 
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219 Purrucker I, supra note 215, reference is made in paras 15, 36 and 91.  
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commenced in Germany to obtain enforcement of the judgment of the Juzgado 
de Primera Instancia221 gave rise to the judgment in Purrucker I.222  
Purrucker clarified some fundamental questions concerning the enforcement of 
provisional measures. It made clear that, if a court having jurisdiction because 
of one of Articles 8–14 of the Regulation adopts provisional measures regarding 
custody, the recognition and enforcement of those measures in the other 
Member States is governed by Article 21 et seq. Conversely, if a court, which 
has not based its jurisdiction on Article 8 et seq., adopts a provisional measure, 
Article 21 et seq. are not applicable. 
Emphasising that the courts have to distinguish provisional measures of a court 
with jurisdiction as to the substantive matter from measures based on Article 20, 
the ECJ made clear that the respective court has to establish whether the court 
of origin based its jurisdiction on Article 8 et seq. of the Regulation or not. 
Criticising the Spanish court, the ECJ stated that a decision may be assumed to 
have been adopted in accordance with the jurisdiction rules of the Regulation if 
an order for a provisional measure contains a correct reasoning concerning its 
jurisdiction in respect to the substantive matter. To refer back to the original 
question, the German Federal Court had submitted to the ECJ: The Federal 
Court requested whether the provisions laid down in Article 21 et seq. of the 
Regulation also apply to enforceable provisional measures, relating to rights of 
custody, within the meaning of Article 20 of the Regulation. The ECJ ruled that the 
provisions laid down in Article 21 et seq. of the Regulation “do not apply to 
provisional measures, relating to rights of custody, falling within the scope of Article 
20 of that regulation”.223 
It may be argued that Article 20 can only ever be used in very exceptional 
circumstances224. In Purrucker I the ECJ laid a strong emphasis on the 
                                            
221 The Spanish court system is not as simple as the English one. This court is a lower court, 
OLG Stuttgart (higher regional court in Germany) of 22 September 2008 ordered the 
enforcement of a judgment of the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 4 of S an Lorenzo de El 
Escorial (Spain) awarding custody of those children to their father. 
222 Purrucker I, supra note 215. 
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character of provisional measures- on the one hand it argued that the 
importance of the provisional measures and their possible consequences for 
young children required that a person affected by such a procedure, even if that 
person has been heard, should be able to bring an appeal against the judgment 
ordering those measures in order, so as to dispute that the conditions set forth 
in Article 20 of the Regulation were satisfied,225 before a court which is different 
from the court which adopted the measures and which is capable of ruling 
promptly – inter alia, to challenge the substantive jurisdiction which that court 
attributed to itself, or, if it is not evident from the judgment that that court had, or 
had attributed to itself, substantive jurisdiction on the basis of that regulation, to 
dispute that the conditions set out in Article 20 of the Regulation as restated in 
this judgment,226 were satisfied. Then again it argued that “it should be possible 
to bring that appeal without the fact of doing so creating any legal presumption 
whatsoever that the person bringing the appeal accepts the substantive 
jurisdiction which the court which adopted the provisional measures may have 
attributed to itself.”227 In Purrucker II some issues were reviewed.228 The 
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Higher Regional Court)229 had decided that Article 
19(2) of the Regulation is not concerned with the relationship between the 
substantive proceedings and proceedings for provisional measures as those 
proceedings have different objectives. Amtsgericht Stuttgart (district court) 
stayed proceedings and referred three questions to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling: 
“(1) Is Article 19(2) of Regulation [2201/2003] applicable if a court of a Member 
State first seised by one party to resolve matters of parental responsibility is 
called upon to grant only provisional measures and a court of another Member 
State subsequently seised by the other party of an action with the same object 
is called upon to rule on the substance of the matter? 
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(2) Is [Article 19(2)] also applicable if a ruling in the isolated proceedings for 
provisional measures in one Member State is not capable of recognition in 
another Member State within the meaning of Article 21 of the Regulation? 
(3) Is the seising of a court in a Member State for isolated proceedings for 
provisional measures to be equated to seising as to the substance of the matter 
within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Regulation if under the national rules 
of procedure of that State a subsequent action to rule on the substance of the 
matter must be brought before that court within a specified period in order to 
avoid adverse procedural consequences.”’230  
Purrucker I and Purrucker II provide a good insight into what the ECJ considers 
the rationale behind the Regulation’s rules on provisional measures and the 
relationship with the other rules on substantive jurisdiction. It provided a 
guideline as to how to determine whether a court is ‘first seised' as to substance 
or as to provisional measures.  
As of particular interest with respect to the best interests of children, the ECJ 
ruled that the court second seised is not required to wait forever for the 
information from which it can determine whether it can assume jurisdiction. 
Whilst this works in support of the provision of provisional measures, there is 
still the question clarify what is to happen if conflicting rulings as to the 
substance of the matter are eventually delivered.231 
In the English courts the difficulties have been noted. As Lawrence Collins J 
observed in Wermuth No 2,232 ‘provisional measures vary from one context to 
another, and from one country to another, but what they have in common is that 
their object is to ensure that the rights of parties’. Referring back to Reifert233 in 
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Wermuth v Wermuth No 2234 the Court of Appeal gave a valuable interpretation, 
stating that the provision could only be invoked in order to order measures 
intended to preserve a factual or legal situation in one Member State so as to 
protect rights which are the subject matter of litigation in the court of another 
Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. In Wermuth, 
the court held that an application for a pending maintenance suit cannot be 
categorised as a protective measure or as a provisional measure.235 Neither 
Article 31 of Brussels I nor Article 20 of Brussels II bis should “be used 
illegitimately to seize jurisdiction validly vested in the first court”.236  
Provisional measures after a judgment in the main proceedings are not 
envisaged by Brussels II bis. In M X v Mme Y237 the French Supreme Court 
ruled on Article 20 in a case where a Norwich court had held the children's 
residence to be at their mother's in England, and had made orders in respect of 
the father's rights regarding visits and stays. Relying on an order delivered in 
France giving him temporary custody of the children, the father had not returned 
the children to England after a Christmas holiday. The mother had then 
immediately applied in England for the return of the children on the basis of the 
Convention on Child Abduction (notably not referring to Brussels II bis). The 
High Court in London admitted the application by the public prosecution service 
for the return of the children to England and ordered the return. As the father's 
appeal was dismissed, the case was brought before the French Supreme Court, 
after it had been dealt with by the Poitiers Court of Appeal. Not referring to any 
case law, the Supreme Court ruled that under the terms of Article 20 a court in 
charge of children's matters could, in the case of an emergency, take temporary 
or protective measures necessary in respect of children whose custody was in 
another Member State but that those orders of the court were ineffective if the 
court which had jurisdiction to rule on parental authority delivered a judgment 
with provisional measures placing the children under the court’s guardianship 
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upon their return.238It will be discussed in the context of the analysis of the 
interaction of the Regulation and the Convention in Chapter 3 A whether it was 
correct that both courts referred to the Regulation and the Convention though 
no third state was involved but it shows, already in this context, how important 
the interaction has become.  
On 23 December 2009, the ECJ had delivered its judgment in a case which 
could have been respected by the French Supreme Court in the above case. 
Detiček239 concerned the question whether a court of the Member State in 
which the child is present may order protective measures on the basis of Article 
20 though a court of another Member State having jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter has ordered a protective measure enforceable in the 
Member State where the child is present. According to the ECJ it may not order 
such a protective measure– the Court emphasised the continuing jurisdiction of 
the State of the former habitual residence of a child on the merits of custody240, 
and referred to the obligation of other Member States to enforce a return 
order.241 Based on teleological and systematic arguments, the Court referred to 
the systematic aspect of the enforcement of decisions of another Member State 
and the avoidance of wrongful removals. The question in this context is whether 
this approach also is the child’s best interest as there might be a need for 
provisional measures if the factual situation has changed significantly 
subsequent to the first decision. According to the Court, though the Italian 
courts had jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter under Article 8, the 
Slovene courts were entitled to order provisional measures under Article 20. 
The Court referred to the conditions set out in Re A.242 It further held the 
Slovene court’s analysis that Article 20 was urgent due to the child’s integration 
into a new environment to be incorrect. Drawing the distinction between habitual 
residence and an integration of the child based on an unlawful removal, the 
Court held that such integration could not entail any legal consequences. 
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Hence, jurisdiction based on urgency, as it is embedded in Article 20 of the 
Regulation, permits a court which does not have jurisdiction in accordance with 
Brussels II bis, to take provisional measures under the lex fori with regard to the 
child.  
Rauscher and Mankowski have suggested that the limited scope of the 
provision in Brussels II bis would be adjusted once the Convention on Child 
Protection came into force in the Member States of the Community as Article 11 
would then provide the opportunity to order measures on the basis of urgency 
even in situations in which the child is resident in a Member State to Brussels II 
bis.243 It seems unlikely that the Court, -though aware of the concepts adopted 
from the Conventions and the interaction of the Regulation and the Convention 
on Child Abduction with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments-, will support this interpretation. As will become even more evident in 
the chapter on interaction the ECJ has been firm as far as the precedence of 
the Regulation’s provisions on jurisdiction over any other rules are concerned. 
The above assessment of Article 20 demonstrates that the ECJ has clear views 
on the interpretation of the core elements of the rule in the context of the 
Regulation but that specific questions come up rather regularly.244 This makes 
the interaction with the Hague Convention – in particular in view of the child’s 
best interest- rather complicated as will be explained later. The issue of 
provisional measures makes evident that  
“we have to move forward beyond sporadic or erratic and insecure direct judicial 
communications enabled under the scope of the Brussels II bis Regulation.”245 
Shortly after Purrucker, the ECJ dealt with Povse246 under the expedited 
procedure for family law cases with the preliminary reference lodged on 3 May 
and judgment delivered on 1 July – in short, the Court held that the enforcement 
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of a certified judgment requiring the return of the child may not be refused 
because of a judgment delivered subsequently by a court of the Member State 
of enforcement nor because of a change of circumstances after its delivery. 
Why is Povse relevant with respect to provisional orders? In the reference, the 
ECJ was requested to decide on the application of Article 11(8) to return orders 
issued in the context of an interim custody order. Pursuant to the ECJ, a 
decision of a court of a Member State with jurisdiction which requires the child’s 
return falls under Article 11(8) even this Member State’s court has not issued a 
final decision on custody. As the analysis moves on to the difficulties regarding 
recognition and enforcement, this case will be assessed again, having regard to 
the Court’s findings on return orders.  
II. General assessment -  provisional measures  
Provisional measures are a cornerstone of the Regulation. Some of the aspects 
not considered by the ECJ in Purrucker I were addressed in Purrucker II, when 
the German court sought a further preliminary ruling with regard to the 
applicability of the lis pendens provisions of Brussels II bis in the context of the 
effect of an order granting provisional measures, and as to whether the seising 
of a court in a Member State for provisional measures is equal to the seising as 
to substance under the relevant provisions.247 
The judgments reflect the ECJs´ confidence in the proper functioning of mutual 
trust and cooperation between the Member States. It argued that the court 
second seised may seek information from the party relying on the objection of 
lis pendens and that court second seised may advise the court first seised that 
an action has been brought before it, ask the court first seised to send to it 
information on the action pending before it and to state  
“its position on its jurisdiction within the meaning of Regulation no 2201/2003 or 
to notify it of any judgment already delivered in that regard”.248  
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It recognised that the court second seised must proceed to determine the action 
brought before it if those measures are of no avail. It underlined that a 
reasonable waiting period must be determined by the court having regard above 
all to the interests of the child,  
‘‘to ensure, in the best interests of the child, that the court which is nearest the 
child and which, accordingly, is best informed of the child's situation and state of 
development, takes the necessary decisions.“249 
Purrucker clarified some significant questions concerning provisional measures 
and the scope of Article 20 of the Regulation. Article 20 does not confer any 
jurisdiction but rather permits for interim measures and such measures cease to 
have effect once the competent court has taken the measures appropriately. 
Interim measures may not be used to hinder a return order issued by the state 
of the habitual residence or to block the main proceedings.250 Detiček has made 
clear to the national courts that Article 20 allows the Member States courts to 
order interim measures pursuant to their own law but that this competence has 
to be interpreted strictly and does not allow a Member State to order a 
provisional measure where a court of another Member State, which has 
jurisdiction under that Regulation as to the substance of the dispute relating to 
custody of the child, has already delivered a judgment provisionally giving 
custody of the child to the other parent, and that judgment has been declared 
enforceable in the territory of the previous Member State. According to this 
decision, once such measure has been taken it has to be recognised pursuant 
to Articles 21 et seqq. of the Regulation. But then again, there is disagreement 
on this aspect and in Purrucker I the ECJ decided that Article 20 provisional 
orders do not enjoy immediate recognition in fellow Member State courts. some 
scholars contest that measures taken pursuant Article 20 are not enforced 
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pursuant to Article 21 et seqq. but under national law.251 Rauscher insists that 
enforcement should follow Articles 21 ff.252  
Based on the guidelines the ECJ has provided in the cases discussed in this 
section on the application of provisional measures under the Regulation, it is 
suggested that a strict application of Article 20 can very well safeguard the 
interest of the child involved in respective cases. One must not be as 
pessimistic as Wright, who argues that, because of the possibilities to misuse 
the provision, when children just ‘pass through’ a Member State, a narrow 
interpretation is required.253 A careful interpretation is always required to secure 
the interest of the child concerned but not the rule itself but rather its misuse by 
national courts is the inherent danger. The difficulties of carrying out the 
exchange of information as well as the goodwill of the courts in the ‘pass 
through’ State make it cumbersome to find a good solution in the interest of the 
child. There were cases with complicated international ping-pong proceedings, 
attempts at transfer, appeals, and provisional measures in each jurisdiction.254 
In the context of recognition and enforcement it will become evident that the 
Regulation itself and the ECJ’s ruling on provisional measures have been very 
progressive and adaptive to the fast movements of parents and their children 
within the Union’s borders and beyond. There is, however, still uncertainty 
caused by the (mis)interpretation by the national courts255 of the Regulation’s 
rules on provisional measures. This again is often directly linked to the 
interrelation of the Regulation and the Convention with regard to the recognition 
of those measures and orders under one instrument in courts proceedings 
under the other, as will be assessed in the next chapter. 
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III. The set of rules on divorce  
Due to its limited significance with regard to the best interest of the child and the 
interaction of the Regulation and the Conventions, the set of rules on jurisdiction 
referring to divorces will only be discussed briefly, with an emphasis on the 
relation of those provisions and issues of parental responsibility. Nonetheless, 
the provisions on matrimonial matters, in particular since those are not included 
in the Hague Conventions, play a significant role in the framework of EC 
legislation on private international law in family matters and may not be 
disregarded as divorce and child custody are interconnected in the rules of the 
Regulation. 
1. The structure and significance of the provisions in the framework of 
child custody law 
Whilst there is no general jurisdiction rule in matrimonial matters, the jurisdiction 
rule in Article 3 sets out a complete, non-hierarchical system of alternative 
grounds of jurisdiction256 and the prorogation rule of Article 12 defines that a 
court seised in divorce proceedings under the Regulation additionally has 
jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility connected with the divorce if is in 
the best - which is referred to as the "superior"- interests of the child.257 Article 7 
is deviant from the very strict scheme of the other jurisdiction rules, most 
significantly from those in the context of parental responsibility. The Borras 
Report on the 1998 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and the 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters258 qualified Article 8 of the 
Convention (the provision equivalent to Article 7 of Brussels II bis) as being 
parallel to the provision in Article 4 of the 1968 Brussels Convention (Article 4 of 
Brussels I). Similar to Article 4 of Brussels I, the present Article 7 of Brussels II 
bis refers to the national rules on jurisdiction if neither the applicant nor the 
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respondent is resident in a Member State or if the applicant and the respondent 
do not have a common nationality. An applicant can refer to the national rules 
on jurisdiction only if the spouse is a national of a non-Member State habitually 
resident outside the EC legislative area or a citizen of a Member State 
habitually resident in a non-Member State (who then needs to be sued before 
the courts of the third state), as is set forth in Article 7. Pursuant to the 
judgement in Sundelind, which will be discussed in detail in the following, 
Articles 6 and 7 of Brussels II bis must be interpreted as meaning that where, in 
divorce proceedings, a respondent is not habitually resident in a Member State 
and is not a national of a Member State, the courts of a Member State cannot 
claim their jurisdiction to hear the petition on their national law if the courts of 
another Member State have jurisdiction under Article 3 of the Brussels II 
Regulation.259 
2. The rules concerning matrimonial matters 
 Pursuant to the Practice Guide no distinction was intended by the drafters by 
the distinction between the term “superior interests of the child” (Article 12(1)(b)) 
and the best interest standard used in the remainder of the English language 
version.260 Jurisdiction in accordance with Article 12 ends when the divorce 
action ends, with a decree absolute. Alternatively, pursuant to Article 12 the 
courts of a Member States can have jurisdiction when a child is not habitually 
resident but has a substantial connection with the country, all relevant parties 
agree to this allocation of jurisdiction and again it is in the best interests of the 
child. There is a clear rule on the meaning of ‘interest’ in the context of Article 
12 in Article 12(4) only for cases in which the third state is a not a signatory to 
the Convention on Child Protection. With respect to the remainder, ‘best’ 
interest has been used.  
In its second judgment on Brussels II bis, the ECJ underlined the high 
significance of Article 3, holding that Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation must be 
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interpreted as meaning that where, in divorce proceedings, a respondent is not 
habitually resident in a Member State and is not a national of a Member State, 
the courts of a Member State may not refer to their national law if the courts of 
another Member State have jurisdiction under Article 3 of the Regulation.261 In 
this case, Sundelind Lopez, Mrs Sundelind, a Swedish national, married to Mr 
Lopez Lizazo, a Cuban national, the ECJ responded to a reference from a 
Swedish Court as to whether Brussels II bis applied in a case involving a non-
Member State national and held that it does apply. The Court held that 
Articles 6 and 7 must be interpreted as meaning that where, in divorce 
proceedings, a respondent is neither habitually resident in a Member State nor 
a national, the courts of a Member State may not base their jurisdiction to hear 
the petition on their national law, if the courts of another Member State have 
jurisdiction under Article 3.262 Compared to the cases on parental responsibility 
there have been few cases where the ECJ was requested to interpret the 
jurisdiction rules on matrimonial matters.263  
In Hadadi, having regard to Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 12 April 1930 
on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Advocate 
General Kokott responded to the French Cour de Cassation’s question whether 
Article 3(1)(b) was to be interpreted as meaning that in a situation where the 
spouses hold both the nationality of the state of the court seised and the 
nationality of another Member State, the nationality of the state of the court 
seised must prevail. The Advocate General argued that the court seised must 
consider the fact that the spouses also possess the nationality of the Member 
State of origin and that the courts of the latter state accordingly would have had 
jurisdiction in respect of the judgment.264 Hence, she suggests that both courts 
in the Member State whose nationality is held by both spouses have jurisdiction 
since nationality is a connecting factor with regard to divorce, differentiating it 
from the emphasis on habitual residence in the context of child abduction. The 
Court held that where spouses each hold the nationality of the same two 
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Member States, the jurisdiction of the courts of one of those Member States 
may not be rejected on the ground that the applicant does not have any other 
links with that State. It argued that the courts of those Member States of which 
the spouses hold the nationality have jurisdiction under that provision and that 
the spouses may seise the court of the Member State of their choice.265 
Very often at the moment divorce proceedings commence questions concerning 
the custody of the children will arise and the jurisdiction of the divorce court will 
deal with both questions of divorce and parental responsibility, even if it is not 
the court of the habitual residence of the child. Under the original Brussels II 
Regulation, Article 3 was drafted as an extension of the divorce forum, so as to 
include parental responsibility. However, under the present Brussels II bis 
scheme, Article 12 is drafted as an exception to the general jurisdiction rule on 
parental responsibility, pursuant to which the courts of the habitual residence of 
the child have jurisdiction. The jurisdictional grounds pursuant to Article 12 are 
not exclusive so that the courts of the state of the habitual residence of the child 
are not deprived of jurisdiction in the circumstances referred to in Article 12. 
Whilst this is clearly in the interest of the children concerned, there are some 
difficulties. Several courts could be seised simultaneously of a dispute, a 
situation not new in Europe.266 With respect to Article 12 of the Regulation de 
Boer’s criticism is also directed towards what has been identified as the 
extraterritorial reach of the Regulation, hence situations in which the child is 
(potentially) habitually resident outside the EU and the case is nonetheless 
drawn into the EU.  De Boer argues that “Absent a convention on recognition 
and enforcement, there is no guarantee that protective measures rendered in 
one of the member states will be recognized and enforced in the non-member 
state of the child’s habitual residence.”267 Whilst this uncertainty is clearly a 
problem, there are several advantages resulting from the strong link of divorce 
and custody proceedings and in fact any proceedings regarding the children 
concerned. It is contested that Article 12 is clear in its wording that the courts 
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have to consider the best interests and furthermore the emphasis on the 
substantial connection underlines this clarity. The difficulty rather is that the 
term substantial connection leaves room for discretion.  
There has hitherto been no ECJ ruling on Article 12 of the Regulation, the only 
of the jurisdictional rules which explicitly refers to the best interest of the child, 
however it may be assumed that difficulties in the national courts may arise 
from the fact that jurisdiction ends when the divorce action ends and for any 
following proceedings relating to parental responsibility the place of jurisdiction 
must be determined anew.  
IV.  Possible amendments and extension to children habitually resident 
outside the EU 
Whilst the rules of recognition of Brussels II bis apply to all divorce judgments 
issued by a court of a Member State, the jurisdictional grounds are restricted to 
the situations referred to Articles 3 and 4 and the further principles set forth in 
Articles 6 and 7. Hence, for citizens of Member States living in a non-Member 
state, situations may arise in which none of the grounds of jurisdiction provided 
by Brussels II bis is applicable. This in turn, may cause severe difficulties for the 
jurisdiction in proceedings on parental responsibility. As far as the interlink of 
the jurisdiction rules on divorce and parental responsibility is concerned, in 
general, the divorce court will hear the parental responsibility only if there is a 
strong link. Therefore, the court of a Member State which has jurisdiction with 
regard to a divorce proceeding under Article 3 of Brussels II bis will also have 
jurisdiction to hear the question of parental responsibility pursuant to Article 
12(1). However, this solution is possible only under three different conditions 
referred to in detail above and described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). With 
respect to possible amendments the European Commission has initiated a 
study.268The Proposal for a Regulation amending Brussels II bis269 with regard 
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to the provisions on divorce proposes to amend Article 7 so as to enable the 
courts of a Member State to assume jurisdiction even where none of the 
spouses is habitually resident in the territory of a Member State and do not have 
a common nationality of a Member State270 provided that ‘‘the spouses had their 
common previous habitual residence in the territory of that Member State for at 
least three years; or one of the spouses has the nationality of that Member 
State, or, in the case of United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her “domicile” in 
the territory of one of the latter Member States.’’271 It is suggested that, though 
the above situation, in which none of the grounds of jurisdiction provided by 
Brussels II bis apply, may be unfavourable for the children concerned, new 
rules should be drafted so as to not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaty.272 It particular, it may not be disregarded that the place 
of jurisdiction of divorce proceedings may also be the place of jurisdiction for the 
proceedings regarding parental responsibility. As the Select Committee on 
European Scrutiny suggests in its Thirty-Seventh Report273 disputes related to 
‘"international marriages" are not restricted to marriages between spouses of 
EU nationalities’ and possibly,  
“the Hague Conference on Private International Law would more appropriately 
deal with this issue”. 
This suggests that cases which extend beyond the fora of Brussels II bis are 
cases of an international rather than a European legal scope and are better 
dealt with by the existing Conventions than by the Regulation. Under Article 12 
(4) the situation of the case needs to be considered particularly careful. In 
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absence of case law of the ECJ it is valuable to consider case law of the 
English Supreme Court. In I (A Child)274, the Supreme Court decided that Article 
12 could apply to a child lawfully resident outside the European Union, provided 
that the requirements laid down in the Article are fulfilled. 
In this case the child had been resident in Pakistan since 2004, though the child 
and his divorced parents are all British citizens and the parents lived in Britain. 
As the High Court and the Court of Appeal held that the English courts did not 
have jurisdiction, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court as to whether 
Article 12 was applicable in cases where a child was resident in a non-EU 
member state and, if this was generally answered in the affirmative, whether 
there was jurisdiction pursuant to the criteria set out in Article 12.3 (b). 
Based on three arguments, Lady Hale concluded that Article 12 does not limit 
jurisdiction to children who reside in a Member State – first, the term "third 
state" in other parts of the Regulation refers to a non-Member State, second, 
the clear wording of the Practice Guide275 and third, the other references of the 
ECJ to the term “third state”. As the child's parents were habitually resident in 
the UK they and the child were British citizens and jurisdiction had been 
accepted by the parties under 12.3(b) before and after the start of the 
proceedings, the general requirements of Article 12.3 (b) were fulfilled. 
Article 12(4) states the circumstances under which a court in a Member State 
has jurisdiction over a case in which the child habitually resident in a third state 
that is not a contracting State to the Convention on Child Protection is in the 
child’s best interest. I (A Child) suggests that parents may decide to litigate in 
the courts of a Member State though their children are habitually resident 
outside the EU, provided that the requirements set forth in Article 12 are 
satisfied.276 This is clearly an important decision on the application of Brussels II 
                                            
274 Re I, supra note 276. 
275 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2014), supra note 129, section 3.2.6.2.3, 
“Article 12(4) specifies that jurisdiction under Article 12 shall be deemed to be in the “child’s best 
interest” when the child in question is habitually resident in a third State which is not a 
contracting State to the 1996 Hague Convention on Child Protection (35), in particular if it is 
found impossible to hold proceedings in the third State in question”. 
276 Re I (A Child), [2009] UKSC 10 [2010] 1 FLR 361. 
Chapter 2 
94 
bis with regard to states which are not contracting parties. The potential for 
litigation seems vast and will be discussed in the chapter on the interaction in 
connection with Article 61, which concerns the relationship between the 
Regulation and the Convention on Child Protection. As has been seen in this 
chapter, divorce proceedings under the Regulation may well have an influence 
on parental responsibility proceedings and hence may well influence the 
interests of the children concerned. On the positive side Article 12 allows for the 
divorce court to hear the parental responsibility case only if the link between the 
parental responsibility case and the divorce court are sufficiently strong. On the 
negative side, several courts could be seised simultaneously of a dispute over 
parental responsibility since the jurisdictional grounds pursuant to Article 12 are 
not exclusive grounds so that the court in the Member State of the habitual 
residence maintains jurisdiction. Article 19, the adoption of the lis pendens 
mechanism in the Regulation, deals with this situation. Hence, if the child is 
habitually resident in a Member State, the Regulation prevails and the 
jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to parental responsibility will be 
determined pursuant to Article 12 of the Regulation. Additionally, if the child is 
habitually resident in a non-Member State which is not contracting state to the 
Convention on Child Protection there will be jurisdiction of the divorce court over 
parental responsibility pursuant to Article 12 of the Regulation. The 
consideration of the “superior”, as discussed above the best interests of the 
child allow for some judicial discretion and when such would be declined, If the 
court has jurisdiction and at least one of the parents is the holder of parental 
responsibility and if all the holders have agreed on the jurisdiction of the court, 
cases where such jurisdiction is not in the best interest may be considered rare. 
However, with its utmost priority on the best interest, the Regulation allows for 
such a consideration by the court. As the content of Article 12(2) (b) is drafted 
rather ambiguously and could be misunderstood when the court seised only of 
the parental responsibility has reached a final decision. If proceedings on 
parental responsibility are pending before the State where the child is habitually 
resident and will additionally be commenced before the courts of the State 
where the divorce proceedings take place, this is a clear disadvantage. Article 
12 (2) (b) could be misunderstood as meaning that the court seised of the 
divorce could lose jurisdiction when the court seised of the parental 
responsibility has reached a final decision.  
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Article 12(3) has been already been analysed critically in the context of the 
chapter on the prorogation of jurisdiction.  
It has been described that three conditions are required in order to confer 
jurisdiction: a substantial connection between the child and the court seised, the 
agreement of the parties to the proceedings and the consideration of the best 
interests of the child. Such limited party autonomy and possibility of choice is 
quite exceptional for jurisdictional purposes but it is very similar to the approach 
of the Commission later taken with respect to choice of courts for divorce 
proposed in the Proposal on applicable law and jurisdiction in matrimonial 
matters277. The approach taken in Article 12(3) is quite fuzzy. Whilst the 
requirement that the child has a “substantial connection” with the State of the 
court seised is explained in examples of these substantial connections: habitual 
residence of one of the holders of parental responsibility or nationality of the 
child, the courts could establish any other connection. It seems that one must 
wait for more leading case law before knowing exactly the impact of the 
provision and of the ‘substantial connection’; in the meantime, the discretion 
causes legal uncertainty. 
The additional condition of the best interest is a qualifier on the one hand, as in 
Article 12 (1). On the other hand, generally, an extension of the divorce 
jurisdiction to parental responsibility seems a reasonable objective, and the 
application of judicial discretion to refuse to hear the case based upon the best 
interests of the child seems unlikely. Hence, the concept of the provision is 
generally laudable. 
V. Forum non-conveniens 
In the Convention on Child Protection, Articles 8 and 9 contain a ‘reversible 
mechanism’ for forum non conveniens and forum conveniens278, when it would 
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be in the child’s best interest that the case is dealt with by authorities other than 
those of the State of the habitual residence. 
In the jurisdiction chapter of the Regulation, as the above analysis made clear, 
the forum non-conveniens mechanism has been avoided strictly by the drafters 
of the Regulation. All grounds of jurisdiction are hierarchically ordered grounds 
of jurisdiction and their functioning is dependent to considerable extent on 
mutual trust between the courts of the Member States. The limited plurality of 
bases for jurisdiction adds some of flexibility. However, with Article 12(3), there 
is a provision for judicial discretion, therefore, it is also guaranteed that the court 
will determine that it is not ill-placed for deciding over parental responsibility. 
Moreover, it can be argued that this criterion of best interests of the child 
establishes a relation between Article 12 (3) and Article 15. A court could refuse 
to hear the case on the basis of arguing that this would interfere with the best 
interests of the child, suggesting that the holders of parental responsibility 
should seise the normally competent court.  
In this context of the Regulation it therefore seems that the judicial discretion 
provided by the evaluation of the best interests of the child is a positive asset. 
Of course, as always, when it comes to judicial discretion, the assessment of 
the practical effects of the provision will depend on national case law.  
The introduction of Article 15 into Brussels II bis, and hence the introduction of a 
form of forum non conveniens is a clear indication that the European legislator 
was prepared to include provisions combining the civil and the common law 
approach to jurisdiction. While this provision is described as an ‘innovative’ rule 
in the Practice Guide, it is in fact similarly included in the Convention on Child 
Protection, in particular in Article 8. Interestingly, the provisions in the 
Regulation which are based on the forum non-conveniens idea refer to the best 
interest principle.  
C. Conclusion  
Chapter 2 has analysed the provisions on jurisdiction, in view of the main 
concepts established by the ECJ during almost one decade with an emphasis 
on the connecting factor 'habitual residence' and the suitability of the concepts 
included in those provisions for parental responsibility and custody cases. In the 
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context of those rules it has been assessed whether the rules encourage 
national courts to have regard to the ‘best interests’ of the child.  
By bringing up a new approach to the concept of ‘habitual residence’ the 
Regulation has, in the context of those provisions, promoted legal certainty in 
comparison to the discretion under the case-law of the Convention on Child 
Abduction.   
The second part of this chapter, Chapter 2 B, has also assessed the ECJ case-
law in the context of return orders, in relation to provisional measures, and  
return orders will more thoroughly analysed per se in Chapter 4, as the 
interrelation with the Convention on Child Abduction is most inherent to the 
provisions on return orders. This is because of the complementary nature of the 
rules.  
In the context of the provisions on divorce proceedings in the Regulation it has 
become clear how significant the interlink between the place of jurisdiction of 
divorce proceedings and the place of jurisdiction for the proceedings regarding 
parental responsibility is.  
Besides the set of rules on jurisdiction, the rules on provisional measures are a 
cornerstone of the Regulation. As the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated 
the judgments in Purrucker I and Purrucker II reflect the ECJs´ confidence in the 
proper functioning of mutual trust and cooperation between the Member States. 
Main proceedings are supposed to remain unaffected, according to the court in 
Purrucker279 Deticek has also confirmed the interim nature of provisional 
measures.280 The significance of Purrucker and Deticek has become evident 
and discussed in the section on provisional measures and in the general 
assessment.  
The Regulation itself and the ECJ’s ruling on provisional measures have been 
very progressive and adaptive to the fast movements of parents and their 
children within the Union’s borders and beyond. There is, however, still 
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uncertainty caused by the (mis)interpretation by the national courts281 of the 
Regulation’s rules on provisional measures. This again is often directly linked to 
the interrelation of the Regulation and the Convention with regard to the 
recognition of those measures and orders under one instrument in courts 
proceedings under the other instrument. This issue will have to assessed again 
in the context of the interrelation in Chapters 3 and 4.   
Another significant concept analysed in this Chapter was Article 12. As a 
noticeable exception to the general rule, pursuant to which the courts of the 
habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction, the jurisdictional grounds 
pursuant to Article 12 are not exclusive so that the courts of the state of the 
habitual residence of the child are not deprived of jurisdiction but only under the 
circumstances referred to in Article 12.  
In this chapter of this thesis it was further analysed how the wording “better 
placed” is used in the framework of the provisions and has hitherto been 
interpreted in the context of the Regulation, and that, whilst the significance of 
the concept of habitual residence has become clear in combination with “best 
interest” there is no reliable guidance as to what “better placed” shall mean.  
At this stage it has become clear, that a stand-alone evaluation of the provisions 
on jurisdiction and provisional measures only allows for a limited evaluation of 
the advantages and disadvantages. But this analysis sets the ground for an 
analysis of the interrelation of the Regulation with the Convention on Child 
Abduction, and in the second part, the Convention on Child Protection, which 
will be undertaken in the following Chapter. The guidance provided by the 
numerous ECJ decisions strengthens the Regulation by introducing continuity 
and certainty of definitions and in the following chapter it will be assessed if this 
still holds true in the interaction with the Convention on Child Abduction. In the 
next chapter it will be considered if the Regulation weakens the functioning of 
the Convention and inhibits its application. 
 
                                            
281 Povse v Alpago, supra note 244.  
Chapter 2 
99 
 
Chapter 3 
100 
 
Chapter 3 The relation of and interaction between Brussels II bis and 
the Hague Conventions on Child Abduction and Child 
Protection 
Based on the analysis of the structure and concept of the provisions in the 
Regulation and the interpretation of the central terms, this Chapter will analyse 
the various aspects of interrelation of the Regulation with the Convention on 
Child Abduction, and in the second part, the Convention on Child Protection. 
A. Relation of and interaction between Brussels II bis and the Hague 
Convention on Child Abduction  
The following parts of the analysis will cover the rules directly addressing the 
interrelation between the Convention on Child Abduction and the Regulation 
beyond this scope, the rules which are relevant for the interrelation. It will 
consider the additional layer of rules in the Regulation relating to child abduction 
and both return and non-return situations and will assess the influence of the 
ECJ’s decisions on the interpretation of such interrelation, thereby showing 
whether the Regulation – and its application – take the right direction to meet 
the ambitious aim of respecting the best interests of the child. Furthermore it will 
consider the change brought about by the additional layer of rules to the 
concepts of interpretation developed in an immense body of case law on the 
Convention on Child Abduction. The chapter will in this context also address 
difficulties in the Convention on Child Abduction which the Regulation tries to 
overcome, in the interest of fast and fair proceedings. Further, the concept of 
hearing the child in the Regulation and the Conventions will be analysed.  
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I. The necessity of appraising the Conventions when considering 
Brussels II bis 
Though the ECJ has meanwhile given some guidelines on the interpretation of 
the term habitual residence in Brussels II bis282 in different contexts, the need 
for an autonomous interpretation under the Regulation283 is a two-edged sword 
– it will need to be seen whether the ECJ and the courts in the Member States 
are content to rely on their own concepts established by the case-law on the 
Hague Conventions and disregard or respect the cases dealt with by the ECJ 
during the last years. Heretofore the following analysis of the relation of and 
interaction between the provisions on jurisdiction and enforcement and 
recognition in Brussels II bis and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction will 
show the difficulties of an interrelation of a well-established legal instrument with 
the independent EC community body of jurisdictional rules.  
In order to discuss the interaction of the respective rules on jurisdiction in the 
Hague Conventions on Child Abduction and Child Protection with Brussels II bis 
and to outline difficulties and to discuss solutions which have hitherto been 
proposed, a short consideration of the rules on jurisdiction in those Conventions 
is required. 
II.  Jurisdiction in the Hague Convention on Child Abduction 
As the object of the Convention is to ensure that children are returned promptly 
to the country of their habitual residence - assuming that the child’s habitual 
residence is the most beneficial residence - it is for the court of this country to 
decide on custody matters, Article 1(a).284 The whole concept of action in a 
                                            
282 See the above cases Rinau, supra note 19, Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17; 
Sundelind Lopez, supra note34; in M v M, the English court held that a person could only have 
one habitual residence at a given time in accordance with the terms of Article 3(1)(a) and 
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law: M v M, Court of Appeal - Family Division [2005] EWHC 2769 (Fam). 
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ECJ. 
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situation of wrongful removal or retention in the Convention is based on the 
habitual residence of the child before such removal or retention. Not only 
applies the Convention to any child who was habitually resident in a contracting 
state immediately before any breach of custody or access rights, but also, 
pursuant to Article 15 the authorities of the contracting state to which the child 
was removed may request from the authorities of the State of habitual 
residence “a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was 
wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention”. Whilst this concept 
builds on the return of the child to the state of the former habitual residence, the 
authorities of the contracting state in which the child is present is responsible for 
initiating the return of the child. The Convention, as contrary to the Regulation, 
does not define the legal concepts used by it.285  
1. Habitual residence – a disputed concept in Convention cases  
Hence, when drafting the Convention, the Hague Conference avoided a 
comprehensive definition of 'habitual residence', based on the assumption that it 
is an “well-established concept” and a “question of pure fact”.286 Pursuant to the 
Explanatory Report287 “the rules of the Convention rest largely upon the 
underlying idea that there exists a type of jurisdiction which by its nature 
belongs to the courts of a child’s habitual residence in cases involving its 
custody”. Hence, as will be explored in the following, due to the considerable 
degree of discretion, different approaches in different jurisdictions have 
characterized the case-law. Silberman comments that 
 “several of the concepts enumerated above are unique to this Convention and 
have spawned judicial interpretations regarding their meaning”  
and harshly notes that a  
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“failure to acquire a consistent interpretation of the treaty will undermine its 
value as a vehicle for ensuring the return of children wrongfully removed or 
retained in the international setting.”288  
This evaluation, provided back in 1994 has proven true. Though, certainly, the 
application of the concept should take regard of the Convention’s objectives, as 
stated in the Preamble and in Article 1, many courts have departed from purely 
considering those objectives - a prominent example being the US Court of 
Appeals which held that the concept of habitual residence with regard to the 
Convention is one of both law and fact, hence allowing for appellate review.289  
2. The interpretation in the case law under the Convention  
English courts regularly connect the concept with the central requirement of a 
certain period of presence.290 Interpretations have deviated considerably over 
the years. The approach focusing on the intent of the parents, according to 
which the habitual residence of the child is dependent on the habitual residence 
of the parents, does not appear to be consistent with the objective stated in the 
Perez Report291 that habitual residence is intended to be a factual concept. An 
approach referring to the child’s and the parents’ situation rather than solely the 
parents’ situation was chosen in the US Court of Appeals decision in Friederich, 
a case which will be discussed in more detail in this Chapter 3 II in subsection 3 
on the approach of the US courts.292 This approach accords with the objectives 
expressed in Article 1 and the Preamble of the Convention and was followed in 
                                            
288 Silberman, L., Hague International Abduction Convention: A Progress Report available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4246&context=lcp, last accessed 02 
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289 Edward M. Feder, Appellant, v Melissa Ann Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995); 
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some US federal cases,293 as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 II 3 which 
succeeds this subchapter. A “flexible interpretation” was called for in the 
Explanatory Report294 and clearly, the text of the Convention allows for such 
interpretation with the restriction that the determination of the habitual residence 
in the context of the Convention must be in accordance with the objective set 
forth in the Preamble. The Explanatory Report underlines – with a very general 
wording- that the “struggle” against child abduction must be “inspired by the 
desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their 
true interests.” It does not refer directly to the Preamble, which would seem an 
obligatory consideration in the interpretation of the Convention as an 
international treaty. Whilst the binding character of a Preamble has regularly 
been disputed,295 the interpretative value of the Preamble of an international 
convention is beyond question as Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties296 states that  
"[t]he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall [include] the 
text, including its preamble and annexes"  
and has been respected more frequently during the last years.297 However, 
since there is also no reference to the (best) interests of the child in the 
dispositive part of the Convention, a direct reference to the interests of children 
in determining the habitual residence is also not at hand. Hence, whilst the 
Convention’s structure is built on the existence of and return to a habitual 
residence of the child there is no definition or guideline to the interpretation and 
in absence of both the national authorities have been deemed to accept that it is 
a “well-established concept of the Hague Conference”.  
Recently, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law supported the petition in the U.S. Supreme Court case of 
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Abbott298 with an amicus brief299 and the petition in this case is a concise 
interpretation of the Convention’s objectives with regard to jurisdiction. Dealing 
with whether a ne exeat clause300 confers a “right of custody” within the 
meaning of the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, it held that the 
Convention’s text, “particularly when considered in light of its animating goals 
and purposes, as well as its drafting history, demonstrate[s] that a ne exeat 
clause does in fact constitute a “right of custody” within the meaning of the 
Convention.”301 It states that - though the Convention does not provide a 
definition of “rights of custody,” - Article 5 points to the fact that “rights relating to 
the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the 
child’s place of residence.” are meant to be incorporated. It further states that 
the Convention differentiates “rights of custody” from “rights of access,” for 
which the remedy of return is not available. Referring to the Explanatory Report, 
it continues that considering a ne exeat clause a right to determine a child’s 
residence, and therefore a “right of custody” further accords with the 
cornerstone aim of the Convention to protect “all the ways in which custody of 
children can be exercised” through “a flexible interpretation of the terms used, 
which allows the greatest possible number of cases to be brought into 
consideration.”302 This is a recent example for a concrete approach to 
interpreting a concept of the Convention and clarifying a specific question with 
respect to such interpretation. A central authority of the contracting state in 
which the child is present or has been abducted has to initiate the return of the 
child to the former habitual residence of the child – but where is this habitual 
residence? And does it have to consider other conventions or even the case-
                                            
298 Abbott v Abbott, 17 December 2008, Brief amicus curiae of the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
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law regarding such other conventions to apply the term as intended by the 
drafters of the Convention in accordance with the Explanatory Report? A 
concrete, clarifying approach as in Abbott has not been taken during the past 
thirty-five years.  
The Hague Conference has continued its practice of leaving the interpretation of 
the term ‘habitual residence’ to the courts and central authorities. The courts 
and central authorities have been left with a considerable degree of flexibility 
and the case-law in the different jurisdictions reveals different approaches. 
Some courts consider the habitual residence of the child as dependent on the 
residence of the parents, others determine the child’s habitual residence 
independently or at least more independently based on the child’s intent or 
situation.303 It is assumed that the abducted child’s interests can best be 
protected by litigation in the forum conveniens, which usually is the place of the 
child’s habitual residence, however, the terms interests or best interests are 
intentionally not used in the dispositive part of the Convention.304 Whilst this 
view is not disputed and still as up-to-date as in 1980 when Professor Perez-
Vera commented on it,305 the concept has undergone considerable change 
during the last decades. According to de Winter the main reason for the 
acceptance of the concept of habitual residence at The Hague was the 
recognised need to avoid a continuation of the nationality principle and the 
difficulties of the concept of domicile in child custody cases.306 
Before being used in the Convention on Child Abduction, habitual residence 
was used as the main connecting factor in a number of Hague Conventions 
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relating to children307, first in the Hague Convention on Guardianship of 1902.308 
The inability of the 1961 Convention to satisfactorily handle kidnapping cases 
may have been one of the factors responsible for the initiative to draw up the 
Convention on Child Abduction. As the Convention refers to the date before the 
abduction with regard to the determination of habitual residence, it sets a clear 
guideline as regards the point of time. In England and Wales, habitual residence 
was first adopted in the legislation implementing international conventions and 
is now referred to in the Family Act.309 During the decades of case-law on the 
Convention, the main approach has been to consider the settled intention of 
those holding custody rights in conjunction with the factual reality of the child's 
life.310Though the case-law on child custody has had considerable influence on 
the development of habitual residence as a connecting factor in the national 
jurisdictions during the last decades, the national interpretations under the 
Convention differed immensely. Whilst the balance between the interests of one 
parent or both parents and their children has been recognised as important311, 
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in the courts the consideration of child’s intentions has had a limited scope. In 
DT v LBT312 the court stated that the issue for a court hearing a summons under 
the Convention was not what was the best for the child but who should decide 
what the best for the child is. The court clarified that the decision should be 
taken in the state of habitual residence. The interesting part of the case –
besides the consideration of the grave risk and Neulinger which will be 
considered later- is the determination of habitual residence by the court. The 
court explicitly stated that it was “concerned” with regard to the determination of 
the habitual residence. 
However, the dispute does in most cases not merely concern the removal or 
retention of a child but also the situation as it existed at the child’s original 
residence. In the above case the court continued that  
“a broad overview of the child's circumstances and best interests [is] relevant 
when determining whether one of the exceptions in fact applies, and if it does, 
what consequences should follow.”313  
Hence, despite the Explanatory Report’s restrictions to considering the best 
interests, the High Court in this case stated that a broad overview of the child's 
circumstances and best interests was necessary and recognised that the 
habitual residence was difficult to determine. The mother had argued that she 
had been bullied into agreeing to move with the children to live with the father in 
Italy. In conclusion the judge considered that the period as a whole amounted to 
habitual residence of the children. In this case the removal was deemed 
wrongful but the return refused since Article 13(b) had been proved to the 
standard required under the Convention. 
Though in cases under the Convention it was not disputed in the English courts 
that unilateral action does not lead to a change in the habitual residence of the 
child if the other parent is vested with parental rights314, the English courts have 
more recently held that an abducted child may eventually become habitually 
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resident in the State to which he or she was abducted.315 This is one of the 
close connections of the case law under the Convention to the case-law under 
Brussels II bis. Whilst there are many cases in which it is rather clear in which 
country a child is habitually resident, one or two countries may be relevant in 
other cases. Parental intention is a significant factor to be determined through 
documentary evidence if such evidence is available and the Inner House of the 
Court of Session316 has adopted a very strict interpretation of what was agreed 
by the parents formally rather than what may have been the intention.  
One of the judicial interpretations widely adopted in cases regarding the 
Convention is the Shah317 case. Although this case was not related to child 
custody, the definition which has emerged from it has been referred to by courts 
in many countries, in particular as regards the meaning of the term “ordinary 
residence”. It was defined in Shah by Lord Scarman: 
“Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the statutory framework or the legal 
context in which the words are used requires a different meaning, I 
unhesitatingly subscribe to the view that “ordinarily resident” refers to a man’s 
abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for 
settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, 
whether of short or of long duration.”318 
How has the Convention approach been challenged? One should assume that it 
has been replaced by the European approach to the extent only Member States 
are concerned (Article 60 lit e) of the Regulation). However, there is a tendency 
on the part of English judges to resist adopting the approach of the ECJ. 
Recently, in Re H-K319, the Court of Appeal expressed its unwillingness to 
establish habitual residence in accordance with the language of the European 
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Court in Mercredi v Chaffe.320 In Re H-K321, the contesting states were Australia 
and the UK. Though his Lordship Ward respected that  
“the European meaning of habitual residence will, by osmosis, shape the 
autonomous meaning to be given to that phrase in the International Hague 
Convention on Child Abduction with the stress on its international application”322 
he argued that the appropriate approach in the case was to be drawn from 
Shah (Reg v Barnet LBC).323  
There are only few cases under the Convention in which it is explicitly stated 
that the habitual residence of a child is dependent on that of his/her parents - 
these tend to be in cases in which the habitual residence of the child was 
assumed to be different at all from that of the parents or in cases where the 
parents did not have a common habitual residence.324  
In the early case of Re J, Lord Brandon held:  
“Where a child of J’s age is in the sole lawful custody of the mother, his situation 
with regard to habitual residence will necessarily be the same as hers.”  
and continued:  
“In the ordinary case of a married couple, in my judgment, it would not be 
possible for one parent unilaterally to terminate the habitual residence of the 
child by removing the child from the jurisdiction wrongfully and in breach of the 
other parent’s rights.” 325 
Whilst this approach which links the child’s habitual residence to the habitual 
residence determined by the parent holding parental rights, has been followed 
in other decisions326, some Judges began to utter doubts that parental intention 
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should be allowed to prevail over factual considerations.327 It is accepted that 
the focus on the requirement of joint as opposed to unilateral decision-making 
seeks to give effect to the policy of preventing any abduction but that an 
extended period of time in the country of refuge may suffice for an abducted 
child to eventually become habitually resident there328. To a certain extent this 
approach has been adopted by Article 10 of Brussels II bis. Where evidence of 
a shared intention could not be assumed to have existed at the outset of a re-
location, but residence nonetheless endures, some courts have assumed the 
acquisition of a new habitual residence.329  
In the more recent High Court case of Re H and L330 the court focused on 
settlement without giving much emphasis to the parents’ situation. It held that 
the decisive issue was that of the settlement of the child and that settlement 
under Article 12 of the Hague Convention required wider considerations than 
simply the physical whereabouts of the child, in this regard referring to the fact-
specific approach emphasised by Baroness Hale in Re M.331 As the judge 
considered the parents’ evidence to be unsatisfactory, the guardian’s evidence 
that the children were settled in London was accepted in its entirety.332 Article 
12 refers to settlement of the child in the new environment and releases the 
authorities of the state of the former habitual residence from ordering the return 
if “it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” If 
disputed whether a settlement has occurred or not, this defence places the 
burden of determining whether a child is settled or not in the new environment 
on the court. In Re H and L the court referred to the “broad meaning of 
settlement, encompassing not only physical but also emotional and 
psychological security and stability.333 This accords with the Explanatory 
Report’s approach that proving such settlement is “a task [as] falling upon the 
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abductor or upon the person who opposes the return of the child”. It suggests 
that this safeguards the “contingent discretionary power of internal authorities in 
this regard”.  
On the other hand, there have been interpretations of habitual residence more 
similar to the Regulation. In the early High Court case of Re Bates334 the court 
had already considered the meaning of the term ‘habitual residence’ in the 
context of the facts of the particular case, an approach with regard to continuity 
of residence similar to the ECJ’s approach in Proceedings brought by A.335  
The alleged habitual residence of New York was not the only place where the 
child had resided and it was not certain that New York would be the permanent 
residence of the child. The court held that the child was habitually resident in 
New York State at the time of her abduction though she had not been there for 
a long period of time and would not, in any case, remain indefinitely, arguing 
that a sufficient degree of continuity in the residence had been reached.  
3. Deviating path? - the approach in the U.S. courts  
In the U.S. courts the development of the main approaches to the concept of 
habitual residence was different. In the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in 
Friedrich336 the case of a U.S. servicewoman, who lived in Germany with her 
German husband who was the father of the child and the applicant claimed that 
the child became habitually resident in the U.S. as she had to move to a US 
army base. Justice Boggs held: 
 “[H]abitual residence pertains to customary residence prior to the removal. The 
Court must look back in time, not forward. All of the factors listed by Mrs 
Friederich pertain to the future. Moreover, they reflect the intentions of Mrs 
Friederich; it is the habitual residence of the child that must be determined.”337 
Further on it was stated: 
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“[H]abitual residence can be “altered” only by change in geography and the 
passage of time, not by changes in parental affection and responsibility.” 338  
Whilst McClean339 harshly criticised the decision, stating that it “is a striking 
example of how not to handle Convention cases”, the analysis of the child’s 
situation seems more in accordance with the growing significance of 
international conventions and statutes calling to respect the best interests of the 
child340 than an approach based on the parents’ intent and situation. On the 
other hand, the Convention on Child Abduction is an autonomous instrument 
and the emphasis which has lately been laid on respecting the child’s interests 
cannot be conveyed; the discretion the wording offers means that there is no 
certainty that a judge will determine whether or not a return should be denied 
because of a settlement or whether or not a child has been habitually resident in 
a different contracting state.  
Though the approach in Friederich341 and Feder342 has been repeatedly and 
recently referred to in the US courts343, the courts have not developed 
guidelines with regard to particular objective factors and have not drawn a clear 
line between cases requiring the consideration of the child’s connection and the 
parental intentions and those only requiring a focus on the child.  
In Mozes, again a case often referred to in subsequent decisions344, the court 
focused on the standard of parental intent and denied to consider aspects 
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related to the situation of the child and marked them "superficial."345 The court 
stated that the concept of habitual residence had to be applied in an intelligent 
and consistent manner so that parents would know in what circumstances their 
child's habitual residence would change.346 Despite the significance of decisions 
focusing on the settlement of the child, parental intention has remained an 
important factor in US federal cases decided under the Convention. This not 
only in cases in which the courts correctly assumed the child not capable of 
having any relevant intentions due to young age and stated that the parents’ 
intentions had to be considered instead.347 Hence, prior to Abbott348, which is 
not as much a novelty with regard to the concept of habitual residence as some 
think, three major approaches could be found in the US courts: Mozes 
(emphasis on parental intent); Feder (consideration of parental intent and child's 
acclimatisation); Friedrich (factual circumstances, past experience of the child). 
Redmond was a combination of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Mozes and 
the case law established in the Seventh Circuit – in this case the court decided 
to determine habitual residence in accordance with its plain and ordinary 
meaning.349 It recognised that only once the court determines habitual 
residence the issue of custody rights be discussed, and that usually this will 
take place in a court in the state of the child’s habitual residence.  
This ‘mixed’ approach means taking a variety of factors into account, including 
the time spent in the specific state and everyday activities, to determine that this 
was a permanent home.  
Whether due to a lack of concrete guidance or due to a rejection of the 
approach in Friedrich, the courts for years continued to rely on the ‘settled 
purpose’ test, treating the habitual residence of the child as somehow 
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dependent on the residence of the parents. Though it was recognised that the 
child’s daily life must be affected by the intentions and situation of the parents, it 
is difficult to determine which facts were considered of greatest significance. 
The time spent in and the connection between the children and a certain state 
have been considered in different ways. Whilst in Mozes350 the emphasis was 
on the connection between the children and California, where they had spent 
the past year, in Feder351 the District Court emphasised that the children had 
spent most of their lives in the US whilst the Appeal Court laid emphasis on the 
quality of the last six months which had been spent in Australia. An obligation to 
order that a child be returned to another country would regularly run counter to 
the national judges’ tendency to directly address the underlying substantive 
issues and consider the child's individual best interests. Hence, Article 16 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction prohibits a court which has been notified of a 
wrongful removal or retention from deciding a custody dispute until it has been 
determined that the child shall not be returned. Further, under Article 17, the 
fact that a custody decision has been made in the requested state is not 
considered a proper ground for refusing the child's return. 
In the U.S., Isaac v Rice was an example of re-abduction back to the country of 
origin and of the question of habitual residence after a considerable period of 
time.352 Referring to Mozes353, the court held that the child had not become 
habitually resident in Israel where it had lived for a period of 11 years after 
having being abducted by the father as the mother did not intend the child to live 
there.354 
 In the view of the court in Isaac v Rice, it would be: 
“a technical and restrictive reading of the “habitual residence” requirement for a 
court always to look solely at a child’s perspective regarding a country, much 
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less the number of years the child spends in that country in determining the 
child’s habitual residence.” 355 
Whilst Schuz356 criticises that the question of the child’s intention has not been 
taken into account in many cases in which the U.S. courts have adopted what 
she terms the “parental-rights approach”, the U.S. pioneered the approach of 
considering factual circumstances and past experience of the child. The 
wording of the Convention leaves no doubts that the wishes of children who are 
sufficiently mature to understand the implications of their decision will override 
the requirement of mandatory return.357  
Hence, under a child-centred approach, the intention of a child who is 
sufficiently old and mature to have an intention must be considered relevant, 
and it is for the courts to consider this intention in the context of the 
circumstances of the case.  
It remains to be seen if the growing significance of children’s rights in national 
jurisdictions, which calls for an approach considering the child’s intentions and 
interests,358 will now reach the courts to replace the more traditional approaches 
to habitual residence in the context of the Convention on Child Abduction in the 
U.S. The signature of the Convention on Child Protection by the United States 
is considerable step forward, but as of now, the Convention has not been 
ratified.359 As will be considered later with regard to the interaction of the 
Convention on Child Abduction and the Regulation and cases regarding both 
the United States and the EU, a clearer definition of the requirements for the 
acquisition of habitual residence is a central if not the central aspect in the 
framework of the interaction of the Convention and the Regulation and 
jurisdiction, return orders and the enforcement of orders in accordance with the 
rules of the Convention and the Regulation.  
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Is there a movement of US courts towards a more child-centred interpretation of 
habitual residence and settlement in the context of the Convention on Child 
Abduction? Recently, the Supreme Court accepted a case360 regarding a U.S. 
Army sergeant and a Scottish woman who had married while he was stationed 
in Germany. Subsequent to their move to Alabama and the divorce, the couple 
disputed the care of their daughter and the mother obtained a federal court 
order under the Hague Convention that Scotland was the child’s country of 
habitual residence. As the mother had returned to Scotland with the child, the 
father appealed, however the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case arguing that 
the child had returned to Scotland and was outside the Court’s jurisdiction.361  
However, recently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eleventh 
Circuit and Chief Justice Roberts argued that  
“the Chafins continue to vigorously contest the question of where their daughter 
will be raised. This is not a case where a decision would address ‘a hypothetical 
state of facts’.”362  
Silberman and Spector propose to consider a brief automatic stay of a return 
order, pending an expedited hearing for a stay in the appellate court so as to 
allow the appellate court  
“to take a preliminary look at the merits in the context of continuing or lifting a 
stay and then ordering an expedited appeal the best solution”.363 
It is quite surprising that the judge in a child abduction case concludes that U.S. 
Courts often “decide cases against foreign nations, whose choices to respect 
final rulings are not guaranteed.”  
The different approaches the US courts have taken suggest that habitual 
residence may well be in the child’s best interest and may not be in the child’s 
best interest in the context of the Hague Convention. Different interpretations 
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allow for the assumption of habitual residence of a child at a place which may 
not necessarily be in his/her best interest. The following analysis shall show 
whether the interaction of the Convention(s) and the Regulation creates a 
clearer framework for the determination of habitual residence or complicates the 
issue even more, as the Regulation draws cases considered outside the scope 
of the Regulation into the EU or causes a conflict of competence of Hague 
courts and courts applying the Regulation. In order to do so, the interpretation of 
habitual residence under the Regulation is required.  
III. ‘Habitual residence’ under the Regulation  
In DT v LBT364, a Convention case, the court discussed in detail what it 
considered the requirements for habitual residence to be assumed and held that 
a child may be considered to be habitually resident in a place if he/she  
“lives there voluntarily for a settled purpose for an appreciable period of time, 
long or short, temporary or permanent”  
depending on social integration. The case raised the significant question 
whether adoption of habitual residence should be voluntary. It noted that in 
Brussels II bis cases, the court may not refuse to return a child on the basis of 
grave risk of harm if it is made evident that the authorities in the state where the 
child is supposed to be returned have made ‘adequate and effective’ 
arrangements for the protection of the child after the return.365 Those are two 
different aspects but in this case the European framework into which the 
Convention has been drawn became very clear.366 
In Mercredi v Chaffe367, the Advocate General argued that the intention of just 
one parent in leaving a Member State may not be considered a relevant fact in 
the determination of the child’s habitual residence. The court considered the 
meaning of habitual residence in the context of Articles 8 and 10 of Brussels II 
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bis and restated the requirements stated in Proceedings brought by A368, further 
mentioning  
“in order to determine where a child is habitually resident, in addition to the 
physical presence of the child in a Member State, other factors must also make 
it clear that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent”.369  
The court then held: 
“in order to distinguish habitual residence from mere temporary presence, the 
former must as a general rule have a certain duration which reflects an 
adequate degree of permanence. (…). Before habitual residence can be 
transferred to the host State, it is of paramount importance that the person 
concerned has it in mind to establish there the permanent or habitual centre of 
his interests, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character. 
Accordingly, the duration of a stay can serve only as an indicator in the 
assessment of the permanence of the residence, and that assessment must be 
carried out in the light of all the circumstances of fact specific to the individual 
case.” 370 
Whilst this definition appears to differ significantly from the traditional approach 
of the English courts discussed above, when Mercredi v Chaffe returned to the 
Court of Appeal, the European Court of Justice’s definition of habitual residence 
was noted but not considered in detail.371 This was an omission with 
consequences. In April 2011 the Supreme Court refused the father’s application 
for permission to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. This 
decision resulted from the judgment of the Court of Justice to which the Court of 
Appeal had referred three questions. The dismissal of his application for 
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court ended the fight of Mr Chaffe, an 
unmarried father, in the English courts with regard to the relationship with his 
daughter. The Court of Appeal finally raised doubts whether there was a 
wrongful removal of the child from England to La Réunion at all. Hence, the 
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Court of Appeal ordered a request to the courts of La Réunion to accept a 
transfer of the English proceedings. 
Subsequently, in Re H-K372 the Court of Appeal held that the qualifiers ‘a certain 
duration’ and ‘an adequate degree of permanence’ used in Mercredi v Chaffe373 
had to be read consistently with Lord Scarman’s opinion in Shah regarding 
residence. In Shah, the case referred to earlier, which did not concern children 
at all but set a standard for the interpretation of residence had that residence 
could be of short or long duration but had to be adopted “for settled purposes as 
part of the regular order of (…) life for the time being”.374  
In Mercredi v Chaffe375 the Court had held that the factors to be considered for 
determining habitual residence depended on the age of the child and referring 
to the different stages of childhood, the Court held that the mother’s and the 
child’s integration in the social and family environment had to be considered: 
“the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay in the territory of 
that Member State and for the mother’s move to that State”.376 Whilst it held that 
the duration must not be decisive and might solely be indicative, it underlined 
the general rule that to acquire habitual residence the stay must be of a certain 
duration. As in Proceedings brought by A377, the court held that it is for the 
national court to establish the habitual residence of the child, considering all 
circumstances of fact specific to each individual case.378 The Court emphasised 
the importance of differentiating between children depending on different stages 
of childhood is in accordance with the aims of the Regulation and considered in 
detailed the factors which should be considered by the courts it has not given 
guidance on the concrete requirements.379 This remaining degree of discretion 
seems very reasonable – it offers a degree of legal certainty but is not of a 
dictating character. The court confirmed the definition it had given in 
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Proceedings brought by A but went a bit further in explaining how it is to be 
applied and that this may differ because of the factual conditions of the instant 
case. 
Whilst McEleavy380 criticises the ‘more legalistic interpretation of European 
residence’, the concepts mentioned by the Court provide a degree of certainty 
which was never achieved under the Convention. A concise analysis of the 
case makes evident that the difficulties occurred when the case returned to the 
English court and were significantly related to the fact that this was a case 
involving a court seized under the Convention. The application of the Regulation 
on the one hand which led to the involvement of the ECJ and the application of 
the Convention in the primary proceedings provides a good impression of the 
interactions which will be discussed in the course of this thesis. Those 
difficulties concern the principle of primacy and will have to be discussed in 
detail in the context of the interaction the Regulation and the Convention on 
Child Abduction. However, there were also difficulties related to the 
determination of habitual residence and referring to those in more detail will 
lead to the discussion on the interaction.  
Following on from the judgment of the ECJ the matter was brought back before 
the Court of Appeal.381 Prior to the hearing in the Court of Appeal the mother 
issued an application to amend her grounds of appeal, on the one hand arguing 
that she had not been served in compliance with the EU Service Regulation. 
The mother further sought to amend the grounds of appeal to challenge Mr 
Justice McFarlane's decision on the facts.382 
An appeal as to issues of fact was not accepted and hence the attempt to 
challenge McFarlane J's determination that habitual residence had not been lost 
failed. McFarlane J had argued that the child had not lost her habitual residence 
when the proceedings commenced. The Appeal Court considered upon what 
acceptable basis of jurisdiction McFarlane J could have made “findings and 
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declarations for the ‘purposes of Article 15 of the Hague Convention 1980’ 
though no request had been made by the judicial or administrative authorities of 
France under that Article and the proceedings under the Convention had been 
concluded by a judgment delivered 28 days earlier?”383 So how was the 
guidance of the ECJ reflected in the Appeal Court? Before the Court of Appeal, 
the mother argued that the removal was lawful, that the judge should not have 
ordered return even if he had jurisdiction and additionally that the case should 
have been transferred to France under Article 15 of Brussels II bis. 
Thorpe LJ concluded that the child had been habitually resident in England at 
the relevant time and accepted the submission that a lawful removal can turn 
into a wrongful retention if a return order issued by the court of the child's 
habitual residence, is not complied with. However, he insisted that considering 
the case a case of child abduction was an error of the lower court as the mother 
was exercising her right of freedom of movement and that the English orders 
restricted the legitimate decision of the French court. 
On the issue of jurisdiction, the judges were divided as Thrope LJ concluded 
that McFarlane J had been wrong to claim jurisdiction, since he considered the 
wrong date for the question habitual residence. Elias LJ argued that the judge 
should have exercised his discretion to transfer the jurisdiction to the French 
court. Though Article 10 of the Regulation suggests that habitual residence can 
change without the consent of the other holder of parental rights no other 
English court had considered the possibility that habitual residence could 
change without consent. Whilst according to Thorpe LJ’s arguments no 
Article 15 transfer should have taken place because no jurisdiction existed in 
England, Elias LJ’s arguments allowed for a transfer, however, the grant of 
parental responsibility to the benefit of the father, granted by McFarlane J was 
maintained. However, while Thorpe LJ and Elias LJ disagreed on certain 
aspects they agreed that the approach taken by McFarlane J on habitual 
residence had been appropriate and was consistent with the decisions of the 
ECJ in Proceedings brought by A. This confirmed the earlier Court of Appeal 
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decision in Re S384 where Thorpe LJ had considered that Proceedings brought 
by A was consistent with previous English authorities. It was added that in 
determining the question of habitual residence it was only necessary to consider 
whether the child had lost her habitual residence in England and that if the child 
had no habitual residence in either France or England the provisions of Article 
13 of the Regulation would apply. 
In this case the mother was undecided as to what she would do and thus the 
child remained habitually resident in England, though the sole holder of custody 
had moved with her to France. The case brought up the significant question of 
whether a lawful removal could turn into a wrongful retention by orders granting 
parental rights or other rights of custody. This question will be of high relevance 
in the considerations on return orders and discussed later on. On habitual 
residence in the context of the Regulation this complex case brought more 
clarity. On the other hand, the handling of several other questions demonstrated 
that several courts are still hesitant or unconfident with regard to the application 
of the concepts of the Regulation. While the judgement of the ECJ laid down a 
test to be considered for the determination of the habitual residence in all 
circumstance which may arise under the Regulation, it also leaves some 
discretion for the national courts. If Proceedings brought by A and Mercredi v 
Chaffe385 are not disregarded the Court has established influential guidance for 
the determination of habitual residence of children under the Regulation.  
IV. The structure of enforcement and return under the Convention  
Article 12 of the Convention provides for orders to “return [of] the child”. 
Naturally, the enforcement mechanism of the Convention on Child Abduction is 
limited to the enforcement of return or non-return order, as a result of the scope 
of the Convention. Article 12 of the Convention obliges the judicial or 
administrative authority concerned to order the return of the child, specifying 
those situations in which those authorities, hence usually the court, in the State 
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to which the child has been removed are obliged to order the child’s return. To 
this end there is a duty of the court where proceedings have begun within one 
year of the wrongful removal or retention and, secondly, there is a rule on 
conditions referring to the time-limitation. The obligation to order is levered 
whenever it can be shown that the child is “settled” in the “new environment”. As 
there is no example as to how this is to be proved, the Convention leaves room 
for discretionary power of the national courts in this regard.386 
The return proceedings mechanism under the Convention on Child Abduction is 
providing solutions in the absence of a harmonised set of rules of jurisdiction 
and in the absence of the set of provisions on recognition of decisions. The 
decision to return a child establishes jurisdiction of the state of habitual 
residence for the subsequent proceedings on the merits of the rights of 
custody/parental responsibility and a decision of non-return allows the state to 
which a child was abducted to exercise jurisdiction on the merits. 
The general scheme is of course that the child is returned to the state where the 
child had his/her habitual residence prior to abduction, as discussed in the 
Chapter on habitual residence in the Convention and jurisdiction in the 
Convention.387 Further, Article 16 of the Convention contains a prohibition to 
exercise jurisdiction on the substance of rights of custody (parental 
responsibility) by the state to which the child was abducted/removed. Article 12 
remains silent on the state to which the child shall be returned thereunder. 
According to the Explanatory Report, “when the applicant no longer lives in 
what was the State of the child's habitual residence prior to its removal, the 
return of the child to that State might cause practical problems which would be 
difficult to resolve.”388 The third paragraph refers to a possible stay of 
proceedings.389  
                                            
386 as discussed at p. 71 et seqq.; p. 116 et seqq. hereof. 
387 as discussed in chapter 3 A. II herein. 
388 Perez-Vera, E., Explanatory Report, supra note 285, para 110. 
389 ibid, para 79, “This provision must be seen in conjunction with the provisions of the 
Convention (specifically Article 14(2)) providing that automatic recognition and in particular the 
updating of civil-status records do not require any special procedure if the judgment of the State 
of origin is one against which no further appeal lies under the law of that Member State.  
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The discretionary power of the courts with respect to the different aspects in 
Article 12 of the Convention became obvious in the different interpretations in 
Hague cases in England and the United States.  
In the House of Lords case of Re H, the House of Lords held that the removal 
and retention referred to in Article 12 of the Convention mean removal and 
retention out of the jurisdiction of the courts of the child's State of habitual 
residence.390 In the Appeal court case of Re M the court expressed a firm view 
that the order to return or not to return a child under Article 12 of the Convention 
is to be considered final in Hague Convention proceedings.391 It further noted 
that Article 13 of the Convention, “deals with specific instances where the 
welfare of the child may inhibit an order for return under Art 12”. For Article 13 
to be raised 
“a court has to be satisfied that the matters raised are so important as to 
displace the prima facie requirement to return the child under Article 12 upon 
proof of wrongful removal or wrongful retention under Article 3.’’392 
Article 12 of the Convention has however been rarely of concern in English 
appeal and Supreme court cases. Mostly, as in the more recent cases, it was 
just mentioned in the context of the exceptions set forth in Article 13 of the 
Convention.393 
 
 
This Article allows the court of a Member State in which recognition is sought to stay the 
proceedings if an ordinary appeal against the judgment has been lodged. For stay of 
enforcement, see Article 27 (and the commentary thereon in paragraph 94).  
In the case of judgments given in Ireland or the United Kingdom, provision is made for special 
features of their national legislation.” 
390 Re S (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] 2 AC 476. 
391 Re M (Abduction: Undertakings) [1995] 1 FLR 1021. 
392 ibid. 
393 Re D (A Child), supra note 315, Re D has hitherto been the only Supreme Court/House of 
Lords case with respect to Article 12 and at Appeal court level for instance Re A and Another 
(Minors: Abduction) [1991] 2 FLR 241 1990; Re H B (Abduction: Children's Objections) [1998] 1 
FLR 422 1997 and for instance Singh v Singh 1998 SC 68 1997 refer to it in the context of 
Article 13; there have been no decisions with respect to Article 12 at this court level during the 
last twenty years.  
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The same applied to United States Federal court cases, were in the context of 
Walsh v Walsh,394 and England v England,395 Article 12 of the Convention was 
only mentioned as a subsidiary aspect to Article 13 of the Convention 
considerations.  
Only in the recent, Yaman v Yaman,396 the court discussed the interpretation of 
“settled” in the context of Article 12 of the Convention and explicitly stated that 
in its view, if a court finds a child well settled, the court still retains discretion to 
weigh against such finding before deciding to order the child's return. Referring 
to the text of the Convention, the Convention's purposes, the inherent equitable 
powers of federal courts in the United States, and the insights of the Executive 
Branch, the court stated that in its view a court is not prohibited from ordering 
the child returned if it finds a child to be settled. The court hence considered it at 
the discretion of a federal court in the United States, to order, at its discretion, 
the return of a child found to be "now settled", as long as the lower court had 
reviewed all the circumstances and considerations and had elected to refuse 
the return the child.  
In England, Cannon v Cannon has hitherto been the only case at appeal level in 
which Article 12 was explicitly discussed.397  
The Court of Appeal found that the existing case law and Article 12 of the 
Convention conferred upon judges a discretion with respect to the settlement 
aspect, so as to achieve valuable outcomes in individual cases. It held that both 
the physical characteristics of settlement and the emotional and psychological 
elements had to be considered with respect to settlement and that trial judges 
should have critical regard to an alleged settlement based on concealment and 
deceit.398 
The Court of Appeal also held that residual discretion existed to make a return 
order even if settlement was established, with a reference to Article 18 of the 
                                            
394 Walsh v Walsh, No. 99-1747 (1st Cir. July 25. 2000). 
395 England v England, 234 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000). 
396 Yaman v Yaman, 730 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
397 Cannon v Cannon [2004] EWCA CIV 1330. 
398 ibid. 
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Convention.399 Hence, at the appellate court level in the United States, there is 
at least a corresponding view with regard to discretion to be exercised under 
Article 12 of the Convention as far as settlement is concerned.  
As for the civil law courts, where the interpretation of particular aspects of the 
Convention is restricted to the case itself rather than to a more general 
interpretation, a French Appeal Court case is one of the very few referring to 
Article 12(2) of the Convention.400 In this case, the court considered that the 
return could be denied in the event of the child's settlement in his or her new 
environment and pointed to psychological and academic as well as extra-
curricular activities for the interpretation of settlement by the trial court. It should 
be noted that a hearing had taken place in this case and based on all findings 
the court ruled that, in the greater interest of the children, their successful 
settlement in France conflicted with their return to the Netherlands, regardless 
of the administrative status of the mother. At superior appellate level, the 
French Cour de Cassation only referred to settlement in the new environment in 
the context of the specific case.401  
In Germany, the appellate courts only referred to Article 12 of the Convention in 
the context of Article 12 of the Convention decisions but not interpreted or even 
mentioned it at all.402  
Under Article 13(b) of the Convention the concept is that the court may refuse to 
order the child's return if it is shown that  
“there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”  
One difficulty which regularly arises with respect to this rule is the wide degree 
of discretion and the question is whether this will actually be in the best interests 
of the children concerned. Different contracting states' legal systems have a 
different understanding of ‘undertakings' as set forth in Article 13(b) of the 
                                            
399 ibid. 
400 CA Paris, 8 août 2008, Nos de RG 08/05791 et 08/07826. 
401 Cass Civ 1ère 12 décembre 2006 (N° de pourvoi: 06-13177). 
402 OLG Dresden, 10 UF 753/01, 21 January 2002 and the Oberlandesgericht Köln, 21 UF 
70/01, 12 April 2001. 
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Convention and the court may not even have an option to seise jurisdiction of its 
own motion upon a child's return. The criterion of grave risk has been rarely 
referred to directly in the superior courts.  
In Re S the Supreme Court even referred to anxieties of a mother about return 
which were not based upon objective risk but nevertheless it held that the Court 
of Appeal had failed to appreciate the mother’s concerns and that the Appeal 
Court had failed to recognise that the judgment about the level of risk required 
for the purposes of Art 13(b) of the Convention was one to be made by the trial 
judge.403 It held that it was not open to the Court of Appeal to substitute its 
contrary view.404  
In Re E the Court held that the applicable standard of proof was the same as for 
the ordinary balance of probabilities and the risk must be "grave", not just 
"real".405 It further held that an "intolerable situation" had to be interpreted 
subjectively, from the perspective of the child concerned. 
It considered the exposure to the harmful effects of seeing and hearing the 
physical or psychological abuse of a parent such a situation.  
However, it also noted that the protective measures to be put in place to ensure 
that the child did not face an intolerable situation should be considered by the 
trial court. 
Hence, it suggested that the trial court should first consider if there was a grave 
risk of harm and then how the child could be protected against the risk. In 
particular, the Supreme Court recognized that the appropriate protective 
measures and their efficacy would vary in every country. 
In Re D406 the court only made reference to the Perez Report.407 In the US, no 
superior appellate court case has dealt with the interpretation of grave risk 
under Article 13(b) of the Convention.  
                                            
403 Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10, [2012] 2 A.C. 257. 
404 ibid. 
405 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 A.C. 144, para 33. 
406 Re D (A Child), supra note 315. 
407 Perez-Vera, E., Explanatory Report, supra note 285. 
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At appellate court level, grave risk has been referred to in some cases but not 
necessarily interpreted beyond application to the circumstances of the case.408 
In Acosta v Acosta409 the Court held that Article 13(b) of the Convention 
provided a narrow exception to the Convention's rule of return, so that general 
evidence of harm was insufficient. It noted that a grave risk could be assumed 
in cases involving "serious abuse or neglect". Both the probability and the 
magnitude of the harm were held to be relevant.  
In Walsh v Walsh410 the court noted that the Convention does not require the 
risk to be "immediate"; only that the risk must be grave.  
And in Baran v Beaty411 the court referred to Friedrich, where the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had stated that a grave risk of harm may exist  
"when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may 
be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection"412 
 but also noted that not all courts have followed this interpretation, underlining 
that many courts have held that the reviewing court has discretion to deny the 
return outright where a return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. It 
held that there is no duty to consider what protection could mitigate the risk.413  
It appears that at the start of the last decade the courts were much more 
hesitant to assume the existence of a grave risk,414 in continuation of the strict 
                                            
408 Sanchez v RGL ex rel. Hernandez, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14849 (5th Cir. 2014); 
 Souratgar v Fair, 720 F.3d 96 (2nd Cir. 2013); Khan v Fatima, 680 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2012) 
Evidence of Grave Risk (only the dissenting judge referred to the interpretation of the 
Convention and concluded that the Convention aimed at a narrow interpretation; opinion of 
Hamilton CJ); Taylor v Taylor, 502 Fed.Appx. 854, 2012 WL 6631395 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) (11th Cir. 
2012).  
409 Acosta v Acosta, 725 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2013). 
410 Walsh v Walsh, supra note 394. 
411 Baran v Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008). 
412 Friedrich v Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996). 
413 Baran v Beaty, supra note 411. 
414 In Danaipour v McLarey, 286 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2002) the court laid considerable emphasis on 
the protection from the intolerable situation; In March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001) 
the court held that a default judgment which found that the father had killed the mother, was not 
convincing evidence that the children would face a grave risk of harm if returned. Furthermore, 
the court stated that the issues regarding the mother's death should be addressed in a custody 
hearing and not in the Convention case, pointing to a possible protection by the Mexican 
authorities. 
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and fierce approach the 6th Circuit took in Friedrich to which this chapter already 
referred in the context of the interpretation of habitual residence.  
On grave risk the court held:  
“The exception for grave harm to the child is not license for a court in the 
abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest. That 
decision is a custody matter, and reserved to the court in the country of habitual 
residence.  
[…] we believe that a grave risk of harm for the purposes of the Convention can 
exist in only two situations. First, there is a grave risk of harm when return of the 
child puts the child in imminent danger prior to the resolution of the custody 
dispute-- e.g., returning the child to a zone of war, famine, or disease. Second, 
there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or 
extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual 
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child 
adequate protection. Psychological evidence of the sort Mrs. F. introduced in 
the proceeding below is only relevant if it helps prove the existence of one of 
these two situations.”415 
Compared with the structure and interpretation of the central concepts under 
the Regulation, the Convention’s central concepts have been approached with a 
wide degree of discretion, as evidently reflected in the case law of the superior 
courts in England and the US.  
Based on this analysis of the central concepts both under the Convention and 
the Regulation, the next chapter will consider the direct interrelation of the 
instruments.  
                                            
415 Friedrich v Friedrich supra note 412, part III. 
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V. The direct interrelation of the Convention and the Regulation  
A core purpose of the Convention on Child Abduction was to abandon parents’ 
incentives to move to another country in order to obtain custody.416 In the 
United States this objective has been taken into account in most cases417 and 
the Convention has become an important standard for the settlement of 
abduction disputes.418 In the EU, however, the Convention works in interaction 
with the Regulation, both directly, as it is envisaged in the respective Articles, 
and furthermore, under the umbrella of the general provisions regarding the 
interrelation. 
Under Articles 59 (1) and 62 (1) of the Regulation, the Regulation supersedes 
all multilateral conventions between Member States relating to matters to which 
the Regulation applies, to the extent those conventions cover such matters. 
Hence, the Regulation does not only have priority over the Convention on Child 
Abduction but replaces them, however, whilst in cases of child abduction 
covered by the Regulation, the rules of the Regulation prevail over the rules of 
the Convention in relations between Member States, Article 11 of the 
Regulation explicitly refers to the Convention. The prompt return of the child to 
his or her habitual residence is the cornerstone of the Regulation, after a ‘child 
abduction’ meaning a wrongful removal and a wrongful retention pursuant to 
Article 2 of the Regulation. According to McEleavy419 the Regulation reflects a 
compromise between the EU Member States which intended to replace the 
Convention and those which intended to save it and were opposed to creating 
EU-specific provisions with regard to child abduction. To this extent, there is no 
ultimate replacement and the term “supersedes” used in Article 59(1) of the 
Regulation is restricted by the wording in Article 11 of the Regulation insofar as 
it sets the ground for an interaction. As Article 1 of the Regulation and Article 10 
(a) of the Convention demonstrate, both the Convention and the Regulation aim 
                                            
416 supra note 345. 
417 US Department of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (2005), available at https://travel.state.gov/content/dam
/childabduction/complianceReports/2005ComplianceReport.pdf, last accessed 01 May 2016. 
418 ibid. 
419 McEleavy, P., supra note 25. 
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at enabling and ensuring a prompt return of the child to the country of the child’s 
habitual residence, however, the procedural settings are different. Whilst Article 
10 of the Regulation contains a distinct, clear jurisdiction rule with respect to 
child abduction situations and Article 11 of the Regulation sets forth a procedure 
by way of reference to the Convention, the Convention lacks such a set of rules 
with respect to jurisdiction, as has been discussed in the context of the 
Convention at the start of this Chapter.  
As a general rule, Article 10 of the Regulation provides that the courts of the 
Member State where the child was habitually resident before the abduction 
retain their jurisdiction to decide on the case after the abduction. Jurisdiction 
may be attributed to the courts of the new Member State only if the child has i) 
either acquired habitual residence in the requested Member State and the 
persons having rights of custody have acquiesced in the removal or retention or 
(ii) if the child has acquired habitual residence in another Member State and the 
child has resided in that Member State for at least one year after the parent with 
rights of custody gained knowledge or should have gained knowledge of the 
whereabouts of the child and has not lodged a request for the return of the child 
within this period. Additionally, the child must have settled in the new 
environment.420  
Article 15 of the Regulation further differentiates it from the Convention. This 
rule allows, as an exception, a court to transfer a case to a court of another 
Member State if the latter is “better placed” to hear the case. As jurisdiction 
does not shift automatically by means of the general rule of Article 8, and there 
may be circumstances under which the court seised is not the best placed court 
to hear the case, it is a considerable merit that the court may transfer the case 
to a court of another Member State provided this is in the best interests of the 
child. Hence, the two superordinate requirements are that the other court is 
                                            
420 Article 10: ”In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the courts of the Member 
State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or 
retention shall retain their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another 
Member State and: […] (b) the child has resided in that other Member State for a period of at 
least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has had or 
should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child is settled in his or her 
new environment and at least one of the following conditions is met:[…]”. 
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better placed and that the transfer is in the best interest of the child. The 
required situation is that the child must have a ‘particular connection’ with the 
other Member State and Article 15(3) of the Regulation lists five situations in 
which such a connection is assumed to exist.421 
According to Article 15(4) of the Regulation the general rule is that the court of 
the Member State having jurisdiction sets a time limit by which the courts of the 
other Member State shall be seised in accordance with paragraph 1. Further, 
pursuant to this paragraph, If the courts are not seised by that time, the court 
which has been seised continues to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with 
Articles 8 to 14. 
Following this section Article 15(5) sets forth that 
“the courts of that other Member State may, where due to the specific 
circumstances of the case, this is in the best interests of the child, accept 
jurisdiction within six weeks of their seisure in accordance with paragraph 1(a) 
or 1(b)”. 
Following this, the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction. If it would not be in 
the best interest to transfer, the court first seised will continue to exercise 
jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 8 to 14. 
Since the court which has received the request for a transfer must decide, 
within six weeks of being seised, whether or not it accepts the transfer, the 
decisive factor should always be whether the transfer would be in the best 
interests of the child. If, however the second court declines jurisdiction or, within 
six weeks of being seised, does not accept jurisdiction, jurisdiction remains with 
the original court and the original court must exercise it. 
When there is an interrelation of the Convention and the Regulation, the 
question of interpretation of the terms provided in the respective provisions 
becomes even more relevant than in the stand-alone context. Whilst the ECJ 
has suggested in Proceedings brought by A422, that the provisions of Brussels II 
                                            
421 as discussed herein at p.68 and p. 150 et seqq. 
422 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17. 
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bis required an autonomous interpretation of its provisions as opposed to an 
interpretation based on domestic law, the context of Article 11 and its reference 
to Articles 12, 13 and 13b of the Convention brings up the question of a 
harmonised interpretation of concepts. Article 11 sets forth a direct reference to 
the Convention, the structure of the provision was introduced in Chapter 2. 
Making evident that the Convention is in fact interconnected with the 
Regulation, the ECJ outlined in Rinau423 that the rules on the enforceability of 
judgments “tie[s] in very closely with the provisions of the 1980 Hague 
Convention” and that the “guiding principles” of the Hague Convention were 
adapted by the Regulation. Continuing that the Regulations “complements” the 
provisions of the Convention and that Article 11(8) must be understood 
chronologically, the Court underlines the interaction. Hence, it is worth 
considering Rinau in more detail. Whilst Article 11 establishes procedural rules 
for the handling of Hague return applications in the courts of EU Member 
States, the most important part of the rule is Article 11(6)-(8) , which establishes 
cross-border co-operation between courts which can lead to a return order 
made in the State of the child’s former habitual residence. The procedure set 
forth in Article 11(6)-(8) allows the court in the state of the habitual residence of 
the child before the abduction to issue a new order requiring the return of the 
child, following an Article 13 non-return order under the Convention from the 
state where the child was removed to after the abduction. Insofar as judgments 
pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention are concerned, the Court points to the 
significance of the Hague Convention, whenever relevant. Article 42(2)(c) 
requires a court to take into consideration the reasons for and evidence 
underlying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention.  
In the Appeal Court case of Re F,424 Thorpe LJ suggested that in an Convention 
case within the European Union, where a summary return was refused on the 
basis of one of the exceptions set forth in Article 13, the left behind parent 
should pursue a procedure under Article 11(6)-(8) of the Regulation rather than 
initiating an appeal in the requested State. 
                                            
423 Rinau, supra note 19. 
424 Re F (A Child) [2009] EWCA Civ 416. 
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Even shortly before the ECJ’s observations in the English court in B v D425 had 
held that where different remedies were available in different jurisdictions the 
Hague Convention proceedings should not take automatic precedence but that 
the Regulation’s general and special rules on jurisdiction applied. 
In most Appeal Court cases in England which have dealt with both Article 11 of 
the Regulation and Article 13 of the Convention the issue was the hearing of the 
child or the consideration of the child’s objections426 rather than the overriding 
nature of Article 11(6–8) and Article 41 of the Regulation (automatic 
enforcement) over non-return orders based on Article 13 of the Convention, as 
will be addressed in the following, the general prevailing character of the 
provisions of the Regulation in intra-community cases over the application of the 
Convention provisions has not been thoroughly reflected in the Court of Appeal 
case law, which makes evident that applications are made without a reference 
to Article 11 of the Regulation and only Article 13(2) of the Convention is 
invoked.427  
Whilst Article 11 of Brussels II bis determines the requirements of return orders 
on the basis of the Hague Convention, it also sets forth that under exceptional 
circumstances, Article 13(2) permits a court to refuse to render a return order if 
the child who is old and mature enough to do so, refuses to accept the return. 
However, according to Article 11(4) of the Regulation, a court is not permitted to 
refuse the return if there is proof that adequate measures have been taken to 
secure the protection of the child after the return.428 The discretion the 
Regulation leaves to the courts to determine whether the measures are 
adequate and the proof sufficient is not of an overwhelming character. The main 
                                            
425 B v D [2008] EWHC 1246 (Fam); [2009] Fam. Law 176. 
426 Re F (Abduction: Joinder of Child as Party) [2007] EWCA Civ 393; Re M (A Child) 
(Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2007] EWCA Civ 260; Re F (Abduction: Child's 
Wishes) [2007] EWCA Civ 468; Re W (Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 520, [2010] 2 F.L.R. 1165. 
427 Re LC (Children) (International Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2013] EWCA Civ 
1058; Re G (Abduction: Children’s Objections) [2010] EWCA Civ 1232, [2011] 1 F.L.R. 1645; 
Re J (Abduction: Children's Objections) [2011] EWCA Civ 1448, [2012] 1 F.L.R. 457; Re W 
(Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 520, [2010] 2 F.L.R. 1165. 
428 Article 11(4) of the Regulation. A court cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of Article 
13b of the 1980 Hague Convention if it is established that adequate arrangements have been 
made to secure the protection of the child after his or her return. 
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problem rather seems that the clarification provided in the recent case of 
Bradbrooke429 solely refers to Article 11(7) and (8) of the Regulation and the 
European Court of Justice has hitherto not been requested to clarify the 
obligatory nature of the Article 11(4) of the Regulation. With respect to the 
question of children removed to non-Member States Article 11(1) completely 
excludes situations where a child is retained or removed to a non-Member 
States as it explicitly refers to situations where  
“a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the 
competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of 
the […]"the 1980 Hague Convention"), in order to obtain the return of a child 
that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the 
Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the 
wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply.in order to obtain 
the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member 
State.”430  
This seems consistent with the general approach of the Regulation that the 
courts of the state of the former habitual residence maintain jurisdiction, with 
precedence so that the courts of the Member State in which the child wrongfully 
stays have very limited measures to oppose a return. On the other this 
approach seems inconsistent with Recital 17 of the Regulation: 
“In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return of the child 
should be obtained without delay, and to this end [the 1980 Hague Convention] 
would continue to apply as complemented by the provisions of this Regulation, 
in particular Article 11. The courts of the Member State to or in which the child 
has been wrongfully removed or retained should be able to oppose his or her 
return in specific, duly justified cases. However, such a decision could be 
replaced by a subsequent decision by the court of the Member State of habitual 
residence of the child prior to the wrongful removal or retention. Should that 
judgment entail the return of the child, the return should take place without any 
                                            
429 Case C‑498/14 PPU, Bradbrooke. 
430 Article 11(1) of the Regulation. 
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special procedure being required for recognition and enforcement of that 
judgment in the Member State to or in which the child has been removed or 
retained.”431  
Prior to the implementation of the Regulation, the Convention would have 
exclusively decided where any case regarding a return would be decided and a 
non-return order by this court would have been exclusively considered under 
the Convention. Now, with the return mechanism exceptions set forth in Article 
11(1)-(5) of the Regulation, the more specific provisions in this Article are 
applied in intra-Community cases, based however on the presumption that 
those provisions complement the rules of the Convention with respect to a 
return order.432  
The wording of the Practice Guide suggests that the provisions of the 
Convention are “complemented by Article 11(1) to (5) of the Regulation”,433 
however, whilst paras (1)-(5) are based on the Convention’s principle that the 
court shall order the immediate return of the child unless the exceptions set 
forth in Article 13(b) of the Convention apply, it adds to those restrictions with a 
further restriction in paragraph (4) that return may not be denied if it is assured 
that the measures referred to therein will be taken in the Member State of origin.  
Pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Convention the court is not obliged to order the 
return if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or would 
place the child in an intolerable situation.434 Pursuant to Article 11(4) of the 
Regulation, even where there is such risk of an exposure of the child to such 
harm, but  
“it is nevertheless established that adequate arrangements have been made to 
secure the protection of the child after the return.”  
                                            
431 Recital 17 of the Regulation. 
432 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2014), supra note 129, section 4.3.1. 
433 ibid, para 4.3.1.  
434 as discussed at p. 123 et seqq. herein. 
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Article 11(4) of the Regulation has however been very rarely been referred to at 
all in the courts. In the case of Re A435 the return was refused and Article 11(4) 
was referred to. Taking into account the boy's refusal to countenance a return, 
the court) concluded that the Article 13(b) exception had been established and 
that no proof had been provided that adequate arrangements had been made to 
secure the protection of the child subsequent to the return pursuant to Article 
11(4) of the Regulation.436 In the French superior courts Article 11(4) has also 
very rarely been referred to same437 and in the German courts has not even 
been considered. A reason for this reluctance may be the complexity of 
paragraphs (2)-(5) or the higher potential for conflict which is embodied in 
paragraphs (6)-(8).  
Hence, Article 11 of the Regulation modifies the procedure under the 
Convention in cases where both the requesting and the requested States are 
parties to the Regulation and there are on the one hand, provisions which relate 
generally to the operation of the Convention and, on the other hand, provisions 
which restrict the scope for refusing to return the child. 
In the Supreme Court only two cases have hitherto dealt with the interrelation of 
Article 13 of the Convention and Article 11 of the Regulation.438 However, in in 
the Matter of LC the Supreme Court explicitly referred to the complexity 
imposed by the additional provisions in the Regulation and at the same time it 
emphasised that 
“by article 42(1), [that,] provided that the judge in the state of habitual residence 
shall have certified that the parties and, if appropriate, the child were given an 
opportunity to be heard and that he took account of the reasons for the refusal 
of the requested court to order the child’s return under the Convention, there 
                                            
435 Re A, supra note 180. 
436 Klentzeris v Klentzeris [2007] EWCA Civ 533, but no explanation with respect to Art 11(4) of 
the Regulation. 
437 CA Paris, 31 mai 2012, No de RG 12/05844 (France) court only referred to Art. 13 I b HC; 
CA Bordeaux, 19 janvier 2007, No de RG 06/002739, court referred to Art. 13 I b of the 
Convention and 13 II und Art. 11 of the Regulation and only very shortly considered the aspect 
“adequate protection measures” without any interpretation. 
438 Re D, supra note 315; In the Matter of LC (Children) (International Abduction: Child's 
Objections to Return) [2014] UKSC 1, [2014] 2 W.L.R. 124. 
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can be no facility for challenge in the requested state to his order for the child’s 
return.”439  
The Supreme Court also referred to the statement made by the European Court 
of Justice in Rinau that the order “enjoys procedural autonomy”.440 
As the English Supreme court’s reflections on the procedure with respect to the 
non-enforcement of orders demonstrates, Article 11(8) is particularly prone to 
criticism  
“Thus B2R has added a dramatic further dimension to proceedings under the 
Convention in which the application is for the child’s return to a fellow EU state. 
When, on whatever basis, it refuses an application under the Convention for 
return to a non-EU state, a court in England and Wales will conventionally 
embark […] on a merits-based inquiry into the arrangements which will best 
serve the welfare of the child; and it will reasonably anticipate, particularly in the 
light of the presence of the child here, that its decision will be fully enforceable. 
But when, by reference to article 13 of the Convention, it refuses an application 
for a child’s return to an EU state, it is aware that an order for return, immune 
from challenge, may nevertheless be forthcoming from that state; and that 
therefore the order for non-return may well provide no more than a breathing-
space.”441 
Whilst, in principle, according to Arts. 59(1) and 62(1) of the Regulation, the 
Regulation supersedes all conventions between Member States relating to 
matters to which the Regulation applies, in so far as they cover such matters, 
the above has already demonstrated that this structure does not mean that the 
interrelation works without problems of subsidiarity. As far as Article 11(2)-(5) is 
concerned, this primarily means that the Regulations provisions have hitherto 
remained unnoticed by the courts in England so that the Practice Guide’s 
assumption that the “rules of the Regulation (Article 11(2) to (5)) prevail over the 
                                            
439 In the Matter of LC, ibid, para 20. 
440 ibid. 
441 ibid, para 21. 
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relevant rules of the Convention”442 have not been reflected in practice. It has 
very much been a complementary approach, with a priority of the application of 
Article 13 of the Convention.  
For Article 11 (6)-(8) of the Regulation the situation is different, as will be 
discussed in a separate chapter, in which it will be analysed how the ECJ 
enforces the primacy of Brussels II bis, and, as a ‘side effect’ Convention on 
Child Protection over the Convention on Child Abduction, with regard to non-
return orders based on Article 13 of the Convention as those orders may be 
overridden by Article 11(6–8) and Article 41 of the Regulation (automatic 
enforcement).443  
In Zarraga444 the Court of Justice confirmed Article 11(8) to ‘override’ an order 
of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention on Child Abduction which  
required a German court to enforce an order of return made by a Spanish court 
after a court in Germany had refused to return the child. Mr Zarraga had 
brought proceedings in Germany to obtain the return of the child to Spain under 
the Hague Convention. As Mr Zarraga had further applied for the judgment of 
the Spanish Court for custody to be recognised under Article 42 of the 
Regulation, the German court argued there had been violation of a fundamental 
right in not hearing the child issuing the Article 42 certificate and requested a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ as to whether it could refuse to recognise a 
judgment. Whilst this primacy may seem awkward at first, the mechanism of 
Article 42 is such that a return order issued in the state of the origin of the child 
will always supersede a non-return order delivered in another state, and will not 
need exequatur, nor any specific procedure, to be enforced in the other state. 
The procedure is strict and has been criticised445 as will later be considered in 
detail in the section on non-return orders. However, it embraces the concept of 
                                            
442 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2005), supra note 30, section 4.3.6. 
443 Chapter 4 A. 
444 Case C-491/10 PPU, Zarraga v Pelz, [2010] ECR I-14247.  
445 Walker, L.; Beaumont, P., ‘Shifting the Balance Achieved by the Abduction Convention: The 
Contrasting Approaches of the European Court of human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice’ (2011) J Priv Int L, 7, 231. 
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consistency that the state of origin has primacy over another state the child may 
have been taken to.  
B. Relation of and interaction with the Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Children 
Having discussed the interrelation with the Convention on Child Abduction, the 
following will analyse the interrelation with the Convention on Child Protection.  
I. The structure and the particularities of the Convention 
In addition to the interaction of the Convention on Child Abduction, family 
lawyers must also take into account the Convention on Child Protection, which 
deals with jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement related to “[the] protection 
of the person or property of the child”. Though the wording “measures of 
protection” suggests that the Convention on Child Protection would solely deal 
with public care and protection, it covers almost every order that can be made in 
respect of a child446 and it is evident that this will result in interactions with the 
Regulation. And even though it would seem clear at first that Brussels II bis 
takes precedence because of the primacy approach it takes in general, the 
situation is a more distinct than this first impression suggests. 
Even predating the Treaty of Amsterdam, the negotiation of the Convention on 
Child Protection involved all the then Member States of the European Union, 
under the Hague Conference umbrella and the delays in the ratification of the 
Convention on Child Protection to a considerable extent resulted from the 
                                            
446 Article 1 of the Convention on Child Protection sets forth the scope namely:  
“(a) to determine the State whose authorities have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the 
protection of the person or property of the child; 
(b) to determine which law is to be applied by such authorities in exercising their 
jurisdiction; 
(c) to determine the law applicable to parental responsibility; 
(d) to provide for the recognition and enforcement of such measures or protection 
in all Contracting States; 
(e) to establish such co-operation between the authorities of the Contracting States as may be 
necessary in order to achieve the purposes of this Convention.” 
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European Union and its processes. Only when the revised Regulation was 
confirmed a Council Decision was issued authorizing Member States to sign the 
Convention in the interests of the Community as part of the November 2002 
compromise on the issue of child abduction.447 There has hence, right from the 
start, been a relation of the Convention on Child Protection and the Regulation.  
As the EC had acquired competence over certain aspects included the 
Convention on Child Protection,448 ratification or accession to the instrument 
had to be in a common move, by all Member States. In the United Kingdom the 
Convention on Child Protection has been recognised as a Community Treaty for 
the purposes of the European Communities Act 1972,449 so that implementation 
has been achieved via regulations under section 2(2) of that Act. 
Compared to the Regulation’s features of automatic enforceability of 
judgments,450 and the primacy of the Member State of habitual residence in 
intra-EU abduction cases,451 the 1996 Convention’s provisions may seem to 
have limited innovation. However, it also contains features that are absent from 
the Regulation, including rules on choice of law and cooperation.452 Also, the 
Convention on Child Protection approaches certain situations completely 
different than the Regulation. The clearest distinction is that the Convention on 
Child Protection deals with issues of applicable law453 and contains a general 
choice of law rule for parental responsibility.454 The geographical scope of the 
                                            
447 Council Decision 2003/93 [2003] OJ L048/1-2. The then Member States signed the 
Convention on 1 April 2003, except for the Netherlands, which had already signed on 1 
September 1997. 
448 Lugano Convention [2006] ECR I-1145. 
449 S 1(3); also see the ‘The European Communities’ (Definition of Treaties) (1996) Hague 
Convention on Protection of Children Etc) Order 2009: available at www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2009/dr
aft/ukdsi_9780111487563_en_1, last accessed 01 May 2016, there the Explanatory 
Memorandum. 
450 Articles 40-42 of the Regulation. 
451 Article 10 of the Regulation. 
452 Chapter V of Convention on Child Protection. 
453 Article 15 of the Convention on Child Protection. 
454 Articles 16 -18 of the Convention on Child Protection. 
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Convention on Child Protection rules varies depending on the Chapter under 
consideration.455  
The scope and objectives set forth in Chapter I of the Convention on Child 
Protection also provides for a description of the “measures for the protection” 
referred to Article 1 in Article 3 and lists exemplary situations and areas of 
application. A summary of the main features of the Convention on Child 
Protection will provide for a framework which provisions are of central interest 
for considering the interrelation and for comparison with the Regulation. The 
jurisdiction provisions of the Convention on Child Protection (Chapter II of the 
Convention on Child Protection) only apply where there is an international 
context and a child is habitually resident in a Contracting State, or, is present in 
such a State, and has no habitual residence at all or is a refugee or is displaced 
in an international context.456 In contrast to the Regulation, recognition is 
granted to measures made in a Contracting State under the bases of jurisdiction 
provided for in Chapter II of the Convention on Child Protection.457 Whilst the 
general rule is that the law of the Contracting State shall be applied (Article 
15(1) of the Convention) exceptions are provided for in Article 15 (2) and (3) of 
the Convention, with regard to parental responsibility there is only the exception 
of a change in habitual residence affecting the change of the applicable law 
(Article 17 of the Convention on Child Protection). With regard to protective 
measures, provisions on cooperation exist, however not in all cases a 
mandatory obligation to co-operate is created.458 The application of the 
Convention in situations involving a non-Contracting State are clearer referred 
to in the Convention than in the Regulation as the Convention refers to 
situations involving non-Contracting States in Article 11(3), 12(3), 20, 21(2), 
23(2) whilst the Regulation solely refers to non-Member States in the provision 
on prorogation of jurisdiction in Article 12(4) with respect to habitual residence 
outside the territorial scope of the Regulation and the Convention on Child 
                                            
455 Lagarde Report, supra note 116 at para. 17. cf Art. 13. 
456 Articles 5-14 of the 1996 Convention. 
457 Clive, E., ‘The New  Hague Convention on Children’ (1998) Juridical Review 169-188, 171. 
458 ‘‘may request’’ is used both in Article 34 and 35 with regard to request by authorities in one 
Contracting State to authorities in another Contracting State. 
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Protection and in Articles 22(d) and 23(f) in the context of grounds of non-
recognition. Exclusivity of jurisdiction under the Convention on Child Protection 
is imposed only where a child is habitually resident in a Contracting State, or 
where a child is present and is a refugee or is internationally displaced, or 
where a child is present and has no habitual residence at all.459 
If the child has no habitual residence at all, both Article 6 of the Convention and 
Article 13 of the Regulation seek to claim jurisdiction, whilst when a child is 
habitually resident in a third State the Convention does not seek to claim 
jurisdiction. Hence, the Convention, a first evaluation suggests, does not draw 
into its application, cases outside its scope, a feature often criticised with 
respect to the Regulation as it applies even if the child is outside the Member 
States, removed to a third state but had its habitual residence in a Member 
State (Article 12(4), taking the approach that jurisdiction of a Member State 
prevails and remains in the Member State in accordance with Article 12. 
However, where a child is not habitually resident in a Member State but in a 
Contracting State the Convention on Child Protection or - in cases of wrongful 
removal or retention - the Convention on Child Abduction applies.  
One of the significant features of the Convention on Child Protection is the 
common rules of jurisdiction provided for in Articles 5–14. Jurisdiction pursuant 
to Article 5 of the Convention460 is subject only to jurisdiction in the original 
Contracting State of habitual residence from where the child has been 
wrongfully removed to or retained in another Contracting State.461 But it does 
not guarantee the jurisdiction of the State of origin permanently.462 Also, the 
rules on jurisdiction determine the Contracting State whose authorities have 
                                            
459 Articles 5-14 of the 1996 Convention. 
460 Article 5 of the 1996 Convention: (1) The judicial or administrative authorities of the 
Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures 
directed to the protection of the child's person or property.  
(2) Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child's habitual residence to another 
Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction.” 
461 Article 7 of the Convention on Child Protection. 
462 If in the context of Convention proceedings, return proceedings conclude without an order to 
return the child, and the child has been in the new State for more than 12 months since the left 
parent in the state from which the child has been taken had or should have had knowledge of 
his/her whereabouts, and the child has become habitually resident, the new place will have 
jurisdiction. 
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jurisdiction, not the authority within the Contracting State. As in the Convention 
on Child Abduction, the term ‘habitual residence’ is not defined in the 
Convention on Child Protection. Under the Convention on Child Protection, 
habitual residence serves to assess the courts of which Contracting State(s) 
have jurisdiction to take measures of protection and whether their decisions 
should be recognised and enforced on other Contracting States. The courts at 
the child’s habitual residence have basic jurisdiction to take ‘measures directed 
to the protection’ of the child. Contrary to the primacy of jurisdiction of the courts 
in the Member State of the original or established habitual residence (Article 
8(2) with the reference to Articles 9, 10 and 12), Article 8 of the Convention 
allows for the authority having jurisdiction under Articles 5 or 6 to decide that an 
authority in another Contracting State may be “better placed” to determine the 
best interests of the child. The authority may either request that other authority 
(either directly or with the assistance of the Central Authority) assumes 
jurisdiction or to suspend taking the case and request the parties to submit the 
request to the other authority. In Chapter 2 of this thesis it was analysed how 
the wording “better placed” is used in the framework and has been interpreted 
in the context of the Regulation.463 As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2 in the 
context of the multiple provisions in which the term ‘best interest’ is used, there 
is no valuable guidance in the Lagarde Report as to what “better placed” shall 
mean. Considering that the Lagarde Report also leaves it to the discretion of the 
national courts to determine the best interests of the child it “is left to the 
judgment of the authority normally having jurisdiction, which should therefore 
show proof of discernment.”464 The Handbook published by the Hague 
Conference in 2014 is no further guidance as it cites the Report465 and the 
degree of discretion with respect to whether or not a court “considers” another 
“better placed” is evidently high.  
                                            
463 as discussed herein at pp. 50, 54, 69, 106, 140.   
464 Lagarde Report, supra note 116, p. 559. 
465 Practical Handbook on the operation of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children available at 
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/handbook34en.pdf, para 5.4, last accessed 01 May 2016. 
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Article 8(2) (d) refers to transfer of jurisdiction to “a State with which the child 
has a substantial connection”’ and it is agreed that jurisdiction may be declined 
under residual rules, such as the doctrine of forum non conveniens.466 There is 
flexibility with respect to lis pendens, for such an action is not restricted to the 
procedure set down in Articles 8 and 9.467 To the Regulation the principle of 
perpetuatio fori applies, to the Convention, on the contrary it expressly does 
not.468 Article 9 of the Convention on Child Protection solely permits requests to 
be made to the competent authority of the Contracting State of the habitual 
residence of the child, hence those having jurisdiction under Article 5, Article 9 
of the Convention on Child Protection reads:  
“(1) If the authorities of a Contracting State referred to in Article 8, paragraph 2, 
consider that they are better placed in the particular case to assess the child's 
best interests, they may either - request the competent authority of the 
Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child, directly or with the 
assistance of the Central Authority of that State, that they be authorised to 
exercise jurisdiction to take the measures of protection which they consider to 
be necessary, or - invite the parties to introduce such a request before the 
authority of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child.” 
Article 8 of the Convention on Child Protection, on the contrary allows for 
transfers from authorities having jurisdiction under Articles 5 or 6.469 It would 
seem that the process under Articles 8 and 9 would practically cause no 
difficulties in common law countries due to their familiarity with the forum non 
conveniens concept. It will have to been seen how the concept will be 
implemented in civil law countries.470 
                                            
466 Article 15(3) of Brussels II bis. 
467 Lagarde Report, supra note 116, p. 80. 
468 ibid, para 41. 
469 Article 8 of the Convention on Child Protection.  
470 The Convention entered into force, for instance, in Germany on 1 January 2011, in France on 
1 February 2011 and in the United Kingdom on 1 October 2012; in the United States it has been 
signed but not been ratified. 
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Article 14 of the Convention on Child Protection sets forth that measures taken 
by an authority having jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 5–10 remain in force 
“according to their terms” even though 
“a change of circumstances has eliminated the basis upon which jurisdiction 
was founded, so long as the authorities which have jurisdiction under the 
Convention have not modified, replaced or terminated such measures.” 
The exercise of parental responsibility is governed by the law of the child's state 
of habitual residence (Chapter III of the Convention on Child Protection). 
However, as a last resort, the application of this law can be refused if it would 
be contrary to public policy, taking into account the best interests of the child.471 
As provisions on the applicable law are totally absent from the Regulation, this 
chapter is free from comparison with the Regulation, but will of course 
nonetheless be relevant with respect to interrelations of the two instruments. 
With respect to recognition and enforcement (Chapter IV of the Convention on 
Child Protection) there are quite a number of distinctions. Whilst discretion is 
significant in the Convention, all grounds of non-recognition are mandatory 
under the Regulation, as the distinction between Article 23 of the Regulation 
and Article 23(2) of the Convention on Child Protection demonstrates. If a 
judgment is incompatible with an order rendered later in the non-Contracting 
State of the child's habitual residence; this order may be recognised in the 
requested State, pursuant to Article 23 of the Regulation. 
Both the Convention and the Regulation contain a public policy exception, 
however Article 23(a) of the Regulation provides that regard must be paid to the 
best interests of the child, a qualifier which is absent from Article 22 of the 
Convention.  
Hence, the provisions of the Convention on Child Protection offer a higher 
degree of discretion to national courts which are not the courts of the habitual 
residence of the child, to accept or decline jurisdiction. The provisions contain a 
number of references to the ‘best interest’, in Article 8(1), as regards the 
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general rule on jurisdiction, in Article 8(4), as an exception to the jurisdiction 
pursuant to Articles 5 and 6, in Article 9, in favour of a court ‘better placed’ to 
hear the case, in Article 10 with respect to the relation of the court competent 
for divorce and marriage annulment matters to have competence over parental 
responsibility matters. Further in Article 22 with respect to the public policy 
exception regarding the applicable laws and in Article 23 with respect to the 
public policy qualifier in the recognition and enforcement provision, in Article 
33(2) with respect to the cooperation on a decision of placement. This brings us 
to the question of cooperation in the Convention on Child Protection.  
Chapter V of the Convention on Child Protection reflects the compromise 
between a lose framework of cooperative measures and binding obligations for 
Contracting States; the duties of the Central Authority are defined in general 
terms only. Article 30 confirms that Central Authorities shall co-operate and 
provide information, whilst Article 31 adds that Central Authorities shall facilitate 
communications, agree on solutions and assist in locating children, but all the 
obligations set forth in Article 31 and the following articles are drafted in general 
words, with reference to situations rather than the exact procedures to be taken. 
In this respect the Convention resembles the provisions of the Regulation. The 
Lagarde Report notes that there is “no obligation to give information or to co-
ordinate in advance the taking of measures […]”.472  
Hence, the Convention on Child Protection covers a wide range of orders about 
children, including parental responsibility orders, and provides rules governing 
which Contracting State's courts will have jurisdiction. With regard to the 
applicable law, the general rule is that each Contracting State should apply its 
own law with exceptions set forth in Articles 15–22 of the Convention on Child 
Protection.  
As far as recognition and enforcement are concerned, there are some 
circumstances in which recognition can be refused, as in Art 23, the Convention 
makes clear that the procedure for enforcement should be ‘simple and rapid’.  
                                            
472 Lagarde Report, supra note 116, para 137. 
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In the UK, the provisions of the Convention on Child Protection were 
implemented via secondary legislation, the Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children.473 
II. The interrelation with the Regulation 
As was explained in detail in the introduction (Chapter 1), the interaction of the 
Regulation is addressed to evaluate the situation of conflicting provisions and to 
establish if there are complications and if there could be enhancements, thereby 
allowing for swift, fair proceedings.  
According to Article 61(a) of the Regulation - in consistency with Article 52(2), 
(4) of the Child Protection Convention, which allows the Member States to apply 
the provisions of Community law to children whose habitual residence is in the 
Community, the Regulation - not the Convention on Child Protection - is to be 
applied if the child concerned has his or her habitual residence in a Member 
State.474  
If the child habitually resides outside the State where a matrimonial matter is 
pending, Article 12(1) and (2) of the Regulation applies. However, it only applies 
to courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 3 of the Regulation. Since the 
provision not only applies to children resident in a Member State but also to 
children resident in third states, it remains uncertain whether Article 12(1) of the 
Regulation or Article 10 of the Convention on Child Protection applies if the 
                                            
473 Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (International 
Obligations) (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Regulations 2010. 
474 Article 59(1) of the Regulation states: “Subject to the provisions of Articles 60, 63, 64 and 
paragraph 2 of this Article, this Regulation shall, for the Member States, supersede conventions 
existing at the time of entry into force of this Regulation which have been concluded between 
two or more Member States and relate to matters governed by this Regulation.”; Article 61 of 
the Regulation states: “As concerns the relation with the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, this Regulation shall apply: 
(a) where the child concerned has his or her habitual residence on the territory of a Member 
State; (b) as concerns the recognition and enforcement of a judgment given in a court of a 
Member State on the territory of another Member State, even if the child concerned has his or 
her habitual residence on the territory of a third State which is a contracting Party to the said 
Convention.” 
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child is resident in a contracting state to the Convention.475 Respecting Article 
61 of the Regulation, Article 10 of the Convention on Child Protection should 
take precedence over Article 12 of the Regulation in such a situation.476  If 12(4) 
of the Regulation does not apply since the child is not habitually resident in a 
Member State or a contracting state to the Convention on Child Protection, it 
would be in line with the Regulation and 1996’s stated aims to follow a 
procedure which is in the best interest of the child and to avoid inconsistencies 
resulting from the parallel application of Brussels II bis and the Convention. As 
has been mentioned with regard to the provisions of Brussels II bis, 12(3) of the 
Regulation offers the possibility for the courts of a Member State to hear a 
parental responsibility case though the child lives in a third state. This appears 
to suggest that Article 12(3) of the Regulation takes precedence over Article 10 
of the Convention on Child Protection. The application of Article 61 the 
Regulation, which provides for the recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
given by a Member State court on the territory of another Member State where 
the child concerned had his or her habitual residence, raises several questions:  
Is the matter at all covered by Brussels II bis? Where is the child concerned 
habitually resident? If the recognition or enforcement of a decision issued by a 
court in another Member State is at issue, as applicable law is not covered by 
Brussels II bis, do the applicable law provisions of the Convention on Child 
Protection apply to cases concerning parties in those Member States which are 
also contracting states to the Convention?477 
As far as the second question is concerned – where is the child habitually 
resident? The Lagarde Report states that habitual residence “has to be 
determined by the relevant authorities in each case on the basis of factual 
                                            
475 Schuz, R., ‘In search of a settled interpretation of Article 12(2) of the Hague Child Abduction’ 
(2008) CFLQ 64, 20(1), 64-80. 
476 Schulz, A., ‘Guidance from Luxembourg: first judgment clarifying the relationship between the 
1980 Convention and Brussels II Revised’ (2008) IFL, December, 221-225. 
477 Lowe, N., ‘The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children’, 1st edition, 2012, 
section 1.43.  
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elements”. As was mentioned it underlines that it is “an autonomous 
concept”.478 
A reference to the extensive case law under the Convention on Child Protection 
seems not desired rather, the Lagarde Report emphasises that under the 
Convention on Child Protection the role of habitual residence is to assess which 
Contracting States have jurisdiction to take measures of protection and whether 
decisions should be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States.479 
Hence, the approach is more similar to the approach of the Regulation.  
Now considering that during the last years, the European instruments have 
demonstrated an EU-centred approach vis-à-vis the existing and the newly 
introduced conventions which is evident in the wording that the Regulation shall 
“take precedence” over certain instruments, with regard to matters governed by 
the Regulation480, it seems that this dominance is overwhelming with respect to 
the Convention on Child Protection. As was mentioned above, Article 61 of the 
Regulation states that in relations between the two instruments the Regulation 
shall prevail if the child concerned has his/her habitual residence on the territory 
of a Member State. It remains unclear which takes precedence where a child is 
without any habitual residence but is present in a Member State. The 
implications of a situation like this once again makes evident that jurisdiction is 
not a formality and the forum may have significant consequences for the 
proceedings. Article 61(a) also has the consequence of excluding the 
application of Article 7 of the Convention where a child habitually resident in a 
Member State is wrongfully removed to or retained in another Contracting State.  
The prevalence set forth in Article 61 of the Regulation only applies to 
jurisdiction as provided for in Articles 5 to 14 of the Convention and provisions 
in respect to recognition and enforcement found in Articles 23 to 28 of the 
Convention. It does not operate in respect to Articles 15 to 22 of the Convention 
                                            
478 Lagarde Report, supra note 116, Para 40, para 4.5. 
479 ibid, para 13.73. 
480 Article 60 an Article 62(1); as mentioned, Art 52(1) of the 1996 Hague Convention in contrast 
provides that the Convention shall not affect any international instrument to which Contracting 
States are Parties and which covers matters governed by the Convention, unless a contrary 
declaration is made by the State Parties to such instrument. 
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as the Regulation remains silent on the applicable law. The Convention refers to 
applicable law in Article 15(1) in connection with Article 21(1), which provides 
that the authorities shall apply their own law lex fori and in accordance with 
15(2) as an exception the law of another State if there is a close connection of 
the case to this state. If the child changes the habitual residence to another 
state, the law of the other state is to be applied pursuant to Article 15(3). Hence, 
the principle of perpetuatio fori does not apply. This principle favouring the 
prevailing rights of the state of habitual residence is so prominent in Article 15 
that it may be assumed that it can also be applied when jurisdiction is 
determined by the Regulation.481 
 On the other hand, as the Guide to Regulation points out, given that the 
applicable law provisions of the Convention on Child Protection fall outside the 
Regulation, they can apply.482 Accordingly, in the context of abduction, in 
determining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention in breach 
of rights of custody (technically for the purposes of Art 2(11) of the Regulation, 
rather than Art 3 of the 1980 Convention), regard should be had to Art 16(3) and 
(4) in the same way as previously discussed in connection with the Convention 
on Child Abduction. 
As was explained and will be explained in the analyses on habitual 
residence483, the Regulation and the Convention are generally supposed to take 
a child-centred approach.484 An exception are Articles 12 of the Regulation and 
Article 10 of the Convention on Child Protection pursuant to which the state of 
the divorce or the state to which the child has an essential connection may have 
jurisdiction with the agreement of the parents and if this is not in collusion with 
                                            
481 Pirrung, J., in Pirrung, J./Henrich, D. in J. von Staudinger Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch: BGB - EGBGB/IPR Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch/IPR, 
Vorbem C–H zu Art 19 EGBGB (Internationales Kindschaftsrecht 2), Munich 2009, Vorbem. zu 
Art. 19 EGBGB Rn C 216; Putzo/Hüßtege, Zivilprozessordnung, Kommentar, Munich 2011, Art. 
3 EuEheVO Rn. 4; Rauscher, T., Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht: Rom I-VO, 
Rom II-VO, Munich 2011, Art. 3 EuEheVO Rn. 13.  
482 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2014), supra note 129, section 8.3.1. 
483 Chapter 2 A I 1; 3 A II 1 and 3 A III. 
484 Schulz, A., ‘Inkrafttreten des Haager Kinderschutzübereinkommens v. 19.10.1996 für 
Deutschland am 1.1.2011‘, FamRZ 2011, 156, 159; Borth, H., ‘Nacheheliche Solidarität als 
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the best interests of the child.485 The general principle is that only one state has 
jurisdiction for the main proceedings (Article 13 of the Convention)486 and that in 
urgent case the courts can take protective measures as was referred to in the 
previous chapters (Article 20 of the Regulation and Article 10 of the Convention 
on Child Protection). 
In contrast to Article 10 of the Convention on Child Protection, Article 12 of the 
Regulation provides that proceedings started on the basis of prorogation can be 
finished even when the proceedings on divorce have been closed with a legally 
binding decision. It can be concluded that the Regulation prevails over the 
Convention in relations between Member States in matters covered by the 
Regulation and hence the Regulation prevails in matters of jurisdiction, 
recognition and enforcement.  
How does the reference to applicable law work? Interaction is created by the 
operation of the Convention's applicable law rules within the European Union. 
Article 62 of the Regulation states that the Convention shall continue to have 
effect with regard to matters not governed by the Regulation. However, in 
contrast to the provision on parental responsibility in Article 16, Article 15(1) 
determines that the general rule applies if authorities are exercising jurisdiction 
‘under the provisions of Chapter II’. To complete the set of questions on the 
interaction, it is not clear whether Chapter V of the Convention is not applicable 
where a child was habitually resident in a Member State. 
Article 15 paragraph II provides the court with a certain flexibility to apply the 
law of another state or to consider the law to which the circumstances of the 
case have a closer connection (substantial connection, Article 15(2)), an 
opportunity should however only be applied in exceptional cases. Article 15 
applies when a court is acting in accordance with the Regulation only. Only this 
interpretation of the Convention text is in accordance with the proclaimed aim.  
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To explain this, a more detailed analysis of Article 15(3) which refers to a 
change in the child’s habitual residence to another Contracting State is helpful.  
If a change in circumstances has removed the jurisdictional basis upon which 
the measures of protection were originally taken, Article 14 provides that 
measures which have been taken pursuant to Articles 5-10 of the Convention 
will remain in force, provided those measures have not been modified, replaced 
or terminated. Hence, for instance, if there is a change in a child’s habitual 
residence after such measures of protection were taken, the measures ordered 
by the courts in the contracting state where the child was habitually resident 
before will remain in force in the other contracting state until they are modified 
or terminated.  
Article 15(3) incorporates a presumption that the way in which such measures 
are applied may differ pursuant to the law of the Contracting State of the child’s 
original habitual residence and the law of the new habitual residence. As of the 
time of change, the conditions of application of any measures of protection are 
governed by the law of the new Contracting State of habitual residence, from 
the time of the change. The Lagarde Report cites the example of a guardian 
who is required to seek judicial authorisation before taking certain actions under 
the law of the child’s previous Contracting State of habitual residence but would 
not be required to do so under the law of the new Contracting State of habitual 
residence.487 
It should not be neglected that the Convention on Child Protection was drafted 
roughly simultaneously with the drafting of Brussels II and the concerns in 
regards to their co-existence were reflected in a Minute of the Proceedings of 
the Hague Conference:  
“the question of the relationship with Brussels II had concerned the permanent 
Bureau from an early stage in the work on the present Convention.” 488  
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The caprices of European politics made the Convention on Child Protection a 
difficult project from the start with the only benefit that it was able to enter into 
force simultaneously for then eighteen of the nineteen remaining Member 
States which were not already a contracting Party.489 It has had a difficult start 
with rare case law in Europe and limited ‘open’ conflict with the Regulation. It is 
mostly to this development that the interrelating rules and situations of the 
Regulation have been those related to the Regulation correlation with the 
Convention on Child Abduction rather than with the Convention on Child 
Protection. It remains to be seen how the potential for interaction will realise. 
C. Conclusion 
Chapter 3 has compared Brussels II bis with the two Hague instruments, first as 
a consideration of the rules directly addressing the interrelation and 
complementary scope and beyond this scope, as an analysis of the rules which 
are relevant for the interrelation. Such analysis of the ECJ’s decisions have 
demonstrated that the judgments of the ECJ have clarified the relationship 
between the Regulation and the Convention of Child Abduction but only with 
respect to certain aspects, not entirely with respect the grave risk exceptions 
and the specific procedural difficulties arising from the mechanism of return 
orders and non-return oders. This chapter has also revealed that the concept of 
the ‘best interests’ of the child is explicitly incorporated in the rules of the 
Regulation but only to a limited and indirect extent in the Convention on Child 
Abduction. Case law on the Convention on Child Abduction during the last 
decades has made evident that the discretion incorporated in the rules is 
considerable as to the determination of a grave risk and the underlying concept 
in Articles 13 (a) and (b) in the Convention and Articles 11 and 15 in the 
Regulation.  
Heretofore the analysis of the relation of and interaction between the provisions 
on enforcement in Brussels II bis and the Convention on Child Abduction has 
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made evident the difficulties of the interrelation of the well-established legal 
instrument with the new rules on return orders in the Regulation. The different 
approaches of the US and the English courts have further made clear that 
habitual residence under the Convention has be interpreted in a way supporting 
the child’s best interest and in other cases in the context of the Hague 
Convention some interpretations have allowed for the assumption of habitual 
residence at a place which may not necessarily be in his/her best interest.  
A clearer definition of the requirements for the acquisition of habitual residence 
is a central if not the central aspect in the framework of the interaction of the 
Convention on Child Abduction and the Regulation in the context of return 
orders and the enforcement of orders in accordance with the complementary 
rules of the Convention and the Regulation. 
Under the Regulation, pursuant to the case law of the ECJ in particular in 
Proceedings brought by A and Mercredi490 the concept of determining habitual 
residence is characterised by a remaining degree of discretion together with a 
set of criteria providing legal certainty and requiring the national courts to 
undertake a careful consideration of the factual conditions of the instant case. 
The lack of a consistent interpretation under the Convention has “undermined 
its value as a vehicle for ensuring the return of children wrongfully removed or 
retained in the international setting.”491  Over the years, some judges began to 
utter doubts that parental intention should be allowed to prevail over factual 
considerations but the high degree of insecurity remained.  
The same applies to the structural concept of Articles 12 and 13 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction. The exceptions to the obligation to order return 
set forth in Article 13 have been interpreted with high discretion throughout the 
past decades and the lack of clarity on what a settlement of the child in the “new 
environment” is supposed to be results from Article 12 not having been subject 
to appeal court case law. In this context it has become evident that the high 
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discretionary power of the courts with respect to return order concept and the 
grave risk exceptions have led to situations which cannot be assumed in the 
best interests of the children concerned. Different contracting states' legal 
systems have developed a different understanding of ‘undertakings' as set forth 
in Article 13(b) of the Convention as well as of the criterion of grave risk.  
Whilst the superseding character of the Regulation set forth in Articles 59 (1) 
and 62 (1) of the Regulation clarifies that the Regulation does not only have 
priority over the Convention on Child Abduction but replaces it in general, the 
complementary character Article 11 has turned out to trigger complications.  
To this extent, in any respect there is no ultimate replacement and Article 11 of 
the Regulation clearly sets the ground for an interaction.  
In the context of this complementary structure, in the Appeal Court cases which 
dealt with both Article 11 of the Regulation and Article 13 of the Convention the 
issue was the hearing of the child rather than the overriding nature of Article 
11(6–8) and Article 41 of the Regulation (automatic enforcement) over non-
return orders based on Article 13 of the Convention. However, in the following 
chapter, the general prevailing character of the provisions of the Regulation in 
intra-community cases over the application of the Convention provisions will be 
addressed.   
The interrelation of Article 11 of Brussels II bis with the requirements of return 
orders on the basis of the Hague Convention, is complemented by the further 
interrelation of Article 13(2) permitting a court to refuse to render a return order 
if the child who is old and mature enough to do so, with Article 11(4) of the 
Regulation, pursuant to which a court is not permitted to refuse the return if 
there is proof that adequate measures have been taken to secure the protection 
of the child after the return.   
Article 11(4) of the Regulation has been very rarely referred to at all in the 
courts whilst Article 11 (6)-(8) has been prone to interpretation.492 
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The Practice Guide’s assumption that the “rules of the Regulation (Article 11(2) 
to (5)) prevail over the relevant rules of the Convention” have not been reflected 
in practice. It has very much been a complementary approach, with a priority of 
the application of Article 13 of the Convention and it remains to be seen how the 
primacy of the Regulation will be enforced with regard to non-return orders 
based on Article 13 of the Convention as those orders may be overridden by 
Article 11(6–8) and Article 41 of the Regulation (automatic enforcement).  In the 
following chapter this will be analysed.  
As to the Convention on Child Protection this chapter has analysed that there is 
no interaction as such. Whilst there is clarity that the provisions of the 
Regulation are to be applied to children whose habitual residence is in the 
Community, as the analysis has shown, there is considerable unclarity if the 
child habitually resides outside the State where a matrimonial matter is pending, 
when Article 12(1) and (2) of the Regulation applies and the same applies to 
Article 12(4) of the Regulation. 
Chapter 4 
159 
 
Chapter 4 (Non-)Return orders, Recognition and Enforcement 
As the analysis in the preceding chapter has indicated, enforcement and 
recognition in the Regulation are particularly relevant in the context of the 
interrelation with the Convention on Child Abduction. Hence, the provisions will 
be analysed in the setting of the case-law and in official reports so as to review 
their procedural suitability and potential to protect the child’s best interests. 
Further, the chapter will analyse the ECtHR's suggestion that it has the function 
of a reviewing court and will consider the ECtHR’s decisions on the 
interpretation of Brussels II bis and the Convention on Child Abduction. Owing 
to the fact that return orders were particularly prone to involvement by the 
ECtHR it will further be assessed whether and how the influence of the ECtHR 
has an impact on national case-law and the interpretation of the Regulation. In 
the context of recognition and enforcement the analysis will seek to determine 
whether ‘mutual trust’ has worked and what significance mutual trust has for a 
proper functioning of the Regulation in the 'best interests' context. It will further 
analyse the potentially overriding mechanism of Article 11 of the Regulation in 
relation to 13 of the Convention of Child Abduction. 
A. Recognition and enforcement – an introduction 
As was explained in the chapter on the background of the Regulation493, the 
Regulation seeks to invoke “complete automatic enforcement” of decisions 
reached in different jurisdictions.494  
Notwithstanding the already existing advanced degree of recognition and 
enforcement tools, the European Council in Tampere495 called for the further 
reduction of the intermediate measures required to enable the recognition and 
enforcement of a decision or judgment in another Member State, including 
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decisions in the field of cross-border family law. Pursuant to the Tampere 
Conclusions such decisions would be  
“automatically recognized throughout the Union without any intermediate 
proceedings or grounds for refusal of enforcement.”496 
In recital 21 of the Preamble of the Regulation it is claimed that the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State should be based on the 
principle of mutual trust and that the grounds for non-recognition should be 
restricted as much as possible.  
Pursuant to Articles 40 and 41 of the Regulation, access rights are directly 
recognised and enforceable under the Regulation so as to  
“ensure that a child can maintain contact with all holders of parental 
responsibility after a separation even when they live in different Member 
States”.497  
Under the provision the application for an “exequatur” is no longer required and 
it is not possible to oppose the recognition of the judgment. On the other hand, 
the provision allows holders of parental responsibility to seek recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment by applying for exequatur pursuant to Article 40(2) 
of the Regulation. In Chapter III, Article 21 provides for recognition of 
judgments, subject to the defined grounds for non-recognition laid down in 
Article 23 and Article 28 refers to the enforcement of judgments in another 
Member State when the judgement has been declared enforceable. In this case 
the Member State making the order must, upon request of the party seeking 
enforcement, issue an Annex II certificate to enable enforcement pursuant to 
Article 39 of the Regulation. For decisions as laid down in Article 11 following a 
non-return order, the Member State must issue a certificate to enable 
enforcement pursuant to Articles 40 and 41 of the Regulation. Pursuant to 
Article 46 authentic instruments may be recognised and declared 
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enforceable.498 This general enforcement procedure does however not apply to 
protective measures as of the scope of Article 20 in cases where the Member 
State did not otherwise have jurisdiction.499 
In the Convention on Child Protection, the system on recognition and 
enforcement differs considerably. The measures taken by the authorities of a 
Contracting State to the Convention on Child Protection must be recognised by 
operation of law in all other Contracting States, unless one of the exceptions in 
Articles 23 of the Convention on Child Protection applies. Article 23 sets forth 
the grounds for refusal of recognition. 
Article 24 of the Convention on Child Protection adds flexibility by providing that 
a request may be issued by any person to the competent authorities of a 
Contracting State requesting them to decide on the recognition or non-
recognition of a measure taken in another Contracting State, such a procedure 
being governed by the law of the requested State. Article 28 makes provision 
for enforcement in another Contracting State and requires that, 
“Contracting State shall be enforced in the latter State as if they had been taken 
by the authorities of that State […] taking into consideration the best interests of 
the child.”500  
However, the Regulation prevails over the Convention on Child Protection 
pursuant to Article 61 with regard to the recognition and enforcement provided 
for in Articles 23 to 28 of the Convention on Child Protection. Hence, as far as 
the recognition and enforcement within the ambits of the Member States is 
concerned, no regard must be given to the respective provisions of the 
Convention on Child Protection.  
As was discussed in the chapter on the return mechanism, in the Convention on 
Child Abduction there is no automated recognition approach as in Article 42 of 
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the Regulation.501 In direct comparison, recognition may be considered one of 
the real weaknesses of the Convention on Child Abduction and the return order 
provisions are provisions on the exceptions to enforce decisions, not provisions 
on recognition. In the Convention on Child Abduction the judicial or 
administrative authority of a requested state is not bound to order the return of a 
child who has been wrongfully removed or retained if the person, institution or 
other body which opposes the child's return establishes that: 
“the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child 
was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or 
retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or 
retention“  
or  
“there is a grave risk that the return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”502  
Whilst it may seem that this allows for exceptions in several situations, the 
courts have been hesitant in giving effect to these exceptions.503 Hence, in 
contrast to the ultimate Character of Article 42 of the Regulation, Article 13 of 
the Convention on Child Abduction is more ‘flexible’ but also allows for a more 
individual consideration of the circumstances. But the issue is more complex 
than this, as will be seen in the subsequent assessment on Article 11(8) of the 
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Regulation and in the analysis of cases decided on Article 13 of the Convention 
on Child Abduction.  
In particular, as was discussed already in the context of the interpretation of 
Article 13 under the Convention on Child Abduction, a grave risk may not to be 
equated simply with considerations that the welfare of the child should be a 
primary concern504. Pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention on Child 
Abduction, the judicial or administrative authority may further refuse to order the 
return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has 
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account 
of his views. 
Hence, the Convention on Child Abduction sets out a limited number of 
defences which, in certain circumstances, give the court a discretion not to 
order the child's return to its country of habitual residence in, particular in 
ordering the return of a wrongfully removed child.505 With regard to returns, the 
Regulation aims at working even more advanced than the provisions of the 
Convention on Child Abduction by introducing greater automatismin the return 
of the child. In contrast to the Convention, which contains a non-ultimate 
presumption in favour of the return of the child, Brussels II bis reinforces such a 
presumption once a judgment ordering the return of the child has been issued in 
the Member State of habitual residence of the child prior to the wrongful 
removal or retention. The provisions on return in the Regulation are based on 
the concept of cooperation and cooperation under the Regulation bears finality 
as the cooperation between the courts takes place on the basis of a certificate 
(Annex IV to the Regulation), against which no appeal is permitted.506 At least in 
theory, as discussed in the chapter on the interrelation of the Regulation and 
the Convention on Child Abduction507, pursuant to Art 11(4) of the Regulation, a 
court cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of the Convention if it is 
established that adequate arrangements have been made to protect the child 
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after the return. Further pursuant to Article 11(5) a court cannot refuse return 
unless the person who requested the return of the child has been given the 
opportunity to be heard. 
Certainly, the degree of automaticity the Regulation incorporates is based on 
the concept of mutual recognition based on a high level of mutual trust among 
Member States. The degree of automaticity incorporated in Brussels II bis with 
regard to cooperation in cases of child abduction is based on the presumption 
that the authorities of the Member State of the habitual residence of the child 
prior to the removal can always provide arrangements which respect the best 
interests of the child and that the exceptions to enforce an order which are set 
forth by the Regulation can strengthen the exceptions set forth in the 
Convention.508 
Where return is refused on the basis of one of the exceptions in Article 13 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction, the courts of the Member State of habitual 
residence prior to the abduction retain jurisdiction and a subsequent decision by 
these courts ordering return will prevail over the refusal to return (Article 11 (8) 
of the Regulation). Those decisions are subject to enforcement in the requested 
State without the need for a declaration of enforceability, provided that certain 
set forth in Article 42 of the Regulation are met. This provision contains the 
underlying principle that the requested State does not acquire jurisdiction 
immediately after a refusal to return and that the State of habitual residence 
prior to the wrongful removal or retention retains jurisdiction, as it is set forth as 
the general concept in the Regulation, including the provisions on child 
abduction in Articles 10, 11 and, in directly, Articles 12 and 15. Under the 
Regulation the requested State is obliged to send, within one month, a copy of 
the non-return order and of the relevant documents to the authorities of the 
State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful 
removal or retention (Article 11(6) of the Regulation). Pursuant to Article 11(7) 
of the Regulation, the respective authorities must then notify the parties of their 
right to make submissions to the court of the State of habitual residence within 
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three months. In the next chapter it will be analysed in detail how the structure 
of interrelation of Article 11 (6-8) of the Regulation and Article 13 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction has turned into an interaction rather than a 
smooth relationship.  
B. The enforcement of child return orders – improvement or disorder 
I. ‘Overriding’ Hague child return orders  
In the previous, the general interrelation of the Regulation with regard to the 
Convention in the particular context of Article 11 of the Regulation and Article 
13 of the Convention was assessed.509 In the following, it will be considered in 
more detail how return orders were particularly prone to an interaction of the 
Convention on Child Abduction and the Regulation in Article 11(6-8) and then, 
afterwards, how the ECtHR’s approach has influenced such interaction. 
During the last years, the ECJ has enforced the primacy of Brussels II bis (and, 
as a ‘side effect’, the Convention on Child Protection, as will be explained in 
more detail) over the Hague Convention on Child Abduction with regard to non-
return orders based on Article 13 as those orders may be overridden by Article 
11(6–8) and Article 41 of the Regulation (automatic enforcement).510 
In Re D511, proceedings brought by a father under Article 11(8) of the 
Regulation for the return of his child following an application under the 
Convention on Child Abduction for return of the child possibly abducted to 
Poland, the Polish court refused to order the return, building its arguments on 
Article 13(b) of the Convention. Why this such an exemplary national case. As 
was already mentioned in various chapters dealing with Mercredi, Mercredi 
made evident that under the present rule, a parent in a case which may be 
subject to the Regulation should seek orders at the earliest opportunity if there 
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is a risk of a removal from the jurisdiction. This is not because of a weakness of 
the Regulation itself, with its very limited degree of discretion but only because 
the French court only applied the Convention; due to the degree of discretion 
granted to the courts with respect to return orders under the Convention, the 
case turned into a demonstration of legal uncertainty under the Convention. 
Had Mr Chaffe directly sought orders he would have established rights of 
custody prior to removal and the French court would have ordered the return. 
Hence, it seems at first sight, to be practically effective the procedure under the 
Regulation most importantly requires speed. As Lowe noted the ECJ 
recognised in Rinau the obvious need for speed to avoid damage to the 
relationship between the child and the left-behind parent. But why are those 
who are confronted with a possible abduction situation need to issue 
proceedings as quickly as possible thereby seeking custody orders and avoid 
proceedings at a court in another Member State. A court should as quickly as 
possible be found and the proceedings should endow a court to decide on rights 
of custody. The series of cross-actions in France and the United Kingdom made 
it necessary for the Court to distinguish between the judgment of a court 
ordering the non-return of a minor under the Convention and the question of 
attribution of parental responsibility for this minor. For this purpose the order 
denying the return was to “have no effect on judgments which have to be 
delivered in that other Member State in proceedings relating to parental 
responsibility which were brought earlier and are still pending in that other 
Member State”. 
Back to Re D, the proceedings brought by a father under Article 11(8) of the 
Regulation, for the return of his child following under the Convention on Child 
Abduction for return of his child. The Polish court had refused to order the return 
and based its judgment on Article 13(b) of the Convention. The English judge 
then argued that there is nothing in the provisions in the Regulation which 
indicates jurisdiction in England is in some way restricted and that the court 
could order a summary or interim return of the child under Article 11(8) of the 
Regulation. She referred to the ECJ’s reasoning in Povse that the objective of 
the provisions of Articles 11(8), 40 and 42 of the Regulation, that the 
proceedings should be expeditious and that the priority should be given to the 
jurisdiction of the court of origin are in conflict with any interpretation “according 
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to which a judgment ordering return must be preceded by a final judgment on 
rights of custody.”512  
Zarraga helped to clarify the interaction of the Convention and the Regulation 
with respect to return orders and non-return orders. In Zarraga513 the Court of 
Justice confirmed that Article 11(8) operated to ‘override’ an order of non-return 
made pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention on Child Abduction. It was 
already mentioned that Mr Zarraga had brought proceedings in Germany to 
obtain the return of the child to Spain under the Hague Convention. The 
German court argued there had been violation of a fundamental right in not 
hearing the child before making a decision and requested a preliminary ruling 
as to whether it could refuse to recognise the Article 42 certificate.514 In the 
European Union, the Charter on Fundamental rights of the European Union has 
the same legal force as the Treaties,515 however its impact in the framework of 
European legislation is still uncertain516 In Zarraga, the European Court of 
Justice was provided with the question whether the court in a Member State 
may review the compatibility of an order for the return of an abducted child 
which was ordered by a court in another Member State, with the Charter.517 
The European Court of Justice emphasised the continuing jurisdiction of the 
State of the former habitual residence of a child on the merits of custody and 
also the obligation of other Member States to enforce a return order made and 
certified by the courts of that State after a Hague return application has been 
denied in the other State. Pursuant to this judgment, challenges against the 
return order, its enforceability as such or against the certificate issued pursuant 
to Article 42 of the Regulation must and may only be before the courts of the 
State of former habitual residence.518  
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Zarraga was a primary example not only of the extent of automaticity in Article 
11. It was also an example of mutual recognition and the limits of mutual trust 
required under the Regulation and of the practical difficulties caused by the 
primacy of the Regulation over the Convention on Abduction. As mentioned, in 
essence, this case concerned the extent to which the national courts were 
entitled to review the judgment they were asked to enforce. The Higher 
Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht Celle) in Germany had questioned whether 
the court asked to enforce an order may exceptionally review it if the judgment 
to be enforced issued in the Member State of origin appears to contain a 
serious infringement of fundamental rights pursuant to the Charter in the 
meaning of Article 42 of the Regulation. The second question referred to the 
Court of Justice was whether the obligation to enforce the judgment remains in 
force even if the certificate issued by the court of the Member State of origin 
under Article 42 contains a declaration which is demonstrably inaccurate.519  
Considering quick action a key part of any effective response to wrongful 
removal or retention of children and to ensure the return of children to the place 
of their habitual residence, the Court argued that pursuant to the Regulation the 
former court of habitual residence retains exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
whether the child is to be returned, even if there is a conflict of opinion between 
the court where the child is habitually resident and the court where the child is 
wrongfully present.520 The court noted that recital 17 in the Preamble to the 
Regulation sets forth that the execution of a judgment entailing the return of the 
child must take place without any special procedure being required for the 
recognition or enforcement of that judgment in the Member State where the 
child is present.521 Referring to Rinau and Povse, the Court argued that it 
follows from Articles 42(1) and 43(2) of the Regulation, in view of recitals 17 and 
24 in the Preamble that a judgment ordering the return of a child by the court 
with jurisdiction pursuant to the Regulation, as it is enforceable and the 
certificate referred to in Article 42(1) in the Member State of origin has been 
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issued, is automatically enforceable in another Member State. It denied there 
was a further opportunity for the enforcing court to review the validity of the 
order and to object to the recognition.522 It further concluded that no further 
appeal against the issuing of a certificate pursuant to Article 42 of that 
Regulation, other than an action within the meaning of Article 43(1) of the 
Regulation, is permitted, even in the Member State of origin. The Court held 
that “questions concerning the lawfulness of the judgment ordering return as 
such must be raised before the courts of the Member State of origin”, in 
accordance with the rules of that legal system.523 The court’s ultimate 
conclusion is that the court supposed to enforce has no power to oppose either 
the recognition or the enforceability of the judgment.524Such automatic mutual 
recognition shows the Court’s presumption that the courts involved in the 
framework of Brussels II bis respect, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, 
the obligations which the Regulation imposes on them and trust in the orders 
and judgements of the national courts of another Member State. 
This presumption however disregards the existing mistrust between courts of 
Member States which has been displayed in many of the enforcement and 
recognition cases discussed in the previous chapters.525 Whilst this ultimate 
character of the decision by the national courts seems laudable to enhance an 
harmonised functioning of the Regulation, the Court’s arguments in Zarraga 
disregard that theory (the application of the Regulation) and practice (the 
application of the Regulation as suggested in the ideal situations envisaged in 
the Practice Guide are not the same and that the Member States’ courts were 
very familiar with the return mechanism in the Convention but would have 
difficulties in additionally applying the Regulation. Adaptions of the legal system 
of each Member State were required to ensure that the Regulation is applied in 
a manner which respects the fundamental rights of the child and the assumption 
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of mutual trust in the decision of another Member State requires a flawless 
application of the Regulation’s rules.  
On the one hand, it seems that such automatism526 disrespects that decision-
making in complicated cross-border abduction cases is not necessarily flawless 
and that such non-availability of corrective control by the other court makes it 
difficult to argue that enforcement would by any means always be in the best 
interest of the child concerned.527 As long as there is mistrust  of one national 
court towards the decision of another national court in intra-EU cases, it is hard 
to imagine that courts would flawlessly deal with cases which require the 
primacy of an order pursuant to the Regulation, without the discretion to review. 
These findings accord with the outcome in the two cases discussed in this 
thesis: Zarraga528 and Povse529. Despite clear rulings from the Court of Justice 
that the orders should be enforced and the children returned, in both cases the 
children were not returned to the state of origin. Considering the difficulties 
surrounding the Article 11(8) process, the lack of enforcement of such orders 
question the suitability of the process. 
In Sneersone and Kampanella v Italy, the Member State of enforcement even 
brought an action against Italy before the Commission under the former Article 
227 EC. It is not surprising that the Commission presented arguments very 
similar to the Court’s reasoning in Zarraga by stating that national authorities 
should retain wide discretion as to how to implement the principle of hearing a 
child’s opinion.530  
Whilst the judgements in those cases were strict as to enforcement under the 
Regulation, it seems that the ECJ at the same time recognised how hard it has 
proven to the national courts to apply Article 11 (6)-(8). Walker and Beaumont 
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criticise that the ECJ considered the certificate pursuant to Article 42 of the 
Regulation more significant than the hearing of the child.531 But this criticism on 
the strictness of the Regulation’s regime on return orders which has been 
discussed in detail in the context of this chapter disregards that the Regulation 
requires a very stringent consideration of the respective child’s interests through 
the rules in Article 10 (b) (i) and (ii) and (iv) and 42 (2). It adds to legal certainty 
that the competent court of the Member State of the child’s original habitual 
residence retains jurisdiction to order he return of the child under Article 10 and 
that the Member State to which the child has been abducted has to recognise 
and enforce the return order, unless the exceptions explicitly set forth in the 
Regulation are met. In Re D the English court held that the interrelationship of 
Articles 10 and 11(7) and (8) of the Regulation allow the state from which the 
child has been wrongfully removed or retained to assess the custody of the 
child once a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention 
has been made.532 It further underlined that proceedings under Article 11(7) 
should be carried out as quickly as possible with the court exercising a welfare 
jurisdiction in carrying out the required examination. As such, it held, the child’s 
welfare is the paramount consideration.  
The Judge noted that the court could in fact order a summary or interim return 
of the child under Article 11(8) prior to a final determination of custody issues. 
However, she further noted that if the court decided to order the return of the 
child pursuant to Article 11(8), the return must be recognised and enforceable in 
another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and 
without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been 
certified in the Member State of origin pursuant to Article 42(2). This reflects 
how much the Regulation has contributed to legal certainty and clarity, which in 
the author’s view clearly is in the interest of an abducted child.  
In Re D, having considered the father's evidence that his drinking was not as 
extensive as alleged by the plaintiff and that he had played a significant role in 
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his child's care prior to her retention in Poland, the court issued a certificate for 
return pursuant to Article 42(2), concluding that this was in the best interest of 
the child. The guardian had obtained the child’s views.533 
Theis J took account of several previous English cases and of Povse534, the 
consistent aspect of which was that the courts exercised a welfare jurisdiction. 
This was in accordance with the ECJ’s ruling that a judgment of the court with 
jurisdiction ordering the return of the child falls within the scope of Article 11(8), 
even if it is not preceded by a final judgment of that court relating to custody 
rights. National courts should make efforts to hear the child regardless of the 
behaviour of the abducting parent. In Re D535 the abducting parent even failed 
to co-operate with the guardian even when the guardian visited the state to 
which the children had been removed. This causes unintended delays. However 
if the court allowed the parent's lack of co-operation to influence the case, and 
not order a return since the parties have not been heard it neither seems a 
valuable solution. Consequently the court of the former habitual residence will 
often have a difficult task in Article 11(8) proceedings, to proceed in the best 
interests of the child(ren) concerned.  
The overriding and ultimate character of the automatic enforcement mechanism 
of the Regulation has not only been criticised by Beaumont and Walker. Others 
argue that the ECJ has been too formalistic in its interpretation of the rules of 
the Regulation and has relied too much on the hardly existent mutual trust 
between the Member States.536  
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II. Hearing of the Child  
As has been discussed before537, the child's right to be heard in proceedings 
concerning him or her are a central part of the provisions (Articles 23, 41, 42 
and 11(2) of the Regulation).  
Article 11(2) of the Regulation requires a child of an appropriate age and 
maturity to be heard in return proceedings following an abduction. As there is no 
specification of this hearing, the actual procedure is carried out by the national 
courts applying national law, so that the procedures for hearing the child vary 
considerably between the Member States. In the Convention on Child 
Abduction, by contrast, there is no provision on the hearing of the child, except 
that there is an exception to return based on a child's objections under Article 
13(2) of the Convention on Child Abduction.  
Article 11(2) of Brussels II bis emphasises the right of children to be heard in 
decisions affecting them. As has been pointed out in the chapter on habitual 
residence538, the more recent case law under the Convention in England mainly 
adopted the position that the rights and welfare interests of children are distinct 
from those of their parents and that a balance between those interests was 
required. A child-centred approach has however been a rare and the 
characterisation of children as being part of the interest of the whole family was 
the main feature of the well-known Convention case law. Only during the last 
decade the rights of children as individual rights have become more recognised. 
The EU Commission and Parliament recognised the significance of individual 
rights and developed a considerable number of policy documents based on the 
rights identified in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon as an objective to promote children's rights. 
In its own words, the 
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“framework the Commission helps to protect, promote and fulfil the rights of the 
child in all internal and external EU actions and policies with an impact on 
them.”539 
Recital 33 of the Preamble states that Brussels II bis wishes to “ensure respect 
for the fundamental rights of the child as set out in Art 24 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union” and Article 24 of the Charter states 
that children should be heard in all decisions affecting them if they are of an 
appropriate age and maturity, it further recognises, thereby establishing an 
additional link that their best interests shall be the primary consideration in all 
decisions concerning them. 
Article 11(2) of the Regulation interacts with the return remedy. It remains 
unclear how the hearing set forth in 11(2) shall be reconciled with the 
requirement set forth in Article 11(3) of the Regulation that the judgment on the 
return application should be issued within six weeks. 
In England and Wales, the Guidelines for Meeting Children540 are applied. The 
purpose of these Guidelines is to encourage judges to enable children to get 
involved and connected with proceedings in which decisions are made 
concerning them. However, the objective of the Guidelines is not to consider the 
opinion of the child binding. In England, even before the Guidelines were 
issued, judges meeting children were regularly applying an approach evaluating 
a child's objection under Article 13 of the Convention on Child Abduction. As 
outlined by Ward LJ in Re T541 it is first, for the judge to find out whether the 
child objects to being returned to the country of habitual residence. Second, to 
determine whether the child has sufficient age and maturity and third, the child’s 
own perspective on interest in the future, “short, medium and long-term”542 In 
this case, the court had also considered it necessary to consider if “reasons for 
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objection rooted in reality or might reasonably appear to the child to be so 
grounded”.543 
A significant and difficult aspect to assess is if the views of the child have been 
influenced by the parents.  
In Re D544 both the concept of hearing a child under the Convention and the 
Regulation were referred to. Their Lordships affirmed that the principle 
embedded in Article 11(2) of the Regulation that a child is given the opportunity 
to be heard during proceedings is very significant and  
“consistent with our international obligations under Art 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.”545 
In this case, Baroness Hale also referred to the hearing of a child under the 
Convention, thereby providing the possibility of the comparison: 
“Especially in Hague Convention cases, the relevance of the child's views to the 
issues in the case may be limited. But there is now a growing understanding of 
the importance of listening to the children involved in children's cases. It is the 
child, more than anyone else, who will have to live with what the court 
decides.”546 
The very clear wording in Article 11(2) of the Regulation that 
 “when applying articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, it shall be 
ensured that the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the 
proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age 
or degree of maturity”  
should be understood as an initiative for the national courts to hear the child 
concerned not only in cases under the Regulation but also the Convention 
without the ambits of the Regulation. However, in a strict interpretation, this only 
applies to cases under the Regulation. Baroness Hales nonetheless said that 
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principle of universal application and consistent with the UK's obligations under 
Art 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 meant that children 
should be heard far more frequently in Hague Convention cases than had been 
the practice. The Baroness went on to say that in most cases an interview with 
a Cafcass officer would be conducted this purpose, but she also noted that in 
some cases it may be necessary for the judge to hear the child.547 
Re D was a case where the boy who was the subject of the proceedings was 
aged 8 and had been in England for almost four years following removal from 
Romania and the primary question was that of custody.  
In the understanding of Moore-Bick LJ in Re KP, the views of the child should 
be heard  
“not only when a “defence” under Article 13 is raised but whenever the court is 
being asked to apply Article 12 but he adds that this should “not to be confused 
with giving effect to [the child’s] views”. 548 
There are notable differences in the European countries. Whilst in Germany, it 
is taken for granted that the judge speaks to the child549   
In England, the common procedure is an interview of the child with a Cafcass 
officer. Though a member of this Cafcass team is always on duty for urgent 
Convention and other international cases, a lawyer is only involved if special 
situations arise out an assessment of the child's maturity and the strength and 
cogency of objections the child raises.550 
The fact that it has been a rare practice to involve a lawyer or to have solicitor 
appointed by the child directly is quite opposite to practice in Germany and a 
result of a regulation551 which provides that the court must appoint a guardian 
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for the child who is the subject of Convention proceedings and has been made 
a party.  
It seems that the direct contact between the court and the child would have 
regard to the child's views and the interests of the child could be understood 
more properly. 
It is suggested that the Regulation requires a revision of the approach of 
hearing children, with a clarification of the minimum requirements to fulfil the 
criteria set forth by the Regulation. 
Article 11(2) of the Regulation is an important asset in protecting children’s best 
interest in a more direct procedure than it existed before. On the other hand, by 
leaving it to the national law how the procedure of hearing the child is carried 
out, an obvious window of discretion is opened.  
Whilst hearing the child has become more important, there has nonetheless 
been reluctance to provide the child with party status. In Re M552, Baroness 
Hale commented that only ‘settlement cases' under Art 12(2) of the Hague 
Convention should be cases where a child shall be made a party. Article 11(2) 
of the Regulation has in the English courts initiated a more considerate 
examination of whether and how the child involved should be heard be it by a 
Cafcass officer. In addition, the application of the principle under Article 11(2) of 
the Regulation could be extended to Convention cases if the courts follow Lady 
Hale’s approach presented in Re D.553  
Nonetheless, difficulties remain. The distinction between having children heard 
by a member of the Cafcass team and only rarely by a judge has a negative 
connotation. Whilst it is clear that the number of Hague Abduction cases has 
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increased554 it is hard to understand why in a German Hague case the judge 
would see the child and in an English case the judge would not see the child. 
Another aspect is the scope of the objection of the child and the consequences 
thereof. As there is no requirement of the hearing in the Convention, the 
Regulation is just clearer and more consequent in its approach. 
In Re G555 the court considered an objection of a girl as to being returned to the 
father not an objection to being returned to Lithuania but to returning to the care 
of her father. The judge decided that this was not an objection under Article 13 
of the Convention. The 11-year-old girl had objected strongly to being returned 
to her father in Lithuania; the court distinguished between an objection to 
returning the girl to the state of habitual residence and to returning the particular 
parent. 
The issue of hearing children's voices hence remains controversial as the 
Regulation lays much more emphasis on it than the Convention, which only 
incorporates the objections of a mature child as an exception to returning the 
child.556 
III. General assessment- enforcement of custody and access decisions 
under Brussels II bis 
After the Hague Convention on Child Abduction had been dealing with the issue 
of enforcement for over thirty years, Brussels II introduced an additional basis 
for return orders in Article 11(6–8) of the Regulation. In this chapter aspects 
related to the interrelation of the Convention and the Regulation with regard to 
return orders were addressed. To assess whether the integration of 
enforcement in the Regulation has brought about an overall improvement, in the 
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interest of the children concerned, chapter has considered the case-law of the 
ECJ with respect to primacy of the Regulation.  
A court rejecting a Hague return application on the grounds of Article 13 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction has to transmit a copy of the order and of the 
relevant documents, in particular a transcript of the hearing, to the court with 
jurisdiction or to the Central Authority in the Member State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention. The 
other court shall receive all these documents within one month of the date of the 
non-return order (Article 11(6) of the Brussels II bis Regulation) and must then 
notify the parties so that they make submissions to the court within 3 months of 
the date of notification. Pursuant to Article 11(8), as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the court may make its decision directly enforceable in the State where 
the child now lives by issuing a certificate according to Articles 40 and 42 of the 
Regulation.  
If the respective order subsequently has to be enforced in the State in which the 
child is present, the same court which refused to return the child under the 
Convention on Child Abduction often has to enforce the foreign return order. 
From the beginning, doubts were voiced as to whether this would work in 
practice. It took a few years until particular questions on the interrelating 
provisions on return where referred to the European Court of Justice in Rinau, 
Detiček, Povse and Zarraga.557 The national courts in Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Austria and Germany provided the Court with questions and issues which - in 
their view - hindered an enforcement of the respective foreign return orders 
issued under Article 11(8) of the Regulation. In all four decisions the continuing 
jurisdiction of the State of the former habitual residence of a child was 
underlined and the Member States were requested to enforce a child return 
order made and certified by the courts of State of habitual residence after an 
unsuccessful Hague return application in the other State. The Court held that 
any challenges may be brought solely before the courts of the State of former 
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habitual residence. This entailed severe criticism - in the view of the strongest 
criticism the Regulation system of return orders should be “taken away” since 
they do not resolve the problem and only further antagonise the parties in 
abduction proceedings.558 
C. Mutual trust or bad mood? – return and access orders 
As Lord Mance wrote in 2005, private international law is the area “par 
excellence where no national legal system can maintain an insular attitude”.559 
The consideration of the current level of mutual trust between the countries 
dealing with Hague and Brussels II bis cases is closely linked to the discussion 
on the critical aspects and shortcomings of the current situation under 
Brussels II bis. As already discussed, the Commission was supposed to present 
to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the European Economic and 
Social Committee, a report on the application of the Brussels II bis Regulation 
on the basis of information supplied by the Member States.560 As yet, however, 
it has not presented such a report.561 As far as the promotion of rights of access 
is concerned with regard to exequaturs in the Regulation the main issue 
remains the issue of overriding and overlapping similar provisions in the 1980 
and 1996 Conventions. The inconsistencies have made it difficult for national 
judges to appropriately handle international child abduction cases.  
While most prominently associated with child abduction cases, the difficulties 
evolved under the Regulation that judicial collaboration and mutual trust are 
particularly required in any conflict of laws case regarding a family law dispute 
with an international feature.  
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Despite the ‘guidelines’ the ECJ has provided in its case law, the lack of mutual 
trust between Member States courts and domestic judges has become evident 
in Purrucker I and Purrucker II.562 As will be discussed in the following, the 
impact and thereby the degree of difficulties the amended Regulation had and 
has experienced in the Member States depends on the legislative situation prior 
to the Regulation and the practice of the courts in parental responsibility and 
child abduction matters with a cross-border element. In the context of the 
analysis of the background of the Regulation, the social and judicial-cultural 
reasons for the national courts’ different approach to habitual residence and 
child protection by means of provisional measures were discussed. And in the 
context of the analysis of the courts’ and the ECJ’s approach to provisional 
measures the Member States courts’ influence to direct and lead a case 
became evident.  
According to the Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Sixth 
Special Commission on the practical operation of the 1980 and 1996 
Conventions, dated June 2011,  
“(…) Convention terms such as “rights of custody” should be interpreted having 
regard to the autonomous nature of the Convention and in the light of its 
objectives” 563  
The ECJ has affirmed that the same rule applies for the Regulation.564 As the 
courts in the Member States have adopted different approaches to dealing with 
this autonomous interpretation the significance of some international 
consistency becomes even more evident. The Special Commission laid 
emphasis on the importance of the direct judicial communications in helping to 
determine the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence to establish if an 
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applicant in return proceedings has “rights of custody” in the meaning of the 
Convention on Child Abduction.565 
As has been discussed above, a particularly problematic aspect regarding the 
implementation of the Regulation is the refusal of the return of a child under 
Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on Child Abduction instead of under 
Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention, thereby avoiding the application of 
Articles 11(6) and (7) and 11 (8) of the Regulation. This circumvention of the 
application of the Regulation is clearly not in the interest of legal certainty and 
speedy proceedings and ultimately conflicts with safeguarding the rights of the 
children concerned.  
It can be recognised that some European judges566 do not seem to see any 
necessity to communicate a return refusal unless based on Article 13 of the 
Convention, thereby overriding the application of Article 11(6) of the Regulation. 
Articles 11(7), 11(8) and 42 of the Regulation imply that the court of origin is 
competent to deal with the substance of the matter in its entirety and the 
abolition of exequatur for a decision of the court of origin entailing the return of 
the child pursuant to Articles 40 and 42 has been a significant problem during 
the last years. Articles 40–45 and Article 11(8) of the Regulation provide for a 
procedure to ensure that specific judgments are enforceable, based on the 
principle of mutual trust between Member States and the fact that their 
respective national legal systems are capable of providing an equivalent and 
effective protection of fundamental rights, recognised at the European level. 
Nevertheless, in many cases the court obliged to enforce an order that is so 
certified, fails to do it and so undermines the effectiveness of the Regulation 
and the mutual trust between countries. 
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Where does this reluctance to enforce originate? Many countries lack particular 
domestic rules and internal proceedings regarding the enforcement of foreign 
return orders and the certificate referred to in Article 42 of the Regulation.567  
In Italy, the juvenile courts have acquired competence to deal with cases of 
international child abduction568 but continue to lack authority to enforce orders 
made by other Member States in matters of parental responsibility/custody. This 
divided competence disregards the importance of consistency and introduces a 
distinction between matters dealt with under the Convention and those under 
the Regulation, as the enforcement of judgements rendered in non-Member 
States which are a contracting state to the 1961 Hague Convention are still 
under the competence of the juvenile courts.569 A reason for this might be the 
distinction made in Italian private international law between matters related to 
parental – child matters and matters of child protection.570 This distinction is not, 
however, reflected in the case-law.571  
In Germany, Brussels II bis was accompanied by the new implementation 
measure, the International Family Law Procedure Act (Internationales 
Familienverfahrensgesetz)572. This measure sought to depart from the rather 
complex structures of implementing international legislation and aimed at 
introducing a simple process for dealing with all aspects of international parental 
responsibility and child abduction matters, with the exception only of those 
matters arising under the 1961 Convention on Child Protection. In the ninth part 
of the Act, the abolition of the exequatur procedure for some decisions has 
been integrated, and decisions on the rights of access and certain judgments 
regarding the return of the child may now be enforced without any intermediate 
procedure.573 Only a few local courts are determined competent for the 
enforcement of the respective foreign decisions (§ 12 of the Act). In such cases 
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it is the family law departments of these courts that are competent. Judges have 
to deal with a significant amendment, as the procedures on the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions regarding parental responsibility distinguished 
between the application of the Regulation and the Convention on Child 
Abduction and for the latter, the courts were in charge of determining the 
procedure of the recognition and declaration of enforceability with regard to the 
Convention on Child Abduction.574 Chapter 5 of the new Act lays down in detail 
for the Regulation and the Convention on Child Abduction the procedures 
regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. An appeal 
against a decision on the recognition or declaration of enforceability can be 
lodged with the Higher Regional Court. This procedure is very clear and may be 
a reason why difficulties in cases with return orders dealt with by the ECJ did 
not originate in decisions made by German courts. Further, the Act speeds up 
the return procedure in accordance with Article 11(3) of the Regulation. With 
regard to the Convention on Child Abduction, the Act introduced that only the 
Higher Regional Courts are competent to order the immediate enforcement of a 
decision concerning the return of the child and that those courts are obligated to 
examine without delay after having received the appeal whether it is necessary 
to take this measure in accordance with § 40 (3) of the Act. It may be argued 
that the cases in which the party who was ordered by a court of first instance to 
return a child appealed can be reduced by the new rule.575 
In France a similar path was taken by introducing a law that provides only the 
tribunal de grande instance in family matters in the Court of Appeal with the 
competence to deal with cases under the Regulation and by simplifying the 
procedures for child abduction cases in a new section of code on civil 
procedures576. It thereby complies with the Regulation’s aim of expediting 
recognition and avoiding abuses of the appeal procedures.577 As Purrucker I 578 
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was an example of how enforcement and recognition should not work and how 
it does not work in the interest of the child concerned, it should be considered 
whether this was just coincidence or whether there is in fact a relation between 
a long-sighted implementation of the Regulation and the functioning of a trustful 
procedure of the courts in enforcement and recognition procedures regarding 
return orders. As mentioned above, Purrucker I originated in Spain and a 
consideration of the implementation in Spain will be useful. First, there was no 
concept of parental responsibility similar to the one in Brussels II bis at all, as 
the concept of patria potestad laid down in Article 154 of the Spanish Civil Code 
does not include several aspects the Regulation refers to. The Ley Organica del 
Poder Judicial which applies whenever the Regulation is not applicable differs 
considerably to the rules of the Regulation. Spanish courts do have to deal with 
the question of whether the Spanish courts on territorial competence or the 
Regulation’s rules on jurisdiction apply.  
The different approaches in the implementation and the difficulties resulting 
from the differences in the former national law of jurisdiction, enforcement and 
recognition are further related to the question of competence. 
In the previous chapters it was explained that family law was in a very short 
time transferred from not being a matter of interest of Community legislation to 
being one of the central issues of private international law and thereby 
European law. It has been discussed in detail how European private 
international law moved into the area of family law and who this interrelated with 
the national law. As has been further discussed, the rules of the Regulation 
deviate considerably from some national rule in force on parental responsibility 
before the implementation of the Regulation. Nonetheless, questions of the 
constitutionality of the Community’s march into the area conflicts of law for 
family law cases were raised mainly by scholars, less by the Member States. In 
the Lisbon decision,579 the German Constitutional Court considered whether the 
Treaty of Lisbon challenged the sovereignty of Germany. It was a peak-point 
decision in a series of judgments which had accompanied the various steps of 
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European integration, in particular Solange580, Maastrich581 and the Banana 
Market582. 
Whilst the Treaty of Lisbon aimed at providing for institutional reforms it 
attracted a diverse range of criticism after the Constitutional Treaty of the 
European Union had failed. Some considered the Treaty an infringement to 
member state sovereignty, other argued that the new legal status of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union would pose a danger to the level 
of fundamental rights protection in Germany.583 It was feared that the ECJ 
would be the decision-maker with regard to fundamental rights and that Article 
79(3) guaranteeing central tenets of German statehood and granting would be 
pushed out. The Court was required to deal with a series of complaints raised 
against the Lisbon Treaty and accompanying domestic legislation.584 The 
domestic legislation which accompanied the Lisbon Treaty was held to be 
unconstitutional.585 Before the decision, it was not considered contrary to the 
German Basic Law if the legislature exceptionally disregarded international 
treaty obligations if this was the only way in which to protect the core principles 
of the German Basic Law. It was argued that this principle was in line with the 
ECJ’s affirmation that the European identity had priority over a generally 
accepted obligation to respect the instruments of UN law586 as affirmed in Kadi 
and AI-Barakaat Foundation International v Council of the European Union.587 
Such a national approach is closely related to the concept of ordre public588 and 
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the option of a withdrawal from the EU as provided by Article 50 of the Treaty 
on the European Union.  
Hesselink argues that there will regularly be situations where the application of 
the rules will lead to unfair and unreasonable results and that, in such cases, a 
judge (to whom he refers as a modern judge) or a Lord Chancellor who will be 
prepared to mitigate the most unfair outcomes.589 As has been discussed in 
various contexts, the EU does not have the general competence in the field of 
private law that it may be assumed to have in other fields. Rather, the 
competence had to be derived from 114 TFEU. Collins590, van Greven591 and 
Smits592 are just a few commentators who support the view that a European 
private law should be developed bottom-up and that the area is not covered by 
European competence. Micklitz argues that the European Commission “was 
aware of the fact that a competence debate could have produced 
counterproductive effects”. However, the CESL was a step in the other direction 
and one supported by the Commission.593  
In the understanding of Caruso and Niglia, conflict and resistance are regarded 
as a possible reaction of the Member States, objections of the national 
parliaments of Member States may demonstrate the limits of European 
regulatory private law and that the EU has no competence to with regard to 
issues that are part of the national private legal orders, competence being only 
one of the reasons.594 Subsidiarity and proportionality are the other ones. Whilst 
nation-state private law matters may have to be “reconstructed in a Market 
State European perspective”595, the legal order of family law is a totally different 
one and a reference to the principle of a free market of non-discrimination is not 
suitable. As the Commission has the legislative initiative and the Parliament has 
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limited and shared legislative competence, there is a constant issue of limited 
possibilities to hinder legislation. In the following chapters the fact that the 
Hague Conventions on Child Abduction and the Hague Convention on Child 
Protection contain rules on applicable law whilst the Regulation leaves out this 
important set of rules, will be examined. It will be examined what influence this 
“gap” in legislation has had in the interrelationship of the rules and in the dealing 
of the national courts with the respective legislation and, as a consequence 
what influence this “gap” has for the preservation of the interests of the 
respective child/children. 
D. Regulation and Convention cases in the ECtHR – conflict or positive 
control?  
I. Introduction 
Being one of the four exceptions to the requirement to return to the home 
jurisdiction any child who has been wrongfully removed in breach of rights of 
custody, Article 13(b) of the Convention on Child Abduction (the grave risk 
exception) also plays a significant role in the development of the ECtHR’s 
increasing influence on the interpretation of Convention and Regulation cases, 
as will be outlined in the following section. In the UK Supreme Court case of Re 
E 596, the main argument of the appeal was that the respondent to a return order 
application is always entitled to a review in the determination of the defence as 
laid down in Article 13(b) of the Convention on Child Abduction.  
To refuse an order to return a child to their country of former habitual residence, 
the court must be convinced that a return order would expose the child to a 
grave risk of physical or psychological harm or that it would place the child in an 
otherwise intolerable situation. In Maumousseau, the mother had wrongfully 
retained her daughter who had French and US nationality in France. The US 
Central Authority, in 2003, transmitted to the French Central Authority a request 
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for return. In May 2014 the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal issued a return 
order and in the meantime the New York court had awarded sole custody to the 
father. The mother appealed against this judgment to the Court of Cassation 
claiming a violation of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention and of Article 8 of 
the ECHR, however the return order was upheld by the Cour de Cassation.597 
Since there were difficulties in enforcing the return order, the child was ordered 
care.598 
II. The application to the European Court of Human Rights alleged a 
violation of Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the 
European Convention). Though the application was not accepted, the 
court’s judgement contained an assessment of the interaction between 
the European Convention, the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989 (UNCRC) and the Convention on Child Abduction as well as 
a clear reference to ‘the concept of the child’s best interests’ 
introduced by the UNCRC, underlining that it is the “primary 
consideration in the context of the procedures provided for in the 
Convention”.599 However, the Chamber refused to accept the 
submission that the Convention on Child Abduction did not promote 
the child’s best interests in the present case.600 In the following sub-
chapters the treatment of Regulation and Convention cases by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the general competence of the 
ECHR to protect the best interest of the respective child/children will 
be critically examined.The Neulinger and Raban decisions 
Since Neulinger601, the aspect of time has become an important element in 
cases of return orders. For Hague return orders and their (non-)enforcement, 
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the ECtHR has looked at the time which passed between the day the order was 
made and its enforcement, also considering at what time the abduction 
occurred. Under Article 11(8) of the Regulation, one would probably also have 
to look at the time elapsed since the abduction itself. It can be a critical question 
whether the enforcement of an order meets the standards of human rights. But 
the question is also whether the standards set by the UNCRC and the 
European Convention on Human Rights stand above the rules of the Regulation 
or independently beside the Regulation. It also has to be considered that the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted in 2000, the 
scope of which is even wider than that of the ECHR, became part of EU law 
under Article 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon.602 
Neulinger concerned Convention on Child Abduction proceedings in 
Switzerland brought by the father and seeking the return of his son to Israel. 
The mother and her son applied to the European Court of Human Rights 
alleging that the return order made by the Federal Tribunal breached their right 
to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR and was a violation of Article 6 of the 
ECHR, arguing that the Swiss court had adopted an improperly restrictive 
interpretation of the exceptions to a return order under the Convention on Child 
Abduction. 
Whilst the Court found the complaint under Article 8 of the ECHR was 
admissible, it rejected the claim of a violation. However, the applicant mother 
was granted a referral to the Grand Chamber and an interim stay on 
enforcement of the return order was granted pursuant to this, so that the Grand 
Chamber finally decided that the period of time of 5 years which had passed 
since the child had been removed from Israel, could not necessarily be 
considered constituted a breach of the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the 
ECHR.603 The judicial proceedings in Switzerland began on 8 June 2006 and 
the case was decided before the Grand Chamber on 6 July 2010. Judge 
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Malinverni stated that, once the conditions for the application of the Convention 
on Child Abduction have been met, the status quo ante should be restored “as 
soon as possible in order to avoid the legal consolidation of de facto situations 
that were brought about wrongfully” but that after such a long time the 
restoration of the status quo ante [was] simply no longer possible to envisage 
and that due to the passage of time, and the facts discovered with respect to 
the child’s father, the child’s return to Israel would not be in the child’s 
interest.604  
The Judges accepted that the Convention on Child Abduction was applicable 
and that the applicant had acted “wrongfully” in bringing the child to Switzerland 
without the necessary authorisation from an Israeli court. Hence, the child would 
have had to be returned to Israel in accordance with Article 12 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction unless the conditions for not doing so in Article 
13 of the Convention had been fulfilled. Judge Lorenzen emphasised that it is 
not the European Court of Human Right’s “task to take the place of the 
competent authorities in examining whether, […], there would be a grave risk 
that the child would be exposed to psychological harm within the meaning of 
[Article 13].”  
National courts, as Judge Lorenzen emphasised, have a margin of appreciation 
to undertake this assessment.  
It was undisputed, in the Swiss courts and by the Court, that a return of the child 
to Israel without the mother would have exposed the child to a grave risk of 
psychological harm.  
The Federal Court in Switzerland stated that it could reasonably be expected 
that the child would return to Israel accompanied by the mother and the 
Chamber asserted this assumption. Judge Lorenzen addressed this particular 
question in his opinion and concluded that only the child concerned by the 
Convention on Child Abduction could be assumed to be under an obligation to 
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return and that no assumption could be made with respect to the holders of 
parental responsibility.605 
For a decision on the return, the Convention on Child Abduction does not refer 
to any connection between the acting wrongfully of the holder of parental 
responsibility holder’s acting “wrongfully” and the return of a child together with 
a holder of parental responsibility to join the other holder of parental 
responsibility or to live close to the holder of parental responsibility.  
The European Court of Human Rights suggested that the refusal of the return of 
the second applicant in this particular case would have undermined the normal 
application of the Convention on Child Abduction but it is not the competence of 
the European Court of European Rights to supervise the application of the 
Convention on Child Abduction, independent of whether or not the assessment 
of Article 13 was sufficient.  
Silberman criticises that the European Court of Human Rights expanded the 
‘grave risk’ defence under Article 13(b) to cases when the child was ‘well-
settled’ in its new environment following a wrongful removal606 and contests that 
such an interpretation is inconsistent with the Convention regime. Silberman 
further underlines that Article 12 of the Convention on Child Abduction only 
provides a defence to return on the basis that the child is settled in its new 
environment if the Hague return proceedings are commenced no later than one 
year after the wrongful removal or retention.607 The ECJ, in contrast to the 
ECHR, seems to favour the enforcement of return orders made by the courts of 
the State of former habitual residence to a more absolute extent.608 It thus 
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remains to be seen how the two courts will manage to establish a co-existent 
cooperation which is indispensable for the courts applying the Convention on 
Child Abduction and the Regulation. 
Silberman also extends her criticism to Raban v Romania609 which concerned a 
challenge to Article 13(b) of the Convention on Child Abduction defences. An 
Israeli-Dutch father and a Romanian mother had two children in Israel. Whilst 
the father agreed that the mother would take the children to Romania for a 
period of six months, the mother informed the father after a month that they 
would not be returning. At first instance the Romanian Court at which the father 
had started proceedings ordered summary return. However, the order for return 
was overturned on appeal based on the argument that there was a parental 
agreement that the children would be in Romania until an improvement in the 
father's financial situation and that the children would be at grave risk of harm if 
returned. Based on this decision, the father issued proceedings on behalf of 
himself and the two children, alleging breaches of Article 8. 
The European Court of Human Rights decided this case by reference to the 
decisions in Maumousseau and Neulinger. In particular, it underlined that Article 
3(1) of the UNCRC requires that in all actions concerning children their best 
interests shall be the primary concern. The ECtHR suggested that it had the 
function of a reviewing court and that significant issue to decide was whether a 
fair balance between the interests of the child, the parents and public order 
could be reached and whether this balance falls within the margin of 
appreciation of the Contracting States. Whilst the ECtHR further emphasised 
that the domestic authorities are required to carry out an in-depth examination 
of the entire family situation within the context of the Hague Convention 
proceedings, it seems unrealistic to expect that such examination is being 
carried out in each case. The Convention on Child Abduction in all the years it 
has been in place has been interpreted very different with respect to Article 13 
and the mechanism in Article 13, setting forth an authorisation to the courts of 
the requested State to refuse to order the return of the child was criticised as 
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flawed.610 Considering that the Convention on Child Abduction has had no 
authority as the ECJ constitutes for the Regulation, to provide for guidance to 
the national courts as to how the welfare situation of the child should be 
assessed, it is understandable that different interpretations have developed and 
that view on what assessment a court needs to undertake differs from 
contracting state to contracting state. The Regulation does not give way to such 
discretion as far as return orders are concerned611 and the ECtHR does in 
addition not have the competence to assess whether the correct application of 
the Regulation constitutes a violation of a provision of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.612  
In the above mentioned Raban v Romania, the ECtHR ruled that the decision of 
an appellate court in Romania not to order the return of children unilaterally 
removed from Israel by the mother though the father had “joint custody” did not 
violate the father and children’s right to family life. It laid emphasis on the 
margin of appreciation of the national court which held that the father had given 
his consent to the relocation and that the children were well-integrated and well 
taken care of by their mother.613 The approach of the Court at first appears 
different than in Neulinger. The Court recognised that the assessment of an 
abducted child’s best interests was the task of the domestic authorities, for 
which they had a margin of appreciation, under the Convention on Child 
Abduction. However, the Court then contests that it had to ascertain whether 
the domestic courts had conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family 
situation614, and had made a well-balanced assessment of the respective 
interests with a focus on the child in the context of an application for return to 
the country of origin. 
Whilst it is of course of central importance that “the concept of the child's best 
interests should be paramount in the procedures put in place by the Hague 
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Convention.”615 It is not understandable why the Court sought to assess the 
reasoning of the Romanian court and the interpretation adopted in respect of 
Articles 3 and 13(b) of the Convention on Child Abduction.  
III. Re E and the further steps of the ECtHR 
In Re E616, a case finally dealt with by the Supreme Court in England, the 
mother and the father had met in Spain in 2001 and then moved together to 
Norway where their two daughters were born in 2004 and 2007. The mother 
had lived in Norway until September 2010 when she moved with the daughters 
to England without the father’s consent. It was not disputed that this constituted 
a wrongful removal within the meaning of the Convention on Child Abduction. 
Pauffley J found that the protective measures offered by the father to the 
children and the support available to the mother were sufficient and that the 
requirements of an Article 13(b) defence were not met. A subsequent appeal to 
the Court of Appeal was dismissed and the children’s return ordered.617 The 
order was stayed pending the outcome of a further appeal to the Supreme 
Court. The appeal was dismissed and the court noted that the primary 
objectives of the Convention on Child Abduction are to avoid that either parent 
takes the law into his/her own hands, and to ensure that the child is returned to 
his/her home country if an abduction occurred. The Supreme Court underlined 
that the Convention was designed for the benefit of children, not for the benefit 
of adults, allowing parents only a limited number of rebuttals. It further 
emphasised that “to say the least, [it is] unlikely that if the Hague Convention is 
properly applied, with whatever outcome, there will be a violation of the article 8 
rights of the child or either of the parents. The violation in Neulinger arose, not 
from the proper application of the Hague Convention, but from the effects of 
subsequent delay”618 which seems to be a bad example in this context, as was 
explained in detail. However, the Supreme Court further outlines that Article 
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13(b) was drafted to consider the future of the child, arguing that such future 
depended on the protective measures which would be ordered to prevent the 
child from facing an intolerable situation. Article 13(b) had not previously been 
considered before either the Supreme Court or the House of Lords. The 
Supreme Court’s reference to Neulinger was restricted to the conclusion that 
the cases in the Court of Appeal required no changes. Re E is a demonstration 
of how Neulinger influenced judges in abduction cases to consider Neulinger. In 
Re E the judge even considered an appeal necessary to provide the Supreme 
Court with an opportunity to take a closer look at the recent decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The uncertainties caused by Neulinger are 
difficult to evaluate without considering many individual cases in the regional 
courts of national jurisdictions, but it is clear from the wording of the judgement 
in Re E that it did cause confusion and disapproval in the national courts. In 
Germany, only two higher regional court cases hitherto referred to Neulinger, 
both argued that Neulinger did not change their evaluation of the situation and 
interpretation of Article 13 in the context of the case.619  
It is clear from the most critical paragraph in Neulinger that the ECtHR allowed 
itself an assessment which interpretation of the Convention and which 
evaluation of the family situation is required. This hierarchical aspiration of the 
ECtHR that it is competent to provide a strict guidance with respect to the 
interpretation of the best interest (best solution in the interest) of the child is 
discordant with the aims of the Hague Conference and the European legislation 
to find a harmonised approach with regard to child abduction.620  
“In addition, the court must ensure that the decision-making process leading to 
the adoption of the impugned measures by the domestic court was fair and 
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allowed those concerned to present their case fully … To that end the court 
must ascertain whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination 
of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a 
factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and made a 
balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each 
person, with a constant concern for determining what the best solution would be 
for the abducted child in the context of an application for his return to his 
country of origin.”621 
In Re T, a first instance case with some interesting considerations on the 
Convention on Child Protection and the ECHR, Jackson J made clear that in his 
view Neulinger did not require  
“the court to transform its approach to Hague Convention proceedings whether 
in terms of principle or procedure. The true effect of that decision did not require 
the court to carry out an in-depth examination of the entire family situation in 
each and every case as to do so would defeat the very purpose of the 
Convention”.622  
Further, he argued, he would  
“not read Neulinger as a warrant for falling over in the other direction and 
approaching the Hague Convention exceptions broadly, liberally (or however 
else it might be described), or substantially differently from present established 
practice.”623 
The ECtHR suffered a relapse by referring to the principles adopted in 
Neulinger624 in Lipkowsky and McCormack v Germany625 but then found the 
complaints inadmissible. It has been mentioned before that the President of the 
Strasbourg court acknowledged extra-judicially that the decisive paragraph was 
to be interpreted in the context of the specific case, thereby attempting to 
defuse the concern generated by, in particular, paragraph 139 of Neulinger. 
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Other than Re T, Re E626 was before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal 
judges, as I mentioned above, referred the case to the Supreme Court despite 
expressly mentioning that it is not for the Strasbourg court to decide what the 
Hague Convention requires. The Appeal Court judges had a very plausible 
explanation what the scope of the ECtHR’s review of Convention cases could 
be and what could not be within this scope. It considered an investigation into 
the family situation and other relevant circumstances necessary for deciding 
whether the risk was sufficiently serious to fall within Article 13(b). Hence, in the 
court’s view, the investigation under Article 13(b) would be less specific than the 
investigation undertaken by a court deciding substantive issues and “Any proper 
conclusion about the child's best interest in the medium and long term was 
inevitably precluded”.627 This statement of the court clearly suggests that the 
Convention provides sufficient ground for a consideration of all exceptional 
circumstances which might impair a return or non-return of a child in its best 
interest and that separate consideration of the ECHR would interfere with the 
principles of clarity and legal certainty. A full investigation of custody and other 
issues should be made by the court in the country of habitual residence since it 
is best suited to undertake a full investigation and the court evaluating the grave 
risk of harm in the context of an Article 13(b) defence has to consider the 
immediate, not the ultimate, best interests of the child.628 In the case of Re S 
the UK Supreme Court considered it not right that the European Court of 
Human Rights had reiterated the suggested requirement of an in-depth 
examination and considered such requirement “entirely inappropriate”.629 
IV. Shaw and Sneersone 
In Shaw630, a final Hague return order had been made by the Hungarian courts 
in September 2008 and the order was not enforced during the next ten months. 
                                            
626 Re E, supra note 405. 
627 Re E, supra note 405. 
628 ibid (paras 5, 42, 48, 50-59, 68, 70). 
629 Re S, supra note 403. 
630 ibid. 
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Until the European Court of Human Rights gave its judgment in July 2011, the 
mother and the child had not been found and the Court held that by not 
enforcing the return order the Hungarian authorities had violated the father’s 
right to respect for family life. However, it held that “the passage of time may 
change the circumstances” and that this may “call for an eventual re-
assessment of [the respective child’s] ties to the parents and their environments 
respectively”.631 This is a repetition of what the Court had decided in 
Neulinger.632 No less contradictory is the conclusion that non-enforcement may 
violate the left-behind parent’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention whilst 
delayed enforcement may violate the rights of the child and the other parent as 
protected under Article 8 of the Convention on Child Abduction. As was 
explained, this is contradiction in the case law related to parental responsibility 
and is particularly problematic in in view of the fact that the delay in Neulinger 
was caused by the Court itself. 
In Sneersone633, the ECtHR had to consider the procedure introduced by 
Article 11(8) and Article 42 of the Regulation for enforcing return orders made 
by the State of former habitual residence subsequent to an unsuccessful Hague 
return application in the State to which the child was taken. In Sneersone, the 
Italian court issued a custody order in favour of the father, who remained in the 
country of prior habitual residence and ordered the return of the child to Italy. 
The court issued a certificate pursuant to Article 42 of the Regulation, as such 
making the order immediately enforceable in Latvia. The application to the 
ECHR was brought against the enforceable Italian order by the mother and the 
child (the resident in Latvia). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the 
ECHR and concluded that the Italian court had given insufficient consideration 
to the reasons which had earlier convinced the Latvian court to refuse to return 
the child to Italy. 
The Court accepted the applicants’ complaint that the father’s home had not 
been inspected by the Italian authorities so as to assess whether it provided a 
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suitable home for a young child, a consideration absolutely unrelated to return 
proceedings. In J and A Buday v Belgium634 the Court confirmed this approach 
and issued a provisional measure staying the return of the child until the Belgian 
Court of Cassation had decided upon a further appeal. 
E. Conclusion  
Neulinger has diverted the views on what the scope of evaluation with regard to 
the best interest should be and has caused considerable ado.635 In the higher 
courts of Germany and England, it was made clear that the Convention sets its 
own guidelines for its interpretation, with discretion for the established national 
case law, and that a reference to or violation of the ECHR is not standing to 
reason if the Convention on Child Abduction is correctly applied. In Re E, the 
judges in the Appeal and Supreme Court made clear that any evaluation of 
grave risk of harm in the context of an Article 13(b) defence had to consider the 
immediate, not the ultimate636 best interests of the child, so as to secure the 
interests of the child in the specific situation. One difficulty which arises with 
respect to Article 13(b) the confidence that the structure contained in the 
Convention will automatically provide the degree of protection required to the 
children concerned. Whilst a parent's legal representatives might raise this 
issue and the Convention is based upon principles of comity and mutual trust637 
different contracting states' legal systems pay different levels of regard to 
                                            
634 J and A Buday v Belgium, supra note 631. 
635 Walker, L., ‘The impact of the Hague Abduction Convention on the rights of the family in the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee: the 
danger of Neulinger’ (2010) J Priv Int L, 6(3), 649-682; Silberman, L., supra note 73; Paton, J., 
‘The correct approach to the examination of the best interests of the child in abduction 
convention proceedings following the decision of the Supreme Court in Re E (Children) 
(Abduction: Custody Appeal)’, JPIL 2012, 8(3), 547-576.  
636 Re E, supra note 405. 
637 But contrary to the Regulation, the Convention text or the Explanatory Report, supra note 
104, do not mention those. 
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instruments such as ‘undertakings' and the court might be hindered from seising 
jurisdiction of its own motion upon a child's return.638  
The Hague Conference in its Conclusions and Recommendations to the 6th 
Special Commission639 noted ‘the serious concerns’ which had been expressed 
with regard to Neulinger and Raban. The President of the ECHR in an address 
to the Franco-British-Irish Colloque on Family Law tried to wave away concerns 
that the decisions were a change of direction by the court in the area of child 
abduction.640 Though the ECtHR has made a recognisable contribution to the 
application of the Convention on Child Abduction when it laid emphasis on the 
need for a faster enforcement of return orders641 in the interest of the child, the 
recent decisions, in particular Neulinger, demonstrated that the Court 
misunderstands its role with regard to the Convention. In Neulinger the Court 
went beyond its competence by attempting to interpret the rules of the 
Convention on Child Abduction, rather than deciding whether there had been 
violations of human rights and thereby interfered with and brought an imbalance 
to the delicate system of jurisdiction on child abduction cases, which would 
“jeopardis[e] the aims and objectives of the Hague Convention”.642 Besides 
those substantive aspects and the issue of competence, the length of 
proceedings in the ECtHR and the stay of orders for the proceedings cannot be 
disregarded. The ECtHR was set up to hear complaints of alleged violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms under the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, and is 
                                            
638 Conclusions and Recommendations of the fifth meeting of the special commission to review 
the operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction and the practical implementation of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (30 October – 9. November 
2006) adopted by the Special Commission, available at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/concl28s
c5_e.pdf. 
639 Special Commission on the practical operation of the 1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions (1-
10 June 2011) Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Special Commission 
available at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/concl28sc6_e.pdf, last accessed 02 May 2016 see 
para 48. 
640 Costa, J., ‘The Best Interests of the Child – Recent Case-Law from the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2011) IFL, 183. 
641 Maumousseau, supra note 599. 
642 Black LJ in Eliassen and Baldock v Eliassen and others, [2011] EWCA Civ 361, para 123. 
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presently competent to hear complaints with respect to the ECHR, it is not a 
tribunal supposed to interpret the Convention on Child Abduction. It is beyond 
debate that the Convention on Child Abduction clearly allocates the 
interpretation of its provisions to the national court competent to deal with the 
case.643 As this thesis compares the functioning of the Convention’s and the 
Regulation’s provisions in the interest of the child concerned, it may be noted 
that this allocation of competence with respect to the interpretation of the 
Convention’s provisions can be considered a weakness of the Convention. 
Particularly, as was discussed in detail, Article 11(8) of the Regulation provides, 
in any case, for priority of the decisions of the Member State where the child 
was habitually resident before the removal, a priority even over a non-return 
order of a requested State. 
In any case, Article 8 of the ECHR should not impede the children’s best 
interests by encouraging an abducting parent to delay the return hoping that the 
decision of the ECtHR would lead to stays and, as has been shown, extensive 
delays.  
By referring to the obligation of the national authorities to conduct an in-depth 
examination of the entire family situation in the context of Article 13(b), the 
ECtHR ignores Judge Costa’s remarks on Neulinger. Whilst there is something 
positive about the Court’s emphasis on the significance of the respective child’s 
interests, the decision on the return of a child should not be delayed by the 
proceedings before the ECtHR. As the Supreme Court stated in Re E, the 
Convention on Child Abduction does not allow for a consideration of the best 
interests of the adult whose rights may have been infringed by the abduction of 
the child.644 It will be evident from the above that there are disadvantages and 
advantages of the ECHR making statements on the application of the 
Convention on Child Abduction. It is however a tightrope walk of the ECtHR to 
act beyond its competence and to attempt to take influence on the complex 
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system of the Convention on Child Abduction which already requires a complex 
process in the national courts.  
The ECtHR on the contrary, in its decisions in Neulinger, Raban and X v 
Latvia645, has given rise to serious concerns as it attempted to interpret the 
Convention on Child Abduction rather than restricting its decision to the 
question whether there have been violations of human rights. It is doubtful that 
the European Court of Human Rights' judgments in Neulinger and X v Latvia 
are compatible with the policy aims of the Hague Convention to discourage 
international child abduction and ensure the summary return of abducted 
children. It seems clear that the higher national courts have not accepted the 
approach in this respect.  
Leaving aside the issue of competence discussed above, the European Court of 
Human Rights has regularly examined whether the Convention on Child 
Abduction was applied correctly. 
According to the Court, the non-return of a child may constitute an interference 
with Article 8 of the ECHR as a right of the parent and/or the child and therefore 
has to be in accordance with the law and pursue a legitimate aim. Pursuant to 
the Court the interference has to be “necessary in a democratic society”.646 It is 
decisive whether the national authorities have done everything that could 
reasonably be expected of to find a balance between the different interests. If 
this was not the case, this omission was considered a violation of the right to 
respect for family life guaranteed by and laid down in Article 8(1) of the ECHR.  
In cases of non-enforcement of Hague return orders, the assessment carried 
out by the ECtHR whether the authorities had done everything that could 
reasonably be expected, at first sight seemed to strengthen the system of the 
Convention on Child Abduction in its efforts to returning abducted children.647 
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This was the situation until Neulinger,648as discussed above. Despite President 
Costa’s speech regarding Neulinger, the ECHR issued two more decisions.649 
In Sneersone650 the ECtHR even found a human rights violation in the order as 
such. 
Both Courts have to remain within the framework of their respective mandate. 
Whilst the ECJ does of course not decide the individual case, it gives binding 
guidelines to the national courts on the interpretation of the Regulation. Besides 
this significant task, it must not disregard the best interests of the child in 
question in the concrete case in favour of the respective legislation as whole. In 
all cases decided so far, the ECJ emphasised that it was its aim to always have 
jurisdiction safely placed in the state of former habitual residence of the child. 
Delays in enforcement are a noticeable problem for the courts, both when 
applying the Convention on Child Abduction and the Regulation. However, this 
problem cannot be inhibited by the ECtHR.  
Considering that the European Union’s accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights as required under Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty has yet to be 
completed, how the ECtHR will address these issues after accession remains  
an issue for speculation. Whilst the Lisbon Treaty, with its achievement of a 
legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights and a commitment by the 
European Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
paved the way for a system of fundamental rights protection within EU 
legislation, the European Union’s accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) has not been realised and an expert opinion of 
December 2014 has revealed the severe difficulties of an interrelation of the 
principles under the ECHR and the principles of the EC Treaty651. This is a 
complex issue of competence and it is not surprising that the accession 
negotiations took over three years to find a balance between safeguarding “the 
                                            
648 ibid. 
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651 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIn
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specific characteristics of the Union and Union law”652 and preserving the 
features of the ECHR system, such as the authority of the ECtHR and the 
subsidiary nature of the protection mechanism. The negotiating parties have yet 
to find a solution for those issues of competence. The current system of the 
protection of fundamental rights is a complex framework of the national law, 
including in most countries the national constitution’s fundamental rights, the 
ECHR and its protocols, the EU legislation, all of which do not just co-exist but 
interact and interrelate. Clarity for the national judges dealing with child 
abduction and parental responsibility cases about the applicable standards is 
urgently required and the priority of the Regulation’s application or the 
Convention on Child Abduction’s application respectively over any other 
interests should be clarified. Both human rights and the preservation of the 
interests of children require a very careful evaluation. A determination of levels 
of protection based on generally worded provisions of fundamental rights 
legislation in terms of applying whatever provision that offers the “highest” level 
of protection seems doomed to remain essentially indeterminate. “[…] it is very 
difficult to think of liberty as a commodity.”653 Whilst the ECJ recognises “the 
special significance” of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR,654 the 
Regulation contains specific rules that require an autonomous interpretation. 
Such an autonomous interpretation does not require the autonomy and primacy 
of the EU’s legal order the ECJ laid emphasis on in Kadi  
“[T]he review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light 
of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community 
based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC 
Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an 
international agreement.”655  
                                            
652 See Article 1 of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
653 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Havard (1977), p.270. 
654 Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others, [2007] 
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But an autonomous, independent interpretation is essential. It preserves legal 
certainty for the parties concerned and for the national courts. 
An accession of the European Union to the ECHR should not lead to a situation 
in which orders or decisions under the Regulation are made subject to review 
before the ECtHR if the result is to infringe the best interest of children. Rather, 
the national courts must be obliged to safeguard fundamental rights when 
considering the Regulation and the ECHR, giving primacy always to the 
interests of the children concerned rather than the interests of the holders of 
custody. 
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Chapter 5 Applicable law, structural amendments and perspectives of a 
harmonised system 
A. Introduction  
As the analysis of the preceding chapters has shown, in international cross-
border parental responsibility and abduction cases, the best interest of children 
does not only require a consideration of the competent court, fair procedures 
with regard to return, non-return decisions, and swift recognition and 
enforcement but also a a consideration of safety and welfare issues.  Both the 
state of habitual residence and the state to which the child was removed or 
retained, have a duty to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Regulation 
and/or Convention(s) are applied in the interest of the children concerned 
Finding the competentcourt, enforcing an order or recognising a judgment 
pursuant to Brussels II bis and, as applicable, in accordance with the 
complementary structure of the Convention on Child Abduction are only one 
issue of the proceedings. Another question to be considered is whether a set of 
rules on applicable law would bring about a chance for a balanced interaction 
between the instruments.  In any parental responsibility and child abduction 
case656 the law applicable to the proceedings will have to be determined and 
ideally, in the interest of swift and fair proceedings, the court should be familiar 
with the law it applies.  
Legislation in the area of private international law has been at the heart of the 
reinforced European integration brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
provisions in the area of family law were at the forefront of harmonisation 
ambitions when Vivienne Reding was Commissioner and the focus was on the 
creation and development of a so called ‘European Area of Civil Justice’.657 
                                            
656 Leaving aside divorce because of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 
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With the refugee crisis the focus of the Commission moved and the approaches 
for further harmonisation of the private international law rules and substantive 
law become rare.658 Harmonisation of a certain area of law has during the last 
decades always strongly depended on the initiatives by the Commission.659 
Private International Law is the area “par excellence where no national legal 
system can maintain an insular attitude”660 and where further harmonisation will 
certainly be approached again by the Commission.  However, the current 
version of the Regulation ‘solely’ covers jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement and no provisions on applicable law. 
B. Applicable law – the Regulation’s drawback to the Conventions 
As was explained in the context of the interrelation, Chapter V of the Regulation 
concerns the general relationship between the Regulation and the Conventions.  
In principle, according to Articles 59(1) and 62(1), the Regulation supersedes all 
multilateral and bilateral conventions between Member States, however relating 
to matters to which the Regulation applies and the Regulation does not contain 
any provisions on applicable law.  
Article 60 of the Regulation sets forth that “in relations between the Member 
States” the Regulation takes precedence over Conventions so far as matters 
covered by the Regulation are concerned. On the one hand there are the cases 
of intra-community situations which were referred to the in previous chapters, 
on the other hand, as was also mentioned, the Regulation also gives rise to 
situations in which one or even two third states are involved. Article 36 of the 
Convention on Child Abduction establishes that  
                                            
658 Relevant in the context of this thesis is the European Commission’s Press Release “Towards 
a true European area of Justice: Strengthening trust, mobility and growth”, in which the 
Commission identifies mutual trust as one of three key challenges after the forthcoming end of 
the European Council’s Stockholm Programme on 1 December 2014. 
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“nothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more Member States, in order 
to limit the restrictions to which the return of the child may be subject, from 
agreeing among themselves to derogate from any provisions of this Convention 
which may imply such a restriction.” 
A seemingly straightforward approach would be to include a set of provisions or 
a central provision on applicable law in the Regulation. Hodson argues that 
including applicable law in the Regulation would add to the current problems in 
European family law, as it would increase costs, add to uncertainty and would 
make settlements slower.661 In his view, applying the national law of the place of 
jurisdiction would be the most reasonable approach. In furtherance to the 
interrelation and interaction of the Convention on Child Abduction and the 
Regulation in Chapter 3, with regard to the Convention on Child Abduction, 
further interaction is created by the operation of the Convention's applicable law 
rules within the European Union. Article 62 of the Regulation states that the 
Convention shall continue to have effect with regard to matters not governed by 
the Regulation. As the determination of the applicable law is not dealt with by 
the Regulation, a reference is made to Article 14 which reads: 
“In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within 
the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the 
requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or 
administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual 
residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof 
of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be 
applicable.” [emphasis added] hier  
The important word here is “may” as highlighted in italics. „May“ does not mean 
that the courts are obliged but rather that they can apply the national rules on 
private international law. Hence, the first impression is that, for the parties 
concerned, the legal certainty under the clear structure of the rules on 
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, despite the pitfalls created by the 
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interaction, seems to go up in smoke. And with respect to cases of parental 
responsibility and custody under the Regulation, the applicable law provisions of 
the Convention on Child Protection will apply to those Member States who are 
parties to it, but only when it applies in the Member States. 
Besides the questions of applicability of the Convention on Child Protection and 
the Regulation the relationship between the Convention on Child Protection and 
the Regulation also has to be considered in the context of the applicable law. 
Among Member States the Regulation prevails for the jurisdictional issues in 
most cases. The same is true for the recognition and enforcement of decisions 
from other Member States of the Regulation.662 On the other hand, the non-
jurisdictional rules of the Convention on Child Protection apply in all procedures, 
even when the jurisdiction is based on the Regulation.663 As the scope of 
application of the Regulation is very similar to that of the Convention, the 
application of the rules on applicable law in the Convention will be possible in 
most cases regarding parental responsibility and custody issues.664 Whilst the 
Regulation hence prevails in matters of jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement, the Convention on Child Protection applies in relations between 
Member States in matters of applicable law, since this subject is not covered by 
the Regulation.665 
The provisions of Articles 16-18 of the Convention on Child Protection require 
parental responsibility to be determined in accordance with the law of the state 
of the child's habitual residence. As has been discussed with regard to 
jurisdiction it may not always be avoided that more than one state has 
jurisdiction in relation to cases involving parental responsibility and related 
children matters and authorities and courts in different states may consider that 
they have jurisdiction. In the Regulation, the issue of competing jurisdictions 
between Member States is dealt with by giving predominance to the Member 
State first seised as it is set forth in particular Article 19(2) as well as Articles 17 
                                            
662 as discussed in Chapter 4 hereof.  
663 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2014), supra note 129, section 8.1. 
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and 19(3) of the Regulation. Article 15 provides a Member State having 
jurisdiction the power to request another Member State to assume jurisdiction, 
or to stay the proceedings however the other Member State must consent to the 
transfer. 
Article 21(1) of the Convention on Child Protection excludes the application of 
renvoi, by specifying that the reference to the term ‘law’ of another State means 
‘the law in force in a State other than its choice of law rules’. Hence, ‘law’ refers 
to the law of that contracting state and not to its private international law. 
Pursuant to Lowe, the effect of this is to  
“disapply, except as provided for by Arts 15(2) and 21(2), the law of the State of 
the child’s domicile or nationality insofar as the child is neither domiciled in, nor 
a national of, a State whose law is to be applied by Arts 15–18.”666 
One exception is provided by Art 21(2) of the Convention on Child Protection 
which applies if the law applicable pursuant to Article 16 is the law of a non-
Contracting State. Article 21(2) states: 
“if the law applicable according Article 16 is that of a non-Contracting State and 
if the choice of law rules of that State designate the law of another non-
Contracting State which would apply its own law, the law of the latter State 
applies. If the other non-Contracting State would not apply its own law the 
applicable law is that designated by Article 16.” 
Hence, as the Regulation does not contain any provisions on applicable law as 
to the substance matter in parental responsibility cases, the Convention is 
applied.667 However, for the courts, with the difficulties of the application of the 
Regulation in particular in matters of recognition of enforcement analysed in the 
previous Chapter 4 herein668, it becomes evident that the application of the 
Convention on Child Protection in addition to the Regulation poses the courts 
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with an additional burden. Also, the link between jurisdiction and applicable law 
which is firmly established in private international law is disrupted.  
Back to Hodson’s suggestion referred to at the start of this chapter. Hodson 
suggests that extending the Regulation to applicable law or establishing a new 
instrument on applicable law is not the answer to such difficulties as it would 
also lead to even more uncertainty and make settlements slower.669 Hence, in 
his view, the enhancement should include the appointment of specialist family 
court judges in each Member State to deal with complex international cases and 
that once a place of jurisdiction has been determined, those judges should then 
apply the national law.670 In terms of harmonization an integral framework of 
one Regulation dealing with jurisdiction, recognition, enforcement, provisions on 
return orders and a central provision on applicable law would be more 
convincing than any diverted framework with complementary rules. But 
ratifications of the Convention on Child Protection have just taken place and it 
will remain to be seen how matters develop in the national courts when both the 
Convention on Child Abduction and the Convention on Child Protection are 
regularly applied as an additional layer to the Regulation.  
C. Structural Amendments to the Regulation 
As was discussed in the previous section, integrating a provision on applicable 
law would be a structural change which could however be implemented into a 
recast of the Regulation without much. In the previous chapters, several specific 
suggestions for possible  amendments to particular provisions and the 
mechanism on interrelation were made and approaches to avoid the current 
problems were discussed. In Chapter 3, the concrete problems of the 
interrelation were approached and in Chapter 4 the severe difficulties related to 
return proceedings with the application of Article 13 of the Convention on Child 
Abduction, Article 11 and Article 15 of the Regulation were discussed. The 
guidance provided to the national courts by the European Courts of Justice with 
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respect to the application of the Regulation may be considered in the context of 
structural amendments aiming at a harmonisation of procedural rules.  On the 
other hand the complications imposed by the involvement of the ECtHR were 
addressed, should, it has been concluded, should not lead to any amendments 
of the RegulationHence before moving on to a final conclusion on the research 
question it is significant to consider, in furtherance to those specific issues 
related to provisions on a stand-alone basis and to the provisions of 
interrelation, that there are some structural issues which the analysis in the 
preceding chapters has revealed.  
De Boer’s harsh criticism, including that he can “hardly believe that the drafters 
were aware of the negative consequences of perpetuatio fori in matters of 
parental responsibility.”671 can be confuted. The analysis has not given any 
indications that the problems in application of the Regulation result from the 
application of the concept.  
Lowe published the results an analysis of an empirical study on the application 
of the return mechanism under the Convention on Child Abduction conducted 
back in 2001.672 Since then, the complimentary nature of the Regulation and the 
Convention have completely changed the nature of return proceedings within 
the EU. In 2007, when Brussels II bis had just been implemented, Lowe mainly 
refers to the lack of clarity,673 a problem which has to a considerable extent 
been resolved by the case law discussed herein. But the complexity of 
proceedings in more than one Member State remains. In addition to return 
proceedings under the Convention on Child Abduction (and, in interrelation, the 
Regulation), in cases involving provisional measures, there are usually at least 
two other proceedings pending in both the state of the former habitual residence 
and the state of refuge. The court of former habitual residence has jurisdiction 
                                            
671 De Boer, Th., ‘What we should not expect from a recast of the Brussels II bis Regulation’, 
Netherlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 33(1), 10-19, 14.  
672 Lowe, N., A Statistical Analysis of Applications made in 1999 under the Hague Convention of 
25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, HAGUE CONFERENCE 
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW   CHILD ABDUCTION, Doc. prél. No 3 Prel. Doc. No 3, 
March 2001. 
673 Lowe, N., The current experiences and difficulties of applying Brussels II revised. Presented 
at: 3rd Anglophone/Francophone Family Law Conference, Edinburgh, UK, June 2007. 
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to rule on the substance of the rights of parental responsibility and order any 
provisional measures, and these orders are to be recognised and enforced in 
the state of refuge.674 Considering all the difficulties of interpretation when the 
Convention is applied, such system of parallel proceedings in more than one 
state is truly problematic. The court in the state to which the child has been 
removed or retained will have at least jurisdiction to take urgent provisional 
measures. Hence, in practice, as the case law analysed in this context of 
provisional measures has shown, if the parents have cases in two or three 
courts and in different proceedings the Regulation’s structure on child abduction 
proceedings has not improved the procedural efficiency and fierce fights on 
return orders are not prevented.  
As the recent case-law analysed in this thesis has shown the court in the state 
of habitual residence has primacy, it may issue a decision entailing the return of 
the child and such decision overrides a decision made in the state to which the 
child was taken, and there is no possibility to oppose the recognition or 
enforcement of this decision. This has significantly amended the Hague 
procedure with regard to the question of which state may further proceed on the 
merits of the case. But this amendment, in the context of return orders, which 
are a, if not the vital part of abduction cases, an advancement has not occurred.  
The judgments in Detiček, Povse and Zarraga675 have provided helpful 
guidance to the interpretation and application of the Regulation’s provisions, 
however those decisions have also revealed the inherent difficulties of distrust 
among the Member States with regard to the return proceedings under the 
Regulation’s regime.  
Based on the findings of their empirical study, Beaumont, Walker and Holliday 
in their recent analysis conclude that “given the very limited effectiveness of 
                                            
674 Detiček v Sgueglia, supra note 239 
675 Detiček, supra note 244; Povse supra note 246 and Zarraga v Pelz, supra note 444. 
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Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa and the time and costs involved for the parties and 
the judges it should be scrapped.”676 and that  
“EU Member States should be able to have the mutual trust in each other’s 
courts that if a Hague return has been refused in an intra-EU case then the 
Hague Convention has been applied correctly, the habitual residence of the 
child has shifted to the State of refuge and the courts there are in the best place 
to determine issues of parental responsibility and access.”677 
Based on the analysis in the preceding chapters, of the provisions, their 
application in the courts and the guidance provided by the ECJ and their actual 
potential in view of the research question, such positive evaluation of the 
Convention and negative evaluation of Article 11 (6)-(8) is not supported. An 
evaluation based on the successes during a limited period of time is a limited 
indication of the potential of a provision. A return to the original concept of the 
Convention on Child Abduction and its return proceedings would be a move 
backwards, from a harmonised European set of rules to an international, but 
more isolated approach, as the advantages of the provisions securing the 
interests of the child concerned by such situation, id est the prompt return, the 
hearing of the child, the last word to the court in the Member State of the 
habitual residence of the child and the concrete consideration of the child’s best 
interests, would be erased. It has to be considered that not only paragraphs (6)-
(8) would be “scrapped” but that Article 11 would be erased from the 
Regulation, with those disadvantages.  
However, as has been established, the underlying national procedural rules 
should be adapted to the Regulation. The Central Authorities under the 
Regulation should be obligated to provide assistance both to the parent from 
whom the child has been abducted and to the abducting parent as, ultimately, 
any decision on child abduction should consider what is in the best interest of 
                                            
676 Beaumont, P., Walker, L., Holliday, J., ‘Conflicts of EU Courts on Child Abduction: The reality 
of Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings across the EU’,  
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/CPIL_Working_Paper_No_2016_1.pdf, last accessed 01 
May 2016.  
677 Ibid. 
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the child, penalisation of the abductor is not necessarily in the best interest. 
Compared with the Convention on Child Abduction, the reference in the 
Regulation’s provisions is a very valuable step forward in this regard, as it at 
least requires the courts to consider the best interests of the child, thereby 
supporting a more child-centred approach. Whilst the case law has shown that 
the courts in England take a consideration of the best interests very seriously 
and explicitly refer to it, the ECJ case-law has revealed the procedural 
difficulties in respect to actual enforcement. And in other jurisdictions (the 
continental jurisdictions), there is almost no possibility to control if the 
judgements take the best interests approach as serious as it is suggested in the 
Regulation.678 
The Convention on Child Abduction has the ultimate weakness of undefined 
concepts and terms, allowing for considerable discretion of the courts. At times, 
the terms and concepts have been interpreted in a way respecting the interests 
of the parents rather than the interests of the children concerned (habitual 
residence and grave risk) and hence, a return to the Convention’s scheme on 
return and non-return would be a retrogate step. To this extent, the provisions of 
the Regulation provide legal certainty and clarity which is in the best interest of 
the children concerned. The Convention can be interpreted in a way respecting 
the best interests of the child but only the Regulation has brought the 
awareness that this is a must rather than an option.  
“[T]he dispositive part of the Convention contains no explicit reference to the 
interests of the child to the extent of their qualifying the Convention's stated 
object which is to secure the prompt return of children who have been 
wrongfully removed or retained.”679 
National courts in Convention cases have used their discretion with respect to 
the interpretation of the central concepts of habitual residence, grave risk, 
hearing the child and in applying the concept of return orders. Whilst this 
                                            
678 Beaumont, P., Walker, L., Holliday, J., supra note 676, p.3; the authors found it considerably 
cumbersome to select data from most continental Member States. 
679 Perez-Vera, E., Explanatory Report, supra note 285, at paras 20 – 23. 
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discretion has been contained by the interrelation with the Regulation, the 
interaction itself has proven difficult. Hence, as a possible approach, the scope 
of interaction may be reduced to a minimum in an amendment of the Regulation 
and the Regulation may be extended to cover the complete concept of return 
and non-return. 
As an alternative, in order to overcome the difficulties arising from the 
interrelation on return orders in particular and the provisions on child abduction 
in general, it is suggested that Article 13 of the Convention has to be interpreted 
with more respect to the interests of the children concerned. An over-
interpretation of ‘exceptional’ as a qualifier to return should be avoided and the 
approach presented in Re M680 should be followed.  
Whilst pursuant to the Explanatory Report 
“these exceptions are only concrete illustrations of the overly vague principle 
whereby the interests of the child are stated to be the guiding criterion in this 
area”681,  
the national courts have not had guidance on how this aim might be reached.  
As Lady Hale noted on Article 13b of the Convention on Child Abduction 
“[…] the English courts have sought to avoid placing the child in an intolerable 
situation by extracting undertakings from the applicant […] and by relying on the 
courts of the requesting state to protect him once he is there. In many cases 
this will be sufficient. But once again, the fact that this will usually be sufficient 
to avoid the risk does not mean that it will invariably be so.”682  
Even if the defence of ‘grave risk’ is established, a concept which has been 
interpreted in various way in the English and US courts, there is the difficulty 
that the structure being put in place will provide the required degree of 
                                            
680 Re M & Anor, supra note 331. 
681 Perez-Vera, E., Explanatory Report, supra note 285, at para 25 and 29.  
682 Re D (A Child) supra note 315. 
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protection as different contracting states' legal systems have different 
applications and instruments such as ‘undertakings' and the court might have 
no ability to seise jurisdiction of its own motion upon a child's return.  
Courts are relying upon those protective measures being implemented by the 
requesting state and must assume that the undertakings being enforced but the 
Convention lacks a mechanism for enforcement so that the protective measure 
in fact takes place.  
If the complementary nature of the Regulation and the Convention is 
maintained, as for further possible amendments, either an exception is needed 
to Article 61 of the Regulation, or, non-Member State abductions should be 
regarded as falling outwith the material scope of the Regulation and therefore 
not bound by the provision. 
Necessity and possibility for amendment would consist for both the Convention 
on Child Abduction and the Regulation but it is questionable whether any of 
Brussels II bis jurisdiction rules will be revised in the near future since the 
Proposal for a Regulation amending this Regulation683 has not been 
progressed. But some changes to Chapter III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 
Regulation amending the procedural framework would be required to clarify the 
obligatory nature. 
The Public Consultation on the functioning of the Brussels IIa Regulation (EC 
2201/2003) had revealed some concerns of Member States, judges and 
lawyers with respect to the practical functioning of the Regulation, but mostly 
the criticism was light in the reports. In the UK response684 it was stated that the 
UK considers that it would not be appropriate for the EU to require minimum 
procedural standards for the hearing of the child and that the procedure relating 
to the  enforcement of a return order under Article 42, “where the return order is 
                                            
683 Proposal for a Regulation amending the Regulation, supra note 269. 
684 UK RESPONSE to the EU PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE OPERATION OF COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) No 2201/2003 and to the REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE 
APPLICATION OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2201/2003, 
file:///C:/Users/GIG/Downloads/UK%20GOVERNMENT%20RESPONSE%20BRUSSELS%20IIa
%20CONSULTATION.pdf, last accessed 01 May 2016.  
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made in the Member State of the child's habitual residence and which overrides 
the non-return order in the Member State where the abducted child is, should 
be a matter for the national law of the Member State where the child is.”685 
Contrary to what is suggested in the analysis herein the UK considered it 
inappropriate to introduce common minimum enforcement standards in a 
revised Regulation.686 In general, the UK’s report stated no major concerns and 
answered most questions by saying that the system was satisfactory.  
At the time, most Member States did not submit a report but solely answered 
the questions.687 For analysing the results of the answers in this Public 
Consultation, in particular the results of Member States, judges and Central 
Authority staff will be considered, Furthermore, the results of judges and Central 
Authority staff members will be considered since a majority of those, according 
to their answer of the specific question, had practical experience with the 
Regulation at the time of the survey. The results of this same group of 
participants will further be considered specifically for the UK, Germany and 
Austria, and France. In addition to this, it will be considered if the answers 
provided by lawyers, judges and Central Authority staff members deviate from 
the answers of the other two groups of participant referred to.  
The question whether they thought that “the Regulation is a helpful tool in cross-
border cases concerning custody over a child” was answered with “yes” by all 
participants. The question whether “the Regulation is a helpful tool in cross-
border cases concerning access rights to children” 52.82% of the judges, 
Member States and Central Authority staff members answered “yes”. With 
respect to parental responsibility rights the result was similar.688 
With respect to the efficiency of the scheme in the Regulation on child 
abduction, 48.62% of the participating judges, Member States and Central 
Authority staff members and 50.90% answered “no” whilst to the general 
                                            
685 Ibid, p. 5.  
686 Ibid, p. 5.  
687 See the Submission to the Consultation at 
https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/publication/BXLIIA#, last accessed 02 May 2016.  
688 Ibid.  
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question as to whether the interrelation between the Convention on Child 
Abduction and the Regulation was functioning well, 51.62% answered “yes” and 
47.78% answered “no”. In all the answers relating to the functioning of the 
current rules, the views of this group of participants deviants significantly from 
Member State to Member State. Considering the answers of judges only, the 
percentage results were very similar to those of the group of Member States, 
judges and Central Authority staff members. In the UK, 68% percent of the 
judges and Central Authority staff members answered “yes” to the questions 
regarding the functioning of the interrelation with the Conventions. Views were 
divided on whether there should be improvement to the actual enforcement 
procedure (50%/50%) but with respect to the necessity of improvement of the 
return order procedure 68.75% answered ”yes”.  62.50% of the judges and 
Central Authroty staff members answered that the cooperation mechanism 
ensuring a transfer should be improved.  
In Germany and Austria which have similar legal systems, those judges and 
Central Authority Staff Members requesting improvement of the return order 
procedure had no majority and the request for an improvement of cooperation 
was weaker than in the UK and in general among the Member States. But in 
contrast to the UK, where this group did not consider an amendment to the 
hearing procedure necessary, in Germany and Austria among this group it was 
considered that “common minimum standards for the hearing of a child could 
help in avoiding the refusal of recognition, enforceability and/or enforcement of 
a judgment from another EU country”. Among the participants from this group in 
all Member States, this question was answered “yes” by 53.05% and on the 
questions of necessity for the enforcement procedure with regard to return 
orders, 52.01% answered “yes” whilst on the questions of enforcement in 
parental responsibility cases views were divided (49.56 % each “no” and “yes”).   
Among lawyers, judges and Central Authority staff members in France, there 
was a strong majority seeking to improve the actual enforcement of return 
orders and no majority seeking to improve the enforcement with respect to 
parental responsibility. Both as to demanding minimum requirements for the 
hearing procedure and an enhanced cross-border cooperation there was a 
strong majority.  
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Among lawyers, judges and Central Authority staff members in all Member 
States, 53.31% considered minimum standards for hearing would improve 
“avoiding the refusal of recognition, enforceability and/or enforcement of a 
judgment from another EU country” and on enforcement of return orders 
regarding parental responsibility 51.34% requested improvement and on 
enforcement of return orders in child abduction cases, 50.41% considered an 
improvement would be helpful. Among this group, among all Member States, 
53.43% requested better cooperation as to the transfer procedure.  
The answers to the above mentioned questions by the participants who are 
academics in all Member States demonstrate that their perception of the 
mechanisms is slightly more pessimistic though a majority of 54.85% have not 
had practical experience with the Regulation at the time the Public Consultation 
was undertaken.   
It is suggested that the Public Consultation revealed that a majority of those 
practically experienced with respect to the application of the Regulation would 
support certain improvements. However, views deviate among the Member 
States as to in which part of the provisions improvement would be most 
relevant. With respect to concrete measures of cooperation and the rules on 
enforcement of return orders in child abduction cases, the survey has revealed 
that an improvement is sought by a majority but that there is satisfaction with 
the integration in the Regulation in general.  
For a comparison with the elimination of the procedures on child abduction from 
the Regulation as suggested by Beaumont, Walker and Holliday689, it needs to 
be considered that the results of the study undertaken by Beaumont, Holliday 
and Walker which were then referred in the analysis of 2015690 were based on a 
case study of available cases, a questionnaire sent to the Central authorities 
                                            
689 supra note 676.  
690 Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., ‘Not heard and not returned: the reality of Article 
11(8) proceedings’. (2015) FL (2). 124-133.  
Chapter 5  
222 
and the responses of researchers in the Member States,691 The authors mainly 
criticise that the courts of the habitual residence pursuant to Article 11(6)-(8) 
may insist on the return of a child who has been abducted if a court in the state 
to which the child was abducted has refused to return the child on the basis of 
one of the exceptions provided for in Article 13 of the Convention on Child 
Abduction. The data collected for this study was collected on cases which were 
Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels II bis proceedings arising from Article 13 Hague non-
return orders made between 1 March 2005 and 28 February 2014.692 It is 
acknowledged in the analysis by the authors that “it was difficult to trace Article 
11(8) cases” and that the questionnaire to Central Authorities was not answered 
regularly and as envisaged and, it is additionally acknowledged by the authors 
that the collection of data in the Member States was not pursued in the same 
way in every Member States. Hence, the submissions by the academic 
researchers were a significant contribution to the Study:693 and In comparison, 
in the survey of the EC Commission, 304 judges and 269 members of staff of 
the Central Authorities from all Member States and, additionally, 288 lawyers 
participated in providing answers to the questions mentioned above, as part of 
the official questionnaire.  
D. Conclusion 
It is suggested that the concise analysis of the rules, as it has been undertaken 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and the procedural reality and the case law have 
revealed deficiencies in respect to the return and non-return procedures, but 
that the dark picture which Beaumont, Walker and Holliday draw of the 
                                            
691 Beaumont, P., Walker, L. and Holliday, J., ‘Conflicts of EU Courts on Child Abduction: The 
reality of Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings across the EU’, (2016) 12 Journal of Private 
International Law 211, 258. 
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid, according to the authors, the questionnaire was distributed to all Central Authorities in 
May 2014 requesting data in relation to Article 11(6)-(8) Brussels IIa proceedings following on 
from a non-return order under Article 13 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention in the period 
between the entry into force of Brussels IIa and 28 February 2014. Most Authorities provided 
some information but no information was provided by the Authorities of Greece, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and England and Wales. Judges were requested as members of the European 
Hague Network. Interviews with judges and practitioners were undertaken in the Netherlands,  
Belgium, Latvia, Portugal and the UK. 
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provisions on child abduction in the existing Regulation does not seem reflective 
of the current situation. This, as has just been demonstrated, is supported by 
the outcome of the Public Consultation. In terms of harmonization an integral 
framework in one Regulation, a recast of Brussels II bis dealing with jurisdiction, 
recognition, enforcement, provisions on return orders and a central provision on 
applicable law would seem valuable. Having seen in this sub-chapter how the 
central difficulties inherent in the Regulation’s rules which were discussed in 
detail in the preceding chapters could be overcome by conceptual changes, it is 
suggested at this stage that certain improvements to the provisions would be 
advantageous. The final chapter will now conclude on the findings made 
throughout the thesis so as to answer the cornerstone question, whether, in 
consideration of the analysis of the current structure, an advancement has been 
brought about by the Regulation in terms of legal clarity and certainty, to 
promote the best interests of the child(ren) concerned, 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
“[T]he dispositive part of the Convention contains no explicit reference to the 
interests of the child to the extent of their qualifying the Convention's stated 
object which is to secure the prompt return of children who have been 
wrongfully removed or retained.”694  
A. Provisions on jurisdiction and habitual residence  
The analysis has shown that the central concepts under the Convention on 
Child Abduction have been prone to different interpretations in the different 
jurisdictions. In particular the concept of habitual residence under the 
Convention on Child Abduction has been interpreted with different approaches 
and in a very flexible way by the national courts in England and in the United 
States. In the first two chapters it has become clear that this, as such, has 
triggered uncertainty for the Parties concerned, in particular, the children 
involved in the disputes. For the Regulation and hence for intra-community 
situations the ECJ has, in the short time695 Brussels II bis exists, established a 
new, autonomous interpretation of the definition of habitual residence and 
dispensed with the interpretations of the case law of the contracting states to 
the Convention on Child Abduction.696  
Whilst the European Court of Justice has set forth that habitual residence is 
“”the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and 
                                            
694 Perez-Vera, E., Explanatory Report supra note 285, at paras 20 – 23. 
695 Compared to the Convention on Child Abduction. 
696 Cases in the UK Re Bates, supra note 20; Re F,  supra note 144; Re R, supra note 144; 
Cameron v Cameron, supra note 144; Re P-J, supra note 153; in the Matter of KL, supra 
note 152; A v A and another, supra note 154; M v M, supra note 282 and in the US: Application 
of Robinson , supra note 20; Friedrich v Friedrich, supra note 21; David S v Zamira S, supra 
note 21; Re N, supra note 21; ECJ cases on habitual residence: Proceedings brought by A, 
supra note 17; Rinau, supra note 20; Mercredi v Chaffe, supra note 130; Sundelind Lopez, 
supra note 34; ECHR case: Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland, supra note 105. 
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family environment”697 it also held that habitual residence depends on 
numerous factors698 and has supported the necessity of a full consideration of 
the circumstances in all decisions.699  
In contrast to the Regulation, the Hague Conference in the Convention on Child 
Abduction avoided a comprehensive definition of 'habitual residence', 
supporting that it is a “well-established concept” and a “question of pure fact”.700 
There is a priority of the state of the former habitual residence, however, whilst 
this concept builds on the return of the child to the state of the former habitual 
residence, the authorities of the contracting state in which the child is present is 
responsible for initiating the return of the child.  
Based on the established case-law under the Convention, or rather the 
discretion allowed for under the Convention, there has at first been reluctance 
to adopt the definition of habitual residence provided by the European Court of 
Justice, and in Re H-K701, the Court of Appeal expressed its unwillingness to 
interpret habitual residence in accordance with the language of the European 
Court of Justice in Mercredi v Chaffe.702 It argued that “the European meaning 
of habitual residence will, by osmosis, shape the autonomous meaning to be 
given to that phrase in the International Hague Convention on Child Abduction 
with the stress on its international application”.703 
An autonomous interpretation of the Regulation is not just what the ECJ 
requests. It is also legitimate in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which sets forth the basic rules of 
treaty interpretation, in Article 31(1): "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
                                            
697 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17, para 44. 
698 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17. 
699 Proceedings brought by A, supra note 17; Rinau, supra note 20; Mercredi v Chaffe, supra 
note 130; Sundelind Lopez, supra note 34; ECHR case: Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland, 
supra note 105. 
700 Perez-Vera, E., Explanatory Report, supra note 285. 
701 Re H-K supra note 319. 
702 Mercredi v Chaffe, supra note 130. 
703 Shah (Reg v Barnet LBC), supra note 317. 
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in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose."  
More recently, as discussed in detail in the thesis, in A v A, the Supreme Court 
reflected on the debate as to whether the concept of habitual residence in the 
case law of the courts of England and Wales for the purposes of the Convention 
on Child Abduction differed from the interpretation of the Court of Justice with 
respect to the Regulation.704  
The Supreme Court held that the concept of the Court of Justice should be 
favoured, thereby clearly supporting the child-centred interpretation of the ECJ.  
"[T]he test adopted by the European Court is preferable to that earlier adopted 
by the English courts, being focussed on the situation of the child, with the 
purposes and intentions of the parents being merely one of the relevant 
factors.“705 
It is anyhow not at the discretion of the national courts to decide whether or not 
they want to accept the interpretations provided for by the ECJ with respect to 
the concepts under the Regulation. But it is a true improvement that national 
courts accept those interpretations and guidance and thereby promote a 
harmonised interpretation of the Regulation.  
In the set of jurisdictional rules under the Regulation, there is one valuable, 
exception to the strict structure of allocating jurisdiction to the courts of the 
habitual residence. A court which would otherwise have jurisdiction in 
accordance with Article 8 may request the courts of another Member State to 
assume jurisdiction if the courts in that Member State are “better placed to hear 
the case”. 706  
This reference to a court “better placed” in Article 15 is indeed a valuable 
approach. It establishes a sui generis forum non conveniens jurisdiction for 
national courts only in relation to children in situations where it is deemed that 
                                            
704 A v A and another, supra note 154. 
705 ibid. 
706 Article 15(1) of Brussels II bis. 
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the transfer of a case to another court would be in the child's best interests. The 
qualifier that it must be in the best interests and the wording allowing for a 
transfer only to a State with which the child has a particular connection, 
considerably restricts the discretion of the national courts and only pave a way 
to a transfer of jurisdiction where such transfer would be reasonable. Whilst only 
two cases have been decided on the interpretation of Article 15 of the 
Regulation707 it is suggested that this rule is a perfect example of how the 
Regulation can truly promote the consideration of the ‘best interests’ by the 
national courts. 
B. Provisional measures  
With respect to provisional measures, the Regulation provides a clear structure. 
But, as the analysis has shown, Art. 20 raised many questions. Most criticism 
can be confuted. Detiček has made evident that provisional measures adopted 
in accordance with Article 20 of the Regulation may not operate as means of 
by-passing the jurisdiction rules which apply in the event of the wrongful 
removal or retention.  Moreover, the best interests of the child may make it 
necessary for a court to not order his or her return to the Member State of 
origin.708 However, contrary to the procedural structure under the Convention on 
Child Abduction it is not for the court of the Member State of enforcement but 
for the court of the Member State of origin to decide in this respect.  In 
Purrucker II709, in 2010, the ECJ held that Article 20 of the Regulation may not 
be regarded as a provision which determines substantive jurisdiction and that 
due to the objective of the Regulation it is “in the best interests of the child, 
[that] the court which is nearest the child and which, accordingly, is best 
informed of the child’s situation and state of development, takes the necessary 
decisions.”710  
                                            
707 Re M, supra note 196; AB v JLB, supra note 198. 
708 Detiček, supra note 239 
709 Purrucker II, supra note 213. 
710 Purrucker II, supra note 213, para 84.  
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Besides those valuable clarifications provided with respect to provisional 
measures711 the ECJ’s repeated reference to the best interests of the child not 
only demonstrates the emphasis it lays on respecting Recitals 12, 16 and 21 of 
the preamble but also the actual expectation that the national courts will 
consider the best interests.712  
In an environment of complicated ping-pong proceedings, attempts at transfer, 
appeals and provisional measures in each jurisdiction,713 the ECJ’s rulings on 
provisional measures have been very adaptive to the fast movements of 
parents and their children within the European Union’s borders and beyond.  
A stand-alone change of circumstances resulting from a “gradual process such 
as the child’s integration into her new environment” is not a sufficient ground for 
the court of the Member State in which the child is present to adopt provisional 
measures under Article 20 of the Regulation.714  
An interpretation favouring the parent responsible for the wrongful removal 
would neither be in accordance with the wording of Article 20 of the Regulation 
nor in accordance with the Regulation’s objective to deter wrongful removal and 
retention. Under the Regulation it is for the court having jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter to consider the circumstances and strike a balance. 
As a second important concept in the interest of the children concerned the 
Regulation establishes a connection between parental responsibility and 
divorce proceedings under the Regulation, thereby recognising the tie between 
those proceedings. 
C. The innovative provision - Article 12  
The very valuable prorogation rule of Article 12 allows the court seised in 
divorce proceedings under the Regulation to additionally have jurisdiction in 
                                            
711 Purrucker II, supra note 213. 
712 Purrucker I, supra note 215, reference is made in paras 15, 36 and 91.  
713 M.A. v Austria supra note 254. 
714 Detiček, supra note 239, para 47. 
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matters of parental responsibility connected with the divorce if is in the best – in 
this prevision referred to as the "superior"- interests of the child. 715 
A positive feature of Article 12 allows for the divorce court to hear the parental 
responsibility case only if the link between the parental responsibility case and 
the divorce court is sufficiently strong. However, several courts may be seised 
simultaneously of a dispute over parental responsibility since the jurisdictional 
grounds pursuant to Article 12 are not exclusive grounds and hence the court in 
the Member State of the habitual residence maintains jurisdiction. 
D. Interrelation and the issues of enforcement 
Making evident the interrelation of the Regulation and the Convention on Child 
Abduction, the ECJ outlined in Rinau716 that the rules on the enforceability “tie[s] 
in very closely with the provisions of the 1980 Hague Convention”.717 The 
obligation to order return under the Convention is levered out whenever it can 
be shown that the child is “settled” in the “new environment” and as there is no 
reference in the Convention as to when this situation is to be assumed, the 
national courts have discretionary power as to the assumption of such a 
situation. 
As the analysis has shown, owing to the complementary character of Articles 
11(6)-(8) of the Regulation, those provisions turned out to be much stronger 
than the wording of the provisions suggests,718 whilst the first part of Article 11 
turns out to be weaker than the wording suggests. the Practice Guide’s 
assumption that the “rules of the Regulation (Article 11(2) to (5)) prevail over the 
relevant rules of the Convention”719 is theory rather than practice. Both the first 
part and the second part delineate the interrelation with respect to the return 
mechanism but (1)-(5) have proven to lack the practical strength of (6)-(8) and 
                                            
715 Article 12 Prorogation of jurisdiction, discussed in Chapter 2. 
716 Rinau, supra note 19. 
717 ibid. 
718 as discussed in Chapter 4 hereof. 
719 Practice Guide for the application of the Regulation (2005), supra note 30, section 4.3.6. 
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the hearing procedures have not be applied as the legislator envisaged.720 The 
additional layer of rules has led to a complete change to the system of child 
abduction proceedings under the Convention on Child Abduction and this 
change has led to problems of enforcements. There is however no indication 
that the procedures are less efficient than under the Convention only when the 
interests of children concerned were often considered less significant than 
those of the parents in the context of ‘grave risk’, as can be derived from the 
analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.  
“B2R has added a dramatic further dimension to proceedings under the 
Convention in which the application is for the child’s return to a fellow EU state.  
When, on whatever basis, it refuses an application under the Convention for 
return to a non-EU state, a court in England and Wales will conventionally 
embark […] on a merits-based inquiry into the arrangements which will best 
serve the welfare of the child; and it will reasonably anticipate, particularly in the 
light of the presence of the child here, that its decision will be fully enforceable.   
But when, by reference to article 13 of the Convention, it refuses an application 
for a child’s return to an EU state, it is aware that an order for return, immune 
from challenge, may nevertheless be forthcoming from that state; and that 
therefore the order for non-return may well provide no more than a breathing-
space.” 721 
As the analysis showed, this paragraph in In the matter of LC overstates the 
strength of Article 11(6)-(8) but describes the strict procedural setting of the 
provisions securing that the exceptions to a return order under the Convention 
are reinforced by the set of exceptions described in Article 11 of the Regulation. 
With a reference to Rinau, the ECJ in Zarraga held that the Member State of 
enforcement cannot oppose recognition and enforcement of a certified 
judgment issued on the grounds of Article 11(8), thereby making clear that 
recognition is automatic.722  
                                            
720 Recital 19 of the Regulation. 
721 In the matter of LC, supra note 439, para 21. 
722 Zarraga v Pelz, supra note 444. 
Chapter 6  
231 
To draw a final conclusion on this significant decision it is helpful to concisely 
recall the circumstances.   
The Spanish court had awarded sole custody to the father, requesting the 
child’s return to Spain and following this, a series of appeals were initiated. 
Upon the mother’s appeal that the child should have been heard by the Spanish 
court, the Spanish court certified the custody decision in accordance with Article 
42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation, which lead the mother to request from the 
German court the non-recognition of the judgement. This was granted. The 
father appealed.  
As paragraph 11 of the Article 42 certificate requires the court of origin to 
expressly confirm that the child has been given the opportunity to be heard, not 
hearing the child is a procedural breach. But under the Regulation, in the view 
of the ECJ in Zarraga, the court of the Member State of enforcement has no 
power to review a certified judgement made in accordance with Article 42(2).723  
The question is if the rights of the child concerned are thereby deprived of 
judicial protection since the Spanish court retained the sole power of review.  
As the analysis on the lack of mutual trust has strikingly demonstrated the 
ECJ’s referral to mutual trust between states is problematic. It is one of the 
cornerstones of the Regulation that the courts of one Member State trust in the 
willingness of the courts of another Member State to regard the obligation to 
protect fundamental rights. The Spanish court considered it had not breached 
the child’s right to be heard, as the child had been provided with the opportunity 
to be heard and only the mother had refused the child this opportunity. The 
pitfall here is, as was discussed in detail, that the duty of the courts to hear the 
child is a duty under national procedural rules. As was discussed, Germany’s 
procedural rules provide for a high standard with regard to the child to be heard, 
and it is common practice for the child to be heard by the judge.  
Though hearing the child is an integral part of the right to a fair trial and by not 
hearing the child, Spain may have breached this right, a review by the ECtHR 
                                            
723 Ibid.  
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would have likely only delayed the proceedings further and hence not been in 
the interests of the children concerned. 
So it is concluded that the ECJ is right to argue that challenges against the 
return order, its enforceability as such or against the certificate issued pursuant 
to Article 42 of the Regulation must and may only be before the courts of the 
State of former habitual residence.724  
But the recognition of judgments adopted in accordance with the provisions of 
Chapter III, Section 1 (Recognition) of the Regulation allow the Member State of 
enforcement to undertake public policy considerations and an obligation to act 
in the best interests of the child concerned to oppose recognition. The 
distinction between the provisions in Section 1 and Section 4 of the Regulation, 
makes evident the inherent problem. Section 4 should be amended to 
overcome this problem.  
The ECJ’s reference to the principle of mutual trust, a system where all national 
courts provide an equivalent and effective level of judicial protection725 makes 
evident that, for the Regulation’s system to work properly, the courts are forced 
to trust in the procedural settings under the national law of another Member 
State. In its Report in 2014, the Commission identified the differences in the 
national procedures with respect to enforcement and identified them as an issue 
of concern but made no suggestions how such difficulties could be erased.726 
But despite clear rulings from the Court of Justice that the orders should be 
enforced and the children returned, in both cases discussed in detail (Zarraga727 
and Povse728) the children were not returned to the state of origin. Considering 
the difficulties discussed herein with respect to Articles 11(6)-(8) the suitability 
                                            
724 Zarraga v Pelz, supra note 444. 
725 ibid, para 59 and 61. 
726 COM(2014) 225 final, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, p.13 et seqq. 
727 Zarraga v Pelz, supra note 444. 
728 Povse v Alpago, supra note 244. 
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of the process under Article 42 should be reconsidered. The analysis of the 
national case-law considered together with the reasoning of the ECJ on Article 
11 (6)-(8) does not suggest that the fault is only incorporated in those provisions 
itself but rather results from the reluctance of national courts to deal with non-
returns which develop into Article 11(6)-(8) proceedings. Rather, the national 
courts have preferred to approach cases as simple non-returns under Article 13 
of the Convention on Child Protection across the EU.729 
Re D is an excellent example of how effectively Article 11(6)-(8) can be applied. 
In Re D the English court held that the interrelationship of Articles 10 and 11(7) 
and (8) of the Regulation allow the state from which the child has been 
wrongfully removed or retained to assess the custody of the child once a 
judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention has been 
made.730 It further underlined that proceedings under Article 11(7) should be 
carried out as quickly as possible with the court exercising a welfare jurisdiction 
in carrying out the required examination, thereby respecting that the child’s 
welfare is the paramount consideration. 
The court issued a certificate for return pursuant to Article 42(2), concluding that 
this was in the best interest of the child and the guardian had obtained the 
child’s views.731  
The EU’s reasoning in Povse732 that the objective of the provisions of Articles 
11(8), 40 and 42 of the Regulation is that the proceedings should be 
expeditious and that the priority should be given to the jurisdiction of the court of 
origin was respected in Re D.  
The analysis has made evident, that tecently, the development in the courts of 
England and Wales is a practical approach in respect of the return mechanism. 
The ultimate character of the automatic enforcement mechanism of the 
Regulation Chapter III, Section 3 has been criticised for being very formalistic 
                                            
729 Beaumont, P., Walker, L., Holliday, J., supra note 676. 
730 Re D, supra note 511. 
731 ibid. 
732 Povse v Alpago, supra note 244. 
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and for relying too much on the hardly existent mutual trust between the 
Member States. 733 
But this disregards that it is the court of the Member State of origin to decide, 
when issuing a certificate on the basis of Article 42(2) of the Regulation, 
whether hearing the child is in his or her best interests.734 Whilst the party may 
not bring an appeal against the certified judgment, ordering the return of the 
child735 a violation of the child’s right to be heard may provide sufficient grounds 
to overturn a judgment awarding rights of custody.736 The complementary 
structure of Article 13 and Article 11(6)-(8) has very shortly before the 
submission date been harshly criticised by Beaumont, Walker and Holliday in 
an analysis of the final findings of a research project, as was discussed in  detail 
in Chapter 5. In accordance with what has been found in this thesis, the harsh 
criticism on the enforcement procedure in the context of child abduction is not 
supported by the findings herein. However, in the analysis of the empirical study 
the findings developed in the thesis with regard to Article 11(4) is supported: 
“our study shows that this provision is not being used adequately by judges in 
Member States when applying the Article 13(1)(b) exception. This is clear from 
the Article 11(8) Brussels IIa cases where it is often suggested that the judge in 
the State of refuge did not take account of Article 11(4).”737  
E. Hearing the child 
Whilst the wording of Article 11(2) suggests that hearing the child shall be of 
high concern, the current status quo is however that the provision has had 
limited application in the Member States.738 This is a truly disadvantageous 
development.  
                                            
733 McEleavy, P., supra note 536, pp. 147 et seqq. pp. 177 et seqq.. 
734 Zarraga v Pelz, supra note 444 para. 68. 
735 Povse v Alpago, supra note 244, para. 71. 
736 Zarraga v Pelz, supra note 444, para. 72. 
737 supra note 676. 
738 as discussed in Chapter 4 B II hereof.  
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However, as has been pointed out in the preceding chapters,739 in the analysis 
of the best interests principle throughout that thesis and particularly in the 
analysis on the application of the Regulation’s provisions on return orders, the 
more recent case law in England adopted the position that the rights and 
welfare interests of children are distinct from those of their parents and that a 
balance between those interests is required. Whilst, under the Convention, a 
child-centred approach has been rare during the last decades, the more recent 
English case law has made reference740 to the concept of hearing a child under 
the Regulation. Hence, the national procedural rules must be laid out to support 
the concept set forth in the Regulation and must secure that the child is heard 
by competent judges and an amendment of the Regulation should impose 
minimum criteria. 
With respect to the Convention, there is growing recognition that the 
consideration of the child’s views becomes more relevant only that “in Hague 
Convention cases, the relevance of the child's views to the issues in the case 
may be limited. But there is now a growing understanding of the importance of 
listening to the children involved in children's cases.”741 A reliance on only 
Article 12 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
1989 and Article 24(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Art 24(1) which would be the consequence of a return to the Convention since 
the latter does not contain an obligation to hear the child would be a step 
backwards.  
It is suggested that the very clear wording in Article 11(2) should be understood 
as an initiative for the national courts to hear the child concerned both in cases 
under the Convention and under the ambits of the Regulation. However, in a 
strict interpretation, the obligation of course only applies to cases under the 
Regulation and in the analysis of their study Beaumont, Walker and Holliday, 
underline the findings indicate a rare use of Article 13(2) of the Convention on 
Child Abduction concerning the views of the child. This concurs with the 
                                            
739 Chapter 2 A I 1, 3 A II 1 and 3 A III. 
740 Re D (A Child), supra note 315. 
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approach the Convention has taken over the past decades with respect to 
taking into consideration the views of the child. 
It can be concluded, that Article 11(2) of the Regulation is an important asset in 
protecting the best interests. 
As delignated further above, whilst the procedural issues should be solved by 
amendments to the Article 42 certificate, there is no reason for amendments to 
Article 11(8). Since there is no possibility to appeal against a certificate issued 
pursuant to Articles 41(1) or 42(1), the courts should be required to clarify the 
opportunities to be heard were made available to the child, as it is set forth in 
Article 11(2) and 42(2) (a) and the parties were heard to as is set forth in 42(2) 
(b). Reasons should be provided on an obligatory basis where the judge 
considered it was inappropriate to hear the child. Article 42 is an exception to 
the provision in Article 23(b) which sets forth a ground for non-recognition if the 
child has not been “given an opportunity to be heard, in violation of fundamental 
principles of procedure of the Member State in which recognition is sought.” Not 
the ECJ’s judgement is the problem, but rather the inconsistent structure of the 
rules on recognition and the ultimate character of Article 42 is in conflict with the 
best interests of the children concerned. Not the ECJ has failed to consider the 
practical application of the judgement, but rather the wording of Article 42 is so 
inescapable that it trespasses the interests of the children concerned.  
The margin of discretion inherent in the application of national procedural rules 
and of legislation by the Member States would require genuine mutual trust but 
under the current system this advancement is beyond what can be realised in 
practice. Both the lack of mutual trust between Member States’ courts which 
has become evident in Purrucker I and Purrucker II and the lack of a genuine 
standard of application of the provisions on non-return orders, recognition and 
enforcement call for the suggested amendment of Article 42.  
In addition to more detailed requirements with respect to the certificate, appeal 
should generally be permitted before the courts of the Member State of origin if 
one of the parties considers that the court of the Member State of origin has 
issued a certificate in violation of Article 42(2) (a).   
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F. Intervention of the ECtHR 
In cases of non-enforcement of Hague return orders, the assessment carried 
out by the ECtHR as to whether the authorities had done everything that could 
reasonably be expected to protect the interests of the children concerned 
convey the impression that the system of the Hague Convention is 
strengthened in its efforts to returning abducted children.742  
However, the thesis has shown that this impression is deceiving.  
Whilst both the protection of human rights and the preservation of the best 
interests of children require most careful evaluation, a determination of levels of 
protection based on generally worded provisions of fundamental rights 
legislation in terms of applying whatever provision offers the “highest” level of 
protection seems doomed. Both the Regulation and the Convention on Child 
Abduction contain specific rules that require an autonomous interpretation. 
Jurisprudence from the ECtHR appeared to support that Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights prevailed over the Convention, thereby 
undermining the functioning of the Convention, and the rulings in Neulinger743 
and Raban744 remained discredited among academics and courts.  
Also, since there has hitherto been no succession of the European Union’s to 
the ECHR,745 it is not in the interests of the children concerned if the ECHR 
undermines legal certainty.  
Being one of the four exceptions to the requirement to return to the jurisdiction 
of habitual residence the grave risk exception of Article 13 (b) has played a 
significant role in the development of the ECtHR’s increasing influence on the 
interpretation of Convention and Regulation cases.  
Whilst it is of course of central importance, as referring to the Convention on 
Child Abduction, that  
                                            
742 Janzen, U., Gärnter, V., supra note 647. 
743  Neulinger, supra note 601. 
744 Raban v Romania, supra note 106. 
745 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIn
dex=0&doclang=DE&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=400431. 
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“the concept of the child's best interests should be paramount (…),”746  
The ECtHR sought to review the reasoning of the Romanian court and the 
interpretation adopted in respect of Articles 3 and 13(b) of the Convention on 
Child Abduction.  
In Re E747 the Supreme Court was requested to consider the recent decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights and in Germany, the higher regional court 
cases which hitherto referred to Neulinger argued that Neulinger did not change 
their evaluation or the interpretation of Article 13 in the context of the case.748  
In the English case of Re T, Jackson J made clear that in his view Neulinger did 
not require any change to the  
“approach to Hague Convention proceedings whether in terms of principle or 
procedure.”749  
And in the case of Re S the Supreme Court considered it not right that the 
European Court of Human Rights had reiterated the suggested requirement of 
an in-depth examination and considered such requirement “entirely 
inappropriate”.750 
It can be concluded from the in-depth analysis which has been undertaken in 
Chapter 4 that the ECtHR’s attempt to exercise the function of a reviewing court 
for the interpretation of the return mechanism under the Regulation and the 
Convention on Child Abduction has had a very negative influence on the 
harmonised application of the return mechanism in national courts. The 
standards set by the European Convention on Human Rights stand 
independently ‘side-by-side’ the Regulation, and, as the Regulation contains 
specific rules at European level and judgements no case law under the 
Regulation is revisable by the ECtHR. 
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The chapter on the ECtHR’s involvement has however revealed difficulties in 
the return mechanism under the Convention. The major difficulty which arises 
with respect to Article 13(b) of the Convention is confidence that the structure 
contained in the Convention will automatically provide the degree of protection 
required to the children concerned. Whilst a parent's legal representatives might 
raise issues set forth as exceptions to return or may apply for return and the 
Convention is based upon principles of comity and mutual trust751 the different 
legal systems of the Contracting States pay different regard to instruments such 
as ‘undertakings' and the court might under the national procedural rules not be 
able to seise jurisdiction upon a child's return.752  
It is not in the interest of the children concerned to lower the chances to 
succeed with an Article 13(b) defence by requiring the court to undertake a full 
examination of best interests of the child - the interpretation of "grave risk" in 
Article 13(b) requires no consideration of any criteria other than those set forth 
in the Convention. Whilst this may be considered a legal disadvantage for 
children in ‘simple’ Hague cases compared to cases under the Regulation with 
respect to which Article 11 applies as an additional qualifier, this can only be 
remedied by amendments to the Convention, not by any case-to-case revision 
by the ECtHR. In the context of the interrelation, this could be remedied by an 
improvement of the overriding mechanism, discussed in Chapter 5 B. 
From the analysis of the rules on provisional measures it can be concluded that 
those are indeed progressive and, though complicated, not entirely 
disadvantageous.  
A change of circumstances resulting from a gradual process such as the child’s 
integration into her new environment cannot be considered a sufficient ground 
                                            
751 But contrary to the Regulation, the Convention text or the Explanatory Report, supra note 
104, do not mention those. 
752 Conclusions and Recommendations of the fifth meeting of the special commission to review 
the operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
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for the court of the Member State where the child is present to adopt provisional 
measures. Wrongful removals and detentions shall not be consolidated and the 
position of the parent responsible for the abduction of the child shall not be 
supported by procedural advantages.  
Compared to the Regulation’s features of automatic enforceability of 
judgments,753 and the primacy of the Member State of habitual residence in 
intra-EU abduction cases,754 the 1996 Convention’s provisions have a limited 
scope.755 The clearest distinction is that the Convention on Child Protection 
deals with issues of applicable law756 and contains a general choice of law rule 
for parental responsibility.757  
European politics made the Convention on Child Protection a difficult project 
from the start.758 It has had a difficult start with very few case law and limited 
interrelation with the Regulation. It is primarily to the delayed development of 
ratification that the interrelating cases under the Regulation have been those 
related to the Regulation’s interrelation with the Convention on Child Abduction 
rather than with the Convention on Child Protection.  
G. Final consideration 
The recent Bradbrooke759 offers a good summery of how certain shortcomings 
of the Convention on Child Abduction can be overcome under the Regulation: 
“it is apparent from Article 11(3) to (5) of the Brussels II bis Regulation that the 
return without delay of the child is to be the general rule and that a refusal must 
remain the exception. Consequently, in the system established by the Brussels 
II bis Regulation, unlike that arising from the 1980 Hague Convention, where 
                                            
753 Articles 40-42 of the Regulation. 
754 Article 10 of the Regulation. 
755 Chapter V of Convention on Child Protection. 
756 Article 15 of the Convention on Child Protection. 
757 Articles 16 -18 of the Convention on Child Protection. 
758 Lowe, N., supra note 477, p. 10. 
759 Bradbrooke, supra note 429. 
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the courts concerned oppose return, that does not automatically bring the 
dispute concerning the return to an end.” 
But, as was suggested in the chapter on amendments, Chapter 5 C., the 
approach only works if there are efficient means to ‘force’ the national courts in 
the Member States to obey to the provisions and a more obligatory nature of the 
concept of mutual trust is required. Additionally, amendments to the procedural 
structure would make the application of the previsions more efficient.  
Mutual trust is a foundation of Brussels II bis. In accordance with that principle, 
every court of a Member State offers an equivalent and effective level of judicial 
protection and the application of the provisions of the Regulation is partially, but 
not wholly, as some have suggested, dependent on the functioning of mutual 
trust.  
Brussels II bis stands for  
“certainty and avoidance of litigation against opportunities for fairness and 
justice, for reconciliation and conciliation”,760  
and provides a complete set of jurisdiction rules on parental responsibility, and 
whilst the complementary nature of provisions on child abduction and return 
order as well as the related provisions on recognition and enforcement have 
complicated the nature of such proceeding the general conclusion is that the 
respective provisions strengthen the framework under the Convention on Child 
Abduction.  
It must never be neglected that family not commercial interests are at stake.  As 
Schlosser suggests, 761 Brussels II bis are ‘innovative and efficient concepts of 
judicial cooperation’762 but the international impact must not be disregarded and 
there should either be a complete separation of the Regulation from the 
                                            
760 Hodson, D., Green, M., ‘Has the SFLA code met its Waterloo?’ (2001) Solicitor's Journal, 
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Convention on Child Abduction or the underlying procedural rules of the 
Regulation must be adopted to clarify the complementary nature. 
The thesis has shown that the Regulation has served to address some of the 
difficulties that were inherent in the operation of the Convention on Child 
Abduction, and by doing so it has promoted to respect the best interests 
approach. The discussion and case-law analysis in relation to the areas which 
were identified as giving rise to concern have shown that the ECJ has provided 
valuable guidance on the application of the provisions, in the best interests of 
the child(ren) concerned. On the other hand, the complementary system of the 
Regulation and, mainly the Convention on Child Abduction, complicated the 
application of the Regulation and parallel proceedings under the Convention 
and the Regulation impede a swift and straightforward application.  
But common criticism regarding the alleged misuse of the Art 13(b) exception, 
the interpretation of Article 20 and measures available to protect abducting 
parents upon return, has been disconfirmed in this thesis. Certain critical issues 
such as the determination of the settlement of the child in the new environment, 
the lack of application of certain provisions in the national courts and procedural 
obligations of courts require amendments.  
For strengthening the summary return mechanism of the Convention on Child 
Abduction the provisions in the Regulation are generally well suited and it is in 
the interests of the children concerned that the Regulation entrusts the courts of 
the Member State where the child was habitually resident before the wrongful 
removal or retention with the judicial procedures. Notwithstanding the adoption 
of provisional measures by other courts, it is for the courts of the former habitual 
residence to determine the measures which are necessary to protect the best 
interests of the child. The ECJ in its interpretation of Brussels II bis made the 
latter an efficient instrument in deterring wrongful removals and retentions. As 
Rinau, Povse and Zarraga763 have demonstrated, the Regulation must be 
interpreted to avoid that the parent responsible for the wrongful removal or 
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retention is supported procedurally. Also, Detiček764 has supported that 
provisional measures shall never operate as means of circumventing jurisdiction 
rules that apply in the event of the wrongful removal or retention. Contrary to the 
system under the Convention on Child Abduction, it is not for the court of the 
Member State of enforcement but for the court of the Member State of origin to 
decide, which, as this thesis has shown, is clearly an asset.  
Whilst the Hague Conference regularly discusses improvements and difficulties 
of the Conventions, the case-law has over decades been dominated by national 
differences and there have been tendencies of a child-centred, a balanced and 
a parent-focused interpretation of the major concepts. This is a clear weakness 
of the Convention on Child Abduction.  
As for the Regulation, it has partially overcome those tendencies inherent to 
different interpretations. The objective stated in the Preamble to “serve the 
protection of the children’s best interests“ has been met, with exceptions. It may 
be concluded that under English case law the children concerned have 
benefited from the application of the Regulation. 
It is not just in accordance with the ECJ’s rulings but also in the interest of the 
children concerned that the interpretation of any concept in the Regulation 
unless explicitly stated therein is not undertaken under national law, but should 
be accorded an “autonomous” meaning under the Regulation, thereby providing 
for legal clarity and certainty.  
 
Bohez v Wiertz765 reinforced that the Regulation 
“is based on the principle of mutual trust between Member States in the fact that 
their respective national legal systems are capable of providing an equivalent 
and effective protection of fundamental rights, recognised at EU level”. 
The Regulation sets the grounds for a progressive approach of the courts to 
respecting the children’s interests in parental responsibility and 
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abduction/retention cases, to the extent this is possible by an efficient allocation 
of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement. Goodwill of the national courts as 
to the application and interpretation of the Regulation is however required. In 
particular, innovative concepts such the obligation to hear the child and the 
further restrictions to exceptions on return the Regulation imposes require such 
goodwill. Initiative to applying the new concepts and dispensing of the discretion 
offered under the Convention on Child Abduction is necessary. Through the 
legal certainty and stringent overall structure together with the guidance the 
ECJ has given the intra-Community framework has undoubtedly improved the 
situation with respect to parental responsibility and custody, for the children 
involved.  
The interrelation and the complementary nature of the provisions in the 
Regulation and, in particular, the Convention on Child Abduction, have created 
a complicated structure reflected in the national case-law and the ECJ case-
law, however, despite this interrelation, the Regulation overcomes many pitfalls 
of the Convention. Hence, it is concluded, that the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages which result from the complexity of the interrelation and from 
flaws of the rules and, to return to the original question posed by this research, in 
general, the majority of the Regulation’s provisions are not to the detriment of 
the ‘best interests’ of the children concerned but, if applied diligently and in 
accordance with selected guidance by the ECJ, promote the best interests 
approach of the Regulation.  
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Postscript 
1. Introduction  
The EU Commission on 30 June 2016 presented a proposal for a recast of 
Brussels II bis1, based on the findings in its Report and the Public Consultation 
mentioned in the main part of the thesis.2 At the time of the final submission and 
prior to the submission, there had, as is usual with respect to Commission 
Proposals, not been reliable indication that a Proposal would be published. Two 
years had passed between the Public Consultation initiated by the Commission 
in 2014 and the publication of the Proposal. At the time this Postscript is written, 
a recast of Brussels II bis has still not been presented. However, the suggested 
amendments are of relevance to the thesis as the proposed changes to the 
present Brussels II bis regime would lead to certain changes in the context of the 
procedure in parental responsibility and child abduction cases and hence possibly 
have an impact on the (best) interests of the children concerned.  
 
2. Alleged aims of the Proposal  
As far as the objectives for the suggested amendments are concerned pursuant 
to the Proposal, the issues of procedural complexity have formally been 
acknowledged and are considered in the context of the children’s best interests.  
In the Explanatory Memorandum it is stated that “[t]he objective of the recast is to 
further develop the European area of Justice and Fundamental Rights based on 
Mutual Trust by removing the remaining obstacles to the free movement of judicial 
decisions in line with the principle of mutual recognition and to better protect the 
                                                          
1 Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of  
decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international 
child abduction (recast), 30 June 2016, COM(2016) Final 411. 
2 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the application of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, COM (2014) 225 final.; EU PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE 
OPERATION OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2201/2003 and to the REPORT FROM THE 
COMMISSION ON THE APPLICATION OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2201/2003, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/140415_en.htm, last accessed 20 May 2017. 
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best interests of the child by simplifying the procedures and enhancing their 
efficiency.”3  
 
As mentioned in the thesis4 the ambitions of the Commission with respect to a 
particular area of law have during the last years depended on the identification of 
problems in the application of the existing legislation and the alleged significance 
of changes, and hence, issues of immediate concern prevail over any other 
matters. The Commission's Political Guidelines of 2014 identify the significance 
of improving judicial cooperation and mutual recognition of judgments,5 an issue 
also discussed in the thesis in particular in the context of the return order 
procedures.6  
 
The Proposal presents a new recital 13  
“The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the 
present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child 
and should be applied in accordance with them. Any reference to the best 
interests of the child should be interpreted in light of Article 24 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.” [emphasis added] 
 
Such reference demonstrates the emphasis the Commission again wishes to lay 
on a consideration of the best interests of the children by the courts, especially in 
the context of the protection of fundamental rights.  
 
3. Identification of issues of concern 
The Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal recognizes that some issues with 
respect to the provisions on parental responsibility require amendments of the 
respective provisions.  
 
                                                          
3 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, p. 2. 
4 Chapter 5 A. 
5 Political Guidelines, http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker---political-
guidelines.pdf, last accessed 01 May 2017, the Guidelines are also referred to in the Proposal.  
6 Chapter 4 and 5. 
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With regard to the return procedure, the failure to ensure the immediate return of 
the children concerned and the inefficiency of return proceedings is identified and 
the problems recognized are that (i) the six-week time limit to issue a return order 
has brought about uncertainty, (ii) the current Regulation sets no time limit for 
processing an application by the receiving Central Authority, (iii) in domestic law, 
there is a lack of limitation of the number of appeals that can be brought against 
a return order, and (iv) , in several Member States, a lack of specialisation of the 
courts dealing with return applications in several Member States.7 Those are the 
central issues of concern regarding the Regulation which are also identified and 
analysed in the thesis.8  
 
Furthermore the Proposal identifies the problems of the “overriding mechanism” 
which are referred to and assessed in Chapter 4.B I. and II. and mentions that 
the practical application has proven difficult. 
  
Furthermore, the Proposal refers to the delays in the procedure for declaring a 
decision given in another Member State enforceable, which may take up to 
several months, depending on the jurisdiction and the complexity of the case, and 
the problems of several, including parallel proceedings,9 issues which are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4.A and D of the thesis.  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal recognizes the need that children 
are heard and identifies as an issue of concern that the Member States have 
varying standards concerning the hearing of the child, leading to inequality and 
uncertainty and in consequence endangering the best interests of the children 
concerned,10 an issue analysed in detail in Chapter 4.B. I.-III., and in Chapter 5.B 
and Chapter 6. 
 
Furthermore, the Explanatory Memorandum recognizes as an issue that 
“decisions on parental responsibility are often enforced late or not at all”11 
                                                          
7 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, p. 3, 6. 
8 Chapter 5.B, 3.A.IV. [now 3.A.V. ?], 4.D.II, 5.C. [Would it not be worth mentioning which aspect 
was considered in which part as it does not seem to be in the same order of appearance?] 
9 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, p. 5, 8. 
10 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, p. 4. 
11 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, pp. 5, 6, 8. 
4 
 
pertaining to differences in national procedures, as discussed in detail in the 
thesis in Chapter 3.A.IV.-V., Chapter 4 A.-C., Chapter 5.C. and Chapter 6. An 
enhancement of cooperation between the Central Authorities is also envisaged 
as a cornerstone amendment in the analysis in those sections and in the 
conclusion of the thesis and an improvement to the rules on cooperation as 
suggested in the Proposal would potentially prove very valuable.  
 
With respect to the direct interrelation of the Regulation with the Convention on 
Child Abduction and Child Protection, under the topic “Consistency with existing 
policy provisions in the policy area” the Explanatory Memorandum does not refer 
to the many aspects of interrelation discussed in the thesis but refers to the priority 
in regulating the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of decisions. It 
simply states that “Both in intra-EU cases and cases in relation to third States, 
the law applicable to parental responsibility matters is determined by the 1996 
Hague Convention”12, hence with regard to applicable law, everything shall 
remain ‘as it is’. It refers to Rinau also envisaging a harmonization by enhancing 
the actual compatibility of the procedural rules applicable in the Member States, 
an aspect explicitly suggested in the thesis.13  
As stated therein, the Commission’s Proposal is based on a Final Evaluation 
Report and Analytical Annexes14, as well as two surveys.15   
 
It is suggested in the Proposal16 and can also be concluded from the findings in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis that the Regulation is considered to be functioning well 
in general but that there are legal issues owing to the fact that the text is unclear 
or incomplete, as the discussion of the main aspects in the above has shown.  
 
                                                          
12 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, p. 5. 
13 Chapter 6. 
14 Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 and the policy options for 
its amendment; see 
Final Evaluation Report at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/bxl_iia_final_report_evaluation.pdf, last accessed 02 May 
2017. 
15 Proposal, supra note 1, p. 9. 
16 Proposal, supra note 1, p. 9. 
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The Proposal further takes into consideration the results of the Public 
Consultation17, the consensus of which was that there is the need for a carefully 
targeted reform of the existing Regulation. 
 
It appears from the explanations provided that the Commission considered a 
broad spectrum of sources, opinions from experts, parents, Member States, data, 
evaluations of studies and surveys and furthermore an impact assessment was 
part of the preparation of the Proposal.  
 
4. Suggestions for amendments 
The Proposal also contains the main results of the impact assessment, some of 
which are discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of the thesis, to the extent 
presented before the submission.18 With respect to the central aspect of the 
thesis, the interrelation, in the context of to the child abduction procedures, 
clarifications of the current mechanism, options to possible “radical changes” of 
the return mechanism, including the return to only the Convention on Child 
Abduction and the exclusive forum in the Member State of origin are considered 
in Chapter 5 C.   
 
Regarding recognition and enforcement, options discussed in the Proposal 
consider the elimination of the exequatur and with respect to enhancing the 
procedure on hearing the child three options have been considered.19 Whilst they 
criticize the limited scope of the suggested amendments, Beaumont, Walker and 
Holliday refer to the benefits of the concentrated jurisdiction pertaining to 
efficiency and expertise, and to the limited possibility of appeals which may 
reduce the average time for the return of the child in the long run.20 
 
                                                          
17 Study, supra note 14, p. 127.  
18 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, pp. 9-11. 
19 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, supra note 1, pp. 9-11. 
20Beaumont, P., Walker, L., Holliday, J.; “Parental Responsibility and International Child 
Abduction in the Proposed Recast of Brussels IIa Regulation and the Effect of Brexit on Future 
Child Abduction Proceedings”, Working Paper No. 2016/6, p. 3; 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/CPIL_Working_Paper_No_2016_6_revised.pdf, last 
accessed 01 May 2017.  
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In the suggested rules,21 clarification is sought with respect to the time limit and 
the Commission proposes to apply a six-week time limit to the work of the Central 
Authorities as well as to the proceedings before the first instance court and the 
appellate court respectively. Overall this would thus amount to a maximum 18 
week period for all stages, which would indeed be valuable.  
 
In addition, the jurisdiction for child abduction cases would be limited to a number 
of courts, which, in terms of specialization of courts, is also a suggestion for 
enhancement discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 C of the thesis.   
 
It is proposed to limit the number of possibilities to appeal a decision on return to 
one and it would be left to the judge to decide whether a decision ordering return 
should be provisionally enforceable. 
 
It would be an obligation of the Member State where the child was habitually 
resident before the wrongful removal or retention to conduct a thorough 
examination of the best interests of the child before a final custody decision, 
including a hearing of the child, which is identified as a measure of improvement 
in the thesis.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 C of the thesis any measure to improve the direct 
cooperation between the courts should be welcomed to improve the proceedings 
and hence the suggestions of the Proposal relating thereto are considered an 
advancement. It would be possible for the court of the Member State of refuge to 
order urgent protective measures which would be recognised by operation of law 
in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before 
the wrongful removal or retention. These measures would be valid until the court 
in the state of habitual residence orders measures.22   
 
In the new Regulation, the exequatur procedure would be eliminated for all 
decisions covered by the Regulation's scope, but there are procedural measures 
                                                          
21 The most relevant rules of the proposed recast Regulation are reproduced in an attachment 
hereto, those are part of the Proposal, supra note 1. 
Six-week time limits are included in the suggested Art. 32 (4) with regard to enforcement and in 
Art. 63 (1)(g) with regard to returns. 
22 Proposal, supra note 1, suggested Art. 12(1). 
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to secure the defendant parent’s rights and remedies. In furtherance of this there 
would be defined situations in which enforceability and enforcement as such 
could be opposed. 
 
The Proposal does not suggest any changes to the individual Member States' rules and 
practices on how a child shall be heard and solely requires mutual recognition between the 
legal systems.  
 
Several measures would be introduced to address the at times inefficient enforcement whilst 
the application for enforcement has to be made to a court in the Member State of 
enforcement, the procedure, the means of enforcement would be in accordance with the 
law of the Member State of enforcement, all under the national law of the Member State of 
enforcement. 
 
According to the new suggested Article 36, if enforcement would allegedly not be in the 
child's best interests it could be stayed.  The proposal further provides that a decision could 
be declared provisionally enforceable even if the national law would not foresee such 
provisional enforceability.  
 
In terms of cooperation, the obligations with respect to the Central Authorities' and other 
authorities’ tasks could prove valuable.23 Beaumont, Walker and Holliday argue that  
those proposed changes could make Central Authorities more efficient and argue that it 
would be easier for the Commission to bring proceedings against a Member State if the 
required measures are not implemented.24  
 
In summary, the proposed changes have potential to improve the rights of the children 
involved in parental responsibility cases and four of the six addressed issues of concern are 
related to the enforcement of decisions. There is not only a separate provision on the 
obligation for courts to give children the opportunity to be heard (Art. 20), which is not a 
fundamental improvement as such, as a provision exists in Brussels II bis but there are also 
suggestions to improve the efficacy of return proceedings in cases of child abduction by 
limiting jurisdiction for these procedures on a limited number of courts in a Member State 
                                                          
23 Proposal, supra note 1, suggested Articles 14, 25(1), 63.  
24 Supra note 20, p. 13. 
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(Art. 22) and the above described changes to the return procedures (Art. 25) and a limitation 
of the number of appeals to one (Art. 25(4)). In furtherance of this there is the repeatedly 
referred to six-week time frame. The proposed mechanism to request the refusal of 
recognition or enforcement (Arts. 40-42) is similar to the mechanism in Brussels I bis 
(Regulation 1215/2012) and an enhancement to the existing problems under Brussels II bis 
thus foreseeable in this respect. 
 
5. Impact of the Brexit 
After the final official submission of thesis the first change occurred when the Proposal was 
published and second a fundamental change occurred, when the decision on the Brexit was 
taken. The second occurrence, after the viva, was the official initiation of the Brexit, when 
on Wednesday March 29 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May triggered Article 50 saying: 
“This is a historic moment from which there can be no turning back. Britain is leaving the 
European Union.”25 
It is of significance that according to the recital 30 (adapted), which is the new recital 55 
“[t]he United Kingdom and Ireland are not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and 
are not bound by it or subject to its application.” but then again in a written ministerial 
statement on 27 October 2016, the Minister for Courts and Justice, stated: “the Government 
have today decided to opt in to the European Commission’s proposal which repeals and 
replaces regulation 2201/2003, also known as the Brussels IIa regulation, on cross-border 
family matters”.  Hence, formally, the UK decided to opt in under Article 3 of Protocol 21 of 
the EU Treaty. The Minister further stated that “[n]otwithstanding the result of the 
referendum on EU membership the Government consider it is in the UK’s interests to opt in 
to this proposal […] even after a UK exit from the European Union, the Regulation may affect 
UK citizens” and eventually added that “[d]uring the negotiations the Government will aim to 
make sure that what is agreed respects national competence, limits any impacts on 
domestic law and procedures and minimises any additional burdens on the courts and the 
authorities that will use the new regulation”26 it is unclear how the negotiations will develop.27 
                                                          
25 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-idUSKBN16Z22G, last accessed 02 May 2017. 
26 HCWS225 27 October 2016, available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-10 
27/debates/16102729000011/BrusselsLlaRegulationOnFamilyLaw, last accessed 01 May 2017 
27 Subsequent to the publication of the Proposal, the decision of the UK to leave the European Union has an 
additional impact on the further developments in the area of private international law concerning parental 
responsibility and child abduction which is unforeseeable; this aspect will be addressed further below.   
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According to Beaumont, Walker and Holliday, the possibility provided for by the UK 
Government in its White Paper on Brexit should not lead to any transitional arrangements 
for future cooperation on civil justice matters in the area of conflict of law provisions 
regarding children.28 
The authors argue that there no such necessity owing to the fact that “the legal regime 
provided by the three Hague Conventions will apply to our relations with the EU Member 
States immediately that the EU Regulations cease to apply.” and argue that the fall-back to 
the Convention on Child Abduction will be a good solution.29  
Whatever the UK will decide, the current Regulation or its recast will continue to apply in all 
current Member States except Denmark and if the Proposal would lead to the Brussels II 
recast the improvements detailed further above would apply, including those to the 
overriding mechanism which is considered vital in the context of ensuring that best interests 
of the children concerned.  
 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Supra note 20. 
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